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FOREWORD
The morning of my arrival at the Public Service Commission, my
colleagues presented me with a book entitled The Biography of an
Institution. Written by Professor J. E. Hodgetts et al., it was all about
the first sixty years of this organization. The commission is not well
known outside of the public service so I was pleased to read such a
comprehensive piece of work about the organization for which I had
just begun to work as president. It would appear that change and
challenge have always been a way of life for the commission, even from
its very inception.
One hundred years ago, in 1908, the Civil Service Commission,
as it was then called, was born. It is my good fortune to be here for
this special birthday. The book you are about to read is a special
contribution to the celebration of this event. It is the result of the study
by two scholars, Professor Ken Rasmussen of the University of Regina
and Professor Luc Juillet of the University of Ottawa.
I want to thank both these authors for their work and their
willingness to take on the challenge of exploring the one hundred years
of a parliamentary institution—a formidable task by any reckoning.
This project demonstrates the effectiveness of partnership. I refer
here to the close working relationships that have always existed among
academics, the Institute of Public Administration of Canada and the
Public Service Commission.
While reading this book, I could not help but think of the
thousands of Canadian men and women who have contributed to the
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direction of the Public Service Commission during the past century.
From clerks to commissioners, they strived to help form and defend
the evolution of the core values—merit and non-partisanship—that have
helped guide the Canadian public service to this very clay.
I hope you enjoy reading this book. I believe it contributes to a
better understanding not only of the Public Service Commission but





AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF CANADA
[Democratic government in modern industrial society must be able
to command ... the services of a well-trained bureaucracy of good
standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no
less strong esprit de corps. Such a bureaucracy is the main answer to the
argument about government by amateurs— It must also be strong
enough to guide and, if need be, instruct the politicians who head
the ministries. In order to be able to do this it must be in a position
to evolve principles of its own and be sufficiently independent to
assert them. It must be a power in its own right.1
Joseph Schumpeter, 1942
The creation of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in September
1908 represents a milestone in the history of the public service and the
development of democratic government in Canada.2 The establishment
of a commission independent from the government with exclusive
statutory authority for appointing individuals to the public service,
apart from the most senior executives, marked the birth of a non-
partisan bureaucracy. By putting in place a system that would appoint
and promote public servants on the basis of an independent assessment
of their merit, the Government of Canada ended widespread political
patronage and made possible the development of a professional public
1
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service that would be better able to ensure the effective delivery of public
services and advise the government of the day on policy decisions.
In addition to increasing the competence of the public service,
the application of the merit principle gave public servants a measure
of independence from their political masters. While it was recognized
that public servants could never be completely insulated from political
pressures, the independent system of appointment and promotion
allowed them to remain politically impartial and offer candid advice
to ministers guided solely by the public interest and without fear of
repercussions on their career prospects. The merit system also gave
public servants enough independence and security to resist unscrupulous
politicians who might try to pressure them into circumventing laws
or disregarding standards of conduct in order to further partisan aims.
In sum, in September 1908, the Canadian Parliament took a crucial
step toward building a professional public service that could be used
by the government as an effective instrument in the pursuit of the
public interest, and it also planted the seed of a new national institution
destined to become a power in its own right in the governance of
Canada.
On the surface, the creation of a staffing agency and the
adoption of rules for appointing civil servants hardly seem like crucial
matters of state. But a decision to build a professional and impartial
bureaucracy is of fundamental importance in the development of a
modern democracy. As Professor Ezra Suleiman reminds us, democratic
governments require legitimacy, which, in no small measure, is derived
from their effectiveness in delivering important public goods and from
citizens' ability to trust that they will be treated with fairness and
impartiality by the state bureaucracy.3 Despite some of the potential
dangers associated with professional bureaucracies, notably the lack of
responsiveness to duly elected governments that can come from too
much independence and from the asymmetry of information and
expertise that necessarily exists between elected officials and bureaucrats,
it remains a fact that the creation of an effective and impartial public
service is an indispensable component of democratic government.
In the Anglo-American democracies, including Canada, the
development of the professional public service was inextricably linked
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to the adoption of a staffing system founded on the principle that
appointments and promotions should be made only on the basis of an
independent assessment of merit as determined through examinations.
This merit principle finds its main source in a landmark report written
for the British government in 1854: the Northcote-Trevelyan report.
Authored by reformers Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan,
the report called for a new civil service to help meet the challenges faced
by their country:
It may safely be asserted that, as matters now stand, the Government
of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient
body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate
to that of the ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown
and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character,
ability and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent,
influence those who are from time to time set over them.4
The progressive establishment of a merit-based staffing system was the
mechanism through which this "independence, character, ability and
experience" would be assured.
The Northcote-Trevelyan report was pivotal in the development
of the civil services of all the Anglo-American democracies, which were
influenced by the report as they reformed their bureaucracies in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Britain set up its first civil service
agency in 1855 and progressively developed its merit-based staffing
system over the subsequent decades. It was eventually emulated by the
others. The United States started to implement a merit-based system
with the adoption of the Pendleton Act in 1883.5 Australia and New
Zealand followed suit with the adoption of a merit-based system in
1902 and 1912, respectively.6 With the creation of the Civil Service
Commission in 1908, and the extension of its authority over the entire
public service in 1918, Canada was clearly part of this broader wave of
reforms. As we will see in our first chapter, the British experience played
an important role in the choices made by Canada. Despite significant
national variations, by the 1920s, all the Anglo-American democracies
had adopted merit systems for staffing their bureaucracies.
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However, despite its historical contribution to the development
of professional public services in these democracies, the merit
principle soon became the target of much criticism. In particular, the
commissions established to make the principle of merit an operational
reality progressively developed extensive and cumbersome sets of rules
that stifled the efficient management of personnel. As the bureaucracies
expanded, government became more complex, and societies began
to expect faster and more adapted responses to a diverse set of social
problems. The merit system came to be seen as excessively unwieldy
and burdensome, a poster child for bureaucratic inefficiency.7 Like
United States President Jimmy Carter, commenting on the arcane rules
of the American merit system in 1976, many people came to believe
that there was "no merit in the merit system."8 Moreover, in the post-
war period, politicians increasingly felt that they lacked control over
the policy-making process and they started demanding that their civil
service be more responsive to their direction. As a consequence, many
democracies witnessed renewed efforts to re-establish political control of
the bureaucracy, including through the politicization of appointments.9
In some cases, public servants themselves came to see the convention
of political neutrality of the public service as imposing unwarranted
shackles on their legitimate right to fully participate in the political life of
their communities. Furthermore, as advanced democracies embraced a
fuller conception of democratic equality, concerns about discrimination
and the underrepresentation of minorities in state bureaucracies posed
additional challenges to the actual operation of merit-based staffing
processes.
As a result of this confluence of criticisms, the operation of the merit
systems of Anglo-American democracies, if not the principle of merit
itself, has changed considerably over the years. In fact, many countries
have abolished their independent commissions and modified their
staffing systems in the hope of responding to the pressures for greater
managerial efficiency and political responsiveness. Canada has not been
immune from these pressures. While the Public Service Commission
(PSC) continues to play an important role as an independent staffing
agency, it has undergone considerable changes over its hundred years of
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history. Like the personnel management system of the Canadian public
service as a whole, it has had to adapt to its changing environment. But
how should we characterize the Public Service Commission's evolution
over the last century? How can we explain its resilience and longevity
despite the growing criticism of the merit system over the years? What
were the main trends and pressures that affected the commission and the
merit system over time? How did the commission itself seek to respond
to its changing environment? What do these changes tell us about the
evolution of Canadian public administration over this period? This
book seeks to address these questions.
MERIT AS A BALANCE OF VALUES AND THE VALUE OF
INSTITUTIONAL AMBIVALENCE
In order to better understand the unique role and origins of the Public
Service Commission, its evolution, and the challenges that it has faced,
this book provides a brief history of its first hundred years of operation.
In recounting this history, we make two broad claims. The first is that
the history of the commission can be understood as an evolving struggle
to achieve a balance among three competing, and at times contradictory,
sets of values at the heart of public service staffing in a liberal democracy:
political neutrality and independence; fairness and democratic equality;
and competence and managerial efficiency. The second is that the
commission's unique institutional position, both as a central personnel
agency with authority over staffing and an independent body reporting
directly to Parliament on the state of the merit system, has contributed
significantly to its longevity and to its ability to ensure a balance among
the key values underpinning the staffing system.
Because these values are complex, multi-faceted and ever-evolving,
periodic adjustments to the staffing system have been required. A look
at the history of the Public Service Commission reveals how a large part
of its efforts have been spent trying to make sense of the meaning of
these values, adjusting to endogenous and exogenous shocks or pressures
that have affected their relative weight or changed their meaning, and
searching for a set of rules—the infamous merit system—that could be
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used to live up to them. In other words, while it is undeniable that the
creation and evolution of the PSC has been inextricably linked to the
ideal of merit, the exact meaning and practical implications of this ideal
have often been ill defined and the object of much controversy. From
the outset, the merit system has been contested, and it has attempted to
strike an uneasy balance among the competing values that it was meant
to embody.
What degree of political rights for public servants should
non-partisanship tolerate? At what point does the independence
of the bureaucracy, meant in part to ensure professionalism and
efficiency, become an obstacle to the effective implementation of the
democratic will as legitimately articulated by the elected government?
Should fairness and equitable access mean preferential treatment for
underrepresented groups? To what extent is preferential treatment
compatible with ensuring that the "most qualified" person is hired?
At what point does a rigid and cumbersome system meant to ensure
the hiring of the best qualified person without political consideration
turn in fact into a drag on organizational efficiency and become a
straight}acket for managers, hindering the efficient delivery of public
services? Conversely, at what point does managerial flexibility in staffing
generate discretionary decisions that are incompatible with fairness
and endanger the competence of the public service? These types of
questions, concerning either the meaning of the three sets of values
previously listed or the appropriate balance among them, permeate the
history of the commission. And, of course, they have few clear and
consensual answers. As the history of the PSC shows, finding answers
to these questions is a never-ending struggle.
The task is all the more difficult because it involves shooting at a
moving target. Over the course of the last century, Canadian society has
changed considerably. For example, the growing emphasis on rights and
the rise of identity politics since the 1960s have given unprecedented
prominence to issues of employment equity and altered old conceptions
of fairness. These social changes are not unrelated to the PSC's renewed
venture into the areas of bilingualism and employment equity in the
1960s and 1970s. But responding to these social and political trends has
necessitated some adjustments to the commission's operations and to its
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operational conception of the merit principle. One only has to read the
speeches of John J. Carson, PSC president in the 1970s, to measure the
difficulties involved in rethinking the traditional meaning of merit in
the new social context. A similar story can be told about the changing
expectations of public servants with regard to their political rights in the
1980s and 1990s. However, probably the most significant trend to have
affected the PSC over the years has been the growing attention paid to
efficiency and managerial flexibility. Since the end of the Second World
War, demands for more managerial flexibility and greater efficiency in
public management have been unrelenting. Over this period, the PSC
has worked to meet these demands while continuing to protect the other
values that have been integral to its raison-d'etre since its inception.
In sum, over the years, more than a simple search for the "best
qualified," merit has been an uneasy proxy for different sets of values and
aspirations that are themselves not easy to either define or reconcile. As
noted scholar Patricia Ingraham puts it, "Merit is related to values, ideals,
and ethics, to the appropriate role of the civil service in a democracy
and thus to governance in a democratic society."10 For this reason, at
some level, debates about the merit system are not merely technical and
administrative in nature. They are also debates about which fundamental
values a public service should espouse in a democracy and about how
to design a system that can reasonably uphold competing values. In
our view, this complex reality involves a difficult balancing act, which
inevitably leads to evolving, and never fully satisfactory, compromises.
It explains in good part the difficulty experienced in trying to 'fix' the
merit system over the years. It explains why the PSC, while actively
embracing the need for reform at several points throughout its history,
has also often been the voice of caution that sought to temper the zeal of
reform advocates more single-mindedly focused on only one dimension
of the staffing system. It also helps us understand why, at some stages of
its history, the commission has heavily invested itself in activities such
as language training, which may have appeared somewhat removed
from a more narrow conception of merit-based recruitment, but which
were related to the promotion of important values for the Canadian
public service.
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The commission's longevity and continued influence can also be
explained by another of its features: its unique institutional ambivalence.
As we will see in Chapter 1, the creation of the Civil Service Commission
in 1908 involved an unusual institutional choice. On the one hand,
the commission is a central personnel agency, exercising exclusive
statutory authority for appointing individuals to the public service, but
it is independent from Cabinet and it does not take directions from a
minister. On the other hand, it is an agent of Parliament, expected to
account directly to Parliament for the use of its executive authority and
responsible for the oversight required to guarantee the integrity of the
merit system, but it is not represented in the House of Commons by
a minister and, historically, it has had only a tenuous relationship with
Parliament. In other words, it has a foot on each side of the executive-
legislative divide.
The creation of an organization with such characteristics took
some creativity and abnegation, especially in the context of the
early 20th century. In order to foster the development of a public
service characterized by professionalism and a reasonable degree of
independence, legislators needed to accept that the commission itself
would have an unusual degree of independence and break with the
traditional doctrine of ministerial responsibility. It would also mean
giving up any involvement in the distribution of patronage. As two of
Canada's pre-eminent political scientists noted, selecting who should
be appointed to the public service was so important that it required a
"self-denying gesture for all MPs, a sort of institutionalized conscience
to act on their behalf so that they could no longer be led into patronage
temptations."11 Equally important was the willingness of the Crown
to abandon its control over appointments and agree to transfer this
authority to an independent agency out of its reach.
This rather remarkable "gesture of self-denial" has had a long-lasting
impact on the PSC and its ability to protect the principle of merit.
At times, the PSC has exercised leadership within the administrative
arm of the executive; at other times, it has played up its privileged
relationship to Parliament, asserting its independence and its unique
role as a guardian of the merit system. Over the years, parliamentarians,
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ministers, and public servants have often found this combination of
roles to be uneasy, even problematic. Several reform proposals have
attempted to do away with this duality, often by transferring the PSC's
executive authority to a traditional central agency while transforming
it into a pure parliamentary oversight body. But by using the two facets
of its institutional personality, by making the most of its ambivalent
institutional position, the PSC has been better able to strive for a
balance among the competing demands placed on the staffing system.
It has been able to remain in closer contact with senior executives and
departmental managers as a direct participant in staffing and other
personnel management functions, but it has also been able to step back,
use its independence to resist political pressures on behalf of departments
and sometimes block reforms that might have undermined some of the
core values of the public service.
Certainly, living with this ambivalence has not always been easy.
Over the years, the PSC has been accused of being both too compliant
and insufficiently co-operative. But despite the criticism, this unique
position has often served it well. Moreover, with the independence of
the PSC inscribed in statute in the name of protecting the ideals of
independence and merit, the executive would have difficulty taking it
back. Even in an age when many observers worry about the lack of the
public service's responsiveness to its political masters, a politician asking
Parliament to do away with the commission's independence in the field
of staffing would run the risk of being accused of wanting to return
to the good old days of political patronage. From this perspective, its
institutional ambivalence has undoubtedly contributed to its longevity.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
In order to fully capture its evolution and the debates that have
shaped it, this book examines the entire history of the Public Service
Commission, from its inception at the turn of the 20th century to
the reforms of recent years. The focus of our analysis is not so much
the detailed organizational changes that have marked the evolution
of the PSC as the broad transformations that have affected its role
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over the years and the debates that have dealt with its raison-d'etre.
Consequently, our treatment of the history of the PSC gives prime of
place to its institutional position in Canada's constitutional order, to
its role in promoting some of the fundamental principles underlying
Canada's public administration and to its importance for democratic
government in Canada. At the same time, given the PSC's inextricable
link to the merit principle, we also examine how the understanding of
this principle has evolved over time and how the merit system has tried
to live up to a changing set of values and objectives over the last century.
While the key trends and events that have shaped the commission are
described, we endeavour to discuss their significance in the broader
context of the evolving nature of Canadian government and public
administration.
Chapter 1 retraces the debate concerning the need for an
independent Civil Service Commission as a key step in overcoming
patronage in the late 19th century and early 20th century. At its heart,
the creation of the commission served one primary goal: eliminating
patronage by establishing a system of competitive examination for
recruitment and promotion on the basis of merit. But, as this chapter
demonstrates, a wide range of arguments were raised at the time and,
from the outset, the purpose of the merit principle and the need for an
independent commission were contested. The need to rid the public
service of patronage was associated in large part with the requirement
for more professionalism and competency in the management of public
affairs. Less political control over staffing would result in a more effective
public service, it was argued. In this sense, while it would come to be
associated with many criticisms of the commission, efficiency was one
of the reasons that the commission was established in the first place.
But professionalism and efficiency were not the only objectives. The
democratic necessity for more equitable access to public employment,
regardless of one's relationship with the governing party, was also a
prevalent argument.
However, standing in the way of these goals was a powerful
constitutional argument in favour of retaining the Crown's prerogative
to make appointments to the public service. Despite the ills associated
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with it, patronage remained for many politicians and public servants
a legitimate use of the Crowns authority, and to place staffing in the
hands of an independent commission with a tenuous relationship to
Parliament would constitute a serious violation of the fundamental
principle of ministerial responsibility. In this period, despite the
growing influence of reformers and the precedents set by Britain and
the United States, the emerging convention of a non-partisan public
service, staffed by an independent commission, remained contested
among the governing elite.
Chapter 2 examines the challenges faced by the Civil Service
Commission from 1918 to the end of the Second World War. Soon
after it gained full authority to staff the entire public service in 1918,
the commission came to occupy a central place in the Canadian
personnel management regime. Whatever limited ambitions may have
existed at the time of its creation in 1908, it was quick to establish itself
as an important institution in the creation of the modern professional
public service, taking on responsibilities not only for recruitment but
also for classification, pay determination, organizational development,
training and development and appeals. Moreover, in this same period,
the commission began to struggle with the need to balance competing
values and demands with regard to staffing the public service. The
appealing idea that competitive examination would be the sole means
of determining merit soon had to be tempered by the need to take
into account other social and political considerations. Throughout this
period, the merit system was adapted in order to favour veterans who
were seeking public employment, prevent women from obtaining certain
positions and entering certain classes of employment and secure better
regional and linguistic representation. Furthermore, as it continued
to fend off criticism for usurping the power of the Crown and being
insufficiently accountable, the commission also had to contend with
the disagreement of staff associations and senior management about the
best way to put in place a classification system that would underpin the
country's merit-based career public service.
Chapter 3 examines the period from the end of the Second
World War to the major legislative reforms of 1967. Arguably,
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this could have been the commission's heyday at the centre of the
personnel management system in Ottawa. Having accumulated more
responsibilities in the preceding decades, it was now playing the central
operational role in staffing and personnel management and, until the
end of the 1950s, it even continued to acquire new functions related
to training, research and appeals. But, over this period, a growing
preoccupation with modern management also led to the emergence of
one particularly stinging criticism of the commission: that it constituted
a barrier to efficient public management. In particular, three high
profile commissions that examined the public service—the Gordon
Commission (1946), the Heeney Commission (1959) and the Glassco
Commission (1962)—released reports that challenged the authority
of the Civil Service Commission in personnel administration. For
these commissions, as the public service was becoming a much larger
and more complex organization, it needed to embrace more modern
approaches to management in order to remain efficient. Excessive
central controls over departmental managers and the awkward division
of responsibilities for management between the Treasury Board and
the Civil Service Commission at the centre were increasingly seen as
impediments to good administration. So while this period saw some
minor changes to personnel management in the public service, most
notably with the adoption of the Civil Service Act of 1961, its more
significant legacy was that it marked the beginning of what became a
strong and lasting criticism of the commission and the merit system in
the name of managerial flexibility and efficiency.
Chapter 4 looks at the period from 1967 to 1979, which witnessed
the most extensive reforms to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and
personnel management since the beginning of the century. The Public
Service Employment Act, adopted in 1967, transformed the CSC into a
new Public Service Commission (PSC), which lost its responsibilities
over matters of pay and classification to the new Treasury Board
Secretariat (TBS), formally designated as the 'employer' of public
servants. In response to the Glassco Commission's report, the PSC
began to extensively delegate its staffing authority to the deputy heads
of departments. Despite having to exercise this authority within the
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policy framework set by the PSC, departmental managers were to gain
an unprecedented degree of freedom in personnel management.
However, as this chapter clearly shows, this crucial period in
the history of the PSC did not simply result in a curtailment of its
responsibilities and authority in favour of the TBS and departmental
managers. In fact, the reforms implemented in the pursuit of greater
efficiency were sufficiently limited that, by 1979, the Lambert
Commission and the D'Avignon Committee were calling for additional
changes to ensure better personnel management. Over this period, the
PSC also developed new services and policies in response to the rising
importance of the concepts of equality and freedom in Canadian society.
Taking a leadership role in building a representative public service, it
developed programs to improve the bilingualism of public servants and
recruit more employees from underrepresented groups, such as women,
aboriginal peoples and members of visible minorities. Moreover, the
PSC had to respond to changing conceptions of political neutrality
and public servants' right to political participation, anticipating further
changes that would occur in the following decades. In sum, while
the growing importance of managerial flexibility and efficiency led to
significant changes over this period, the PSC continued to play a key
role in staffing and personnel management and it remained actively
committed to a broader set of values, including non-partisanship and
equity.
While the growing pressures to redefine the meaning of the
political neutrality of public servants were evident in the 1970s, the
issue took on greater importance in the following decades. Chapter 5
examines how the PSC struggled to defend the traditional values of
neutrality and non-partisanship in the face of changing political and
social expectations in the period from 1979 to 2006. As this chapter
shows, the debate took two forms. First, two important court decisions
forced the commission to rethink the traditional limitations placed on
the participation of civil servants in the political process, eventually
leading to new legal provisions that were inscribed in the new Public
Service Employment Act m 2003. Second, following the arrival in power
of the Progressive Conservative government in 1984, new concerns
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were raised about the bureaucracy's insufficient responsiveness to the
new government's direction. The creation of larger and more powerful
ministerial offices, staffed directly by the government outside the merit
system, was one of the means used to re-establish political control
over the bureaucracy. However, this novel development gave rise to
some concern about the integrity of the merit system, especially since
ministerial staff were able to g;ain priority rights of appointment to
the public service. This pathway into the public service was eventually
closed by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper in 2006.
This chapter clearly illustrates how the commission has had to adapt
to a changing social and political environment and how the meaning
of even fundamental values such as non-partisanship and political
neutrality has evolved over the years.
Chapter 6 looks at the reforms that took place in the period from
1984 to 1993, the years of the Progressive Conservative government
led by Brian Mulroney. With a rhetoric hostile to the bureaucracy and
an agenda of deficit elimination, the Mulroney government, arriving
in office, sent a clear signal to the public service thai: administrative
reforms would soon ensue. Given the government's sympathy for the
New Public Management movement and its belief in the superiority of
private sector management practices, it is not surprising that the staffing
system would again be criticized for its excessive rules and undue
constraints on managers. Efficiency, once again, became the order of
the day. In this context, the Public Service Commission turned out to
be a cautious but dedicated reformer. As this chapter demonstrates, the
PSC itself pursued an agenda of administrative and legislative reforms
meant to facilitate staffing for departments. Then, when the government
launched its own administrative reform process known as Public Service
2000, the PSC worked actively to make more structural improvements,
not only defending the government's legislative proposals but also
proposing some of the new flexibilities that were ultimately included
in the Public Service Reform Act of 1992. However, as this chapter also
shows, while the commission embraced the need for more managerial
flexibility and efficiency, it remained careful to seek a balance between
this objective and other traditional objectives of the merit system, such
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as non-partisanship and equity. Integral to this balance, the commission
believed, was its own independent authority over staffing. For this
reason, while the Mulroney years saw the commission embrace the
need for reform, they also saw the commission successfully defend itself
against another attempt to curtail its direct and independent authority
over staffing.
Finally, Chapter 7 examines the period from 1993 to the present.
Over this period, the human resources management framework of
the public service, including the PSC, underwent its most profound
transformation since the reforms of 1967. Throughout the 1990s, as
the Canadian public service continued its transformation, seeking to
become leaner, more strategic, more results oriented and more flexible,
the PSC itself began to re-examine its raison-d'etre. As the public service
was trying to move away from the traditional forms of bureaucratic
organization, the PSC increasingly felt the need to focus on its core
mandate: the guardianship of some of the foundational values of a
professional public service. It progressively modernized its approach
to delegation, placing more emphasis on accountability for results
and respect for key values, and it came close to withdrawing almost
completely from service delivery in order to better focus on staffing
oversight.
But, ultimately, it was the adoption of the Public Service
Modernization Act, which included a new Public Service Employment
Act, in 2003 that significantly transformed both the PSC and the merit
system. The law enacted a new definition of merit that was clearly meant
to deliver the kind of staffing flexibility that managers and reformers
had demanded over the years. Moreover, under the new framework,
the commission retained its authority over staffing and even saw its
independence reaffirmed, but it also divested itself of a large part of its
human resources services in favour of a clearer focus on the oversight of
departmental staffing. In effect, as it approached its centenary, the PSC
repositioned itself to better focus on fulfilling its essential mandate—
ensuring merit-based appointments—at a time when the meaning of
merit was being radically changed.
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Over the last century, the Public Service Commission has been
much more than a simple staffing agency recruiting competent
employees for careers in the public service. Its direct involvement in
the various facets of human resources management has waxed and
waned over time, but it has always remained a significant force in the
development and preservation of a professional public administration
in Canada. More importantly, the PSC has occupied a unique position
in our national institutions, using its dual status as an independent
agent of Parliament and a central personnel agency within the executive
branch to defend the ideal of an efficient, representative, non-partisan
and responsive public service that is able to serve the government of
the day with a required measure of independence. As the following
story will make clear, defending this ideal has not always been easy
and the PSC has certainly faced much criticism. Over the years, the
merit system—an often cumbersome set of rules meant to achieve an
uneasy mix of competing values—and the PSC itself have had to be
significantly transformed in response to the changing environment.
But, throughout this never-ending search for a proper balance among
efficiency, equity and non-partisanship, the Public Service Commission
has played an invaluable role in the development of a national public
service that continues to serve as an important cornerstone of democratic
government in Canada.
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It would have been much wiser to have framed the measure so as
to give the members of the Civil Service Commission absolutely
independent status similar to that enjoyed by the Auditor General.
Robert Borden, Debates, June 29, 1908
I would also point out that these commissioners are to be appointed
as though they were judges.
Sidney Fisher, Debates, June 29, 1908
There shall be a Commission, to be called the Civil Service
Commission consisting of two members appointed by the Governor-
in-Council. The rank, standing and salary of each commissioner shall
be those of a deputy head of a department; and each commissioner
shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable
by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of
Commons.
Civil Service Amendment Act, September 1, 1908
The Public Service Commission today is the legitimate heir to the
civil service reform movement of the 19th century, which dedicated its
efforts to creating an independent public service that would improve
the quality, fairness and morality of government by eliminating the
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Reformers at the time felt that the best way to bring about positive
reform was to create a public service staffed on the basis of merit as
determined through a process of competitive examination. Such a
reform would enhance efficiency by ensuring that only the competent
would be appointed, and it would enhance equity by making sure that
all Canadians had fair and reasonable access to public employment.
Moreover, by largely removing staffing from the purview of politicians,
the introduction of the merit principle would also enable public servants
to play a legitimate constitutional role in providing the Crown with
honest, fearless and confidential advice.
It is worth noting at the outset that those advocating reform were
not of a single mind and that they were often promoting different aspects
of the reform agenda. Some were more concerned about morality and
patronage. Others mostly wanted to bring about a more professional
and managerially efficient public service. Some cared primarily about
fairness in public employment and wanted to see a public service that
was open to all Canadians. Still others wanted to have the public service
play a more effective role as a neutral and non-partisan adviser to the
Crown and focused on the idea of creating a new independent public
service that would have professional autonomy to serve the nation
as a whole, rather than any particular group or political party. Yet
the concerns and arguments of all reformers culminated in the same
solution: an independent commission that would appoint individuals
to the public service after a process of examination.
When the reforms eventually occurred in 1908, they resulted in the
establishment of a Civil Service Commission (CSC) that had to engage
in a complex balancing act to keep its various objectives in play. The
CSC had to balance a desire for a more professional and managerially
effective public service, the need to ensure greater fairness in staffing
to account for geographical and linguistic differences and the wish to
protect the constitutional conventions of neutrality and anonymity,
which had been weakly observed by politicians in the past. While the
term "merit" would often be used as a shorthand for a new method to
staff the public service, the principle was never easily defined and it was
often an amalgam of conflicting values and objectives embodied in the
reforms.
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In fact, once the CSC was established, it would become clear just
how flexible, or multi-faceted, the definition of merit would need to
be to allow the new CSC to reconcile its competing objectives. And in
pursuing this balancing act, the CSC would also have to play, and use to
its own advantage, its ambiguous institutional role as both an executive
and a parliamentary agency in order to keep both parliamentarians
and Cabinet engaged with, but not in control of, staffing in the public
service. This chapter will examine the origins of this defining balancing
act by exploring the nature of the arguments used to create the original
commission and will take a look at how, in the early years directly after
1908, the CSC struggled with limited authority and jurisdiction.
THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
What stood in the way of the reform of the public service for the first
forty years of Canadian history was the self-interest of the political
parties, which did not want to relinquish their power to appoint
partisans to the public service. Adding legitimacy to this purely partisan
argument was the fact that an independent CSC would require Cabinet,
and the Prime Minister, to abandon prerogative powers that supported
patronage appointments. In Canada, since Confederation, it had been
generally understood and accepted that, once appointed, public servants
should not use their office for directly partisan purposes, but the
method of appointment had always raised concerns about their ability
or willingness to abide by this standard of behaviour. Given also that
pensions were not guaranteed but required the support of Cabinet upon
retirement, the neutrality of the public service was an open question. As
though to prove the point, there were numerous scandals in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries surrounding public servants who had provided
untendered contracts to firms connected with the party in power at the
time, purchased supplies at above-market values and acted to ensure
that those in the private sector contributing to election funds received
favourable treatment. While it had been an established principle, before
and after Confederation, that active political partisanship on the part of
a civil servant would constitute official misconduct leading to dismissal,
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instances of such partisanship were rarely acted upon by the party in
power.2
As with many other ideas in good standing in Canada in the
19th century, concepts of administrative reform were imported
from Britain. In particular, the ideas were taken from the renowned
Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1855, which was referred to endlessly in
Canadian debates about reform and was even appended in its entirety
to one 19th century inquiry. The central concepts of the Northcote-
Trevelyan inquiry were open competitive examination and selection
and promotion by merit. The language of the report doubtless seemed
like a manifesto for a rising middle class: it spoke of meritocracy
and technocracy, and it was flattering to the ethic of self-made
urban professionalism and hard work.3 Armed with a body of ideas
legitimated in the mother country, a growing group of reformers, both
inside and outside government, began to agitate for the establishment
of an independent CSC that would conduct examinations to serve as
the basis of appointment.
While political parties were obviously self-interested when it came
to the issue of patronage appointment, the practice did have some
legitimacy, making it more difficult to abandon. During much of this
period, the prevailing view was that appointment to the public service
was a legitimate part of the Crown prerogative. With the advent of
responsible government in 1848, Canada's political elite and much of
the administrative elite had comfortably accepted the idea that staffing
the public service through the practice of ministerial nomination was
simply part of a comprehensive theory of the sovereignty of the Crown.
In fact, the idea of an independent CSC was seen by many within
government as something that would be constitutionally illegitimate
and a violation of the tenets of responsible government. The practice
was described in an 1882 royal commission on the civil service in the
following manner:
In the spirit and practice of the English constitution, the Crown
is the fountain of all appointments, and among the duties and
responsibilities of its advisers stand the proper and responsible
selection of servants of the State. If it be, at times, expedient for
Constitutional Government to institute Commissions to investigate,
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it is repugnant to them to devolve on such bodies, the duties of
governing and administering, for which appointment and promotions
form an essential part.4
This simple statement captures in essence the problems confronted
by those who were advocating the creation of an independent CSC. The
existing constitutional model justified patronage in terms of the Crown
prerogative, making patronage more than just a synonym of corruption.
It was a constitutionally legitimate form of action for the executive to
engage in. This interpretation of Crown privilege was used to keep the
idea of an independent CSC illegitimate. An independent organization
would violate both the Crown prerogative as well as the conventions
surrounding ministerial responsibility, including the need for ministers
to be able to report to Parliament on the conduct of the affairs of their
departments, specifically in regard to the manner in which individuals
were appointed. This situation
was only possible if the government could freely place its own
appointments within the administrative system. In this view, the
Minister being responsible for the effectiveness of his department
would ensure that the most capable person would be placed in the
leading posts.5
Lending weight to the practice of ministerial nomination was
the manner in which the leaders of Canada's political parties acquired
the power of the colonial governors: they claimed "that Canada's
monarchical constitution validated their comprehensive exploitation of
the public service and manipulation of the electoral system."6 Before the
achievement of responsible government, the entire patronage of Upper
and Lower Canada was in the hands of the Governor General and his
appointed council, and in both colonies powerful networks of local
notables were built up by patronage distribution.7 After responsible
government, and then with the achievement of Confederation, Cabinet
and more particularly the Prime Minister, began to exercise such Crown
prerogatives:
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Macdonald took over the powers exercised by the governors since
1791 and appointed only his party's supporters to posts throughout
the public service. He even evolved a constitutional justification for
such a thoroughgoing deployment of patronage for party purposes.
'By constitutional practice,' he insisted, 'appointments are vested in
the Crown and the whole responsibility of appointments rests with
the ministry of the day.'8
It should be emphasized that this model regarded the use of the Crown
prerogative in this manner as an effective check on democracy, and as
a means of enhancing executive authority and bringing about political
stability.9 Of course, it is well known that this privilege was used mostly
to help build strong political parties.
At first, the concerns around efficiency that emerged from a
patronage bureaucracy were not great, because the early bureaucracy
had few responsibilities and little impact on the lives of most Canadians.
Indeed, the problems of a bureaucracy staffed exclusively on the basis of
patronage only began to present themselves in Britain in the mid-19th
century, when that country was experiencing rapid industrial growth.10
The general response to the problem of bureaucracy that emerged in
Britain was to subsume a non-partisan, merit-based public service under
the institutions of representative and responsible government. Such a
model would be based on a separation between the political party and
the public service, a separation of policy and administration and a belief
that public servants should loyally execute public policy regardless of
personal belief. In short, just as the monarchy moved above the political
party, the civil service was to find its new constitutional position below
the political party.11 Just as the Crown had no political positions, the
new civil service would have complete neutrality. This new model was
part of the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that required
an unpolitical civil service whose primary connection is with the
Crown, and which while subordinated to party government, is
unaffected by their changes: the two permanent elements, the Crown
and the civil service, which not by chance together left the political
arena, supply the framework for the free play of parliamentary
politics and governments.12
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In this interpretation, the public service was no longer a part of a unified
executive but served each successive government. To fully realize this
vision, a body that would select the new neutral public servants would
be essential. Once established, the CSC, according to its advocates,
would create a constitutional public service that would become a
technical instrument of representative and responsible institutions
serving the impartial interests of the Crown and advising and, in some
cases, instructing a succession of governments.
A PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE: EFFICIENT, REPRESENTATIVE
AND NEUTRAL
Arguments favouring an independent CSC began to develop shortly
after Confederation, when the first in a series of royal commissions
was called to investigate the public service.13 John Langton, Canada's
first auditor general, was asked to "inquire into and report upon the
organization of the several branches of the Public Service with a special
view to their adaptation to the wants of the new Constitution, and
to providing for their efficient and economical performance."14 The
Langton inquiry did not pay much heed to patronage; it was more
concerned with creating an effective administrative organization
regardless of the method of appointment. This lack of connection
between efficiency and patronage is probably explained by the fact that
the civil service at the time employed only 250 people in Ottawa and a
few thousand others spread out across the rest of Canada.
The absence of any discussion of patronage cannot, however, be seen
as an endorsement of patronage by the Langton royal commissioners.
Rather, they saw administration as an activity that should be considered
separate from politics, and for that reason they wanted to make public
administration more efficient by ensuring that the partisans who were
appointed were capable of handling the non-political nature of the
majority of their tasks. Their concern was therefore directed almost
exclusively at eliminating conditions relating to the personnel function
that were deterring "young men, who were conscious of energy and
ability, from adopting the public service as a profession."15 In trying
to create a strong administrative "cadre," the commissioners felt that
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steps would have to be taken to ensure that the best young men were
recruited, justly rewarded and assured of a fair system of promotion
based on merit.
For these early reformers, the emphasis was on the very basic desire
to improve the personnel function of the public service. Principally,
the commissioners believed strongly that "only young men should be
appointed to the service, that they should enter it in the lowest grade,
and that before being appointed they should undergo the ordeal of a
rigid examination, and also at every step they take upwards."16 They
also hoped to avoid corruption by paying decent salaries. They wanted
responsibility rewarded with salary and, of course, they advocated the
possibility of an assured pension. If efficiency was to be increased by
attracting talented young men and rewarding them fairly, the next
logical step was to disencumber "the service from men, who from
age and infirmity are no longer efficient for the performance of their
duties."17 The commissioners also advocated a rational system of
promotion based on a combination of ability and seniority. While they
avoided identifying patronage as the cause of any of the ills afflicting
the post-Confederation public service, it seems safe to conclude that
this practice was never far from their minds. The central point in many
of their recommendations was that the whole efficiency of the service
depended upon a rigid adherence to the rules of advancement and
promotion.
Immediately after Confederation, we see the beginnings of the
assault on patronage. Two different arguments were put forward, both
of which would become part of the legacy of the CSC once it was
established. First, patronage needed to be replaced because it was unfair
and contradicted a central liberal belief that a man should have the
opportunity to succeed or fail according to his own abilities. Second,
patronage was wrong because it was inefficient.18 In the context of these
early reforms, the public service was considered part of the broader
political community; it therefore needed to be organized according to
principles that reflected and represented the best of that community.
By attempting to make the public service more efficient, by definition
reformers were hoping to make it more independent, autonomous and
representative. Patronage, then, was both unfair and inefficient. This
notion, that the political must be separated from administration, would
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find its first forceful champion in the person of a Conservative member
of Parliament named George Casey.
GEORGE ELLIOT CASEY: AN INDEPENDENT PUBLIC SERVICE FOR
CANADA
In the 1870s, George Elliot Casey, a Conservative MP from southern
Ontario, was probably one of the first prominent figures in Canada to
champion the creation of a CSC based on the need for an administratively
efficient public service with autonomy from government. Casey's
involvement in the reform movement started almost two years prior to
the establishment of the parliamentary inquiry he was to head. Casey
had begun "an intelligent and persistent agitation to improve the service
along the lines adopted in Great Britain."19 As a result of his intense
activity, a select committee was appointed with him as its head.20 Casey,
along with a growing number of Canadians, regarded the public service
as a necessary and vital part of the governmental system that needed to
be established on a sound and rational basis of administrative practice.
As a strong advocate of the ideas contained in the Northcote-Trevelyan
report, Casey was convinced that "no matter how excellent might be the
Government of the day, or how wise its administrative acts, it might be
spoiled by the faults of the Civil Service."21 This view would remain at
the core of the arguments in favour of an independent public service.
Reformers were now beginning to take dead aim at patronage.
For Casey, and the reform movement in general, the public service was
imperilled because political nomination did not provide the necessary
checks on the quality of the civil servants appointed. Therefore, patronage
"was apt to lead to the establishment of what was sometimes called a
bureaucracy, or a sort of family compact among the civil servants."22
Recognizing the difficulty of persuading party politicians to give
up their patronage power on moral grounds alone, Casey's committee
proceeded to point out that politics and administration were two
separate fields of activity that naturally operated according to different
principles. This was perhaps the most convincing of the arguments
favouring an independent public service commission. The committee
made one of the earliest and most powerful arguments in favour of a
separate realm of public administration:
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As general principle appointments, promotions, and the whole
management of the Service should be separated as far as possible
from political considerations. The Service should be looked upon
merely as an organization for conducting the public business, and
not as a means of rewarding personal political friends. The attempt
should be made to render it a profession calculated to attract the best
ability available, and to afford a due reward for the possession and
exercise of first-class business and administrative capacity.23
At the time, patronage made the public service unattractive "to
the class of active and intelligent young men who should be obtained
for it," and it was not always "able to retain such of that class that do
enter."24 In order to remedy this situation, Casey's committee followed
the lead of the Langton inquiry of 1869 and recommended competitive
examinations guided by a board of examiners as the first step toward
improving the image and quality of the civil service. For the public
service to become a respectable middle-class employer, it would first
have to free itself from the clutches of self-interested politicians. One
deputy minister summed up this concern succinctly in his testimony
before the committee: "I should not like to put one of my sons into
the Civil Service if I could put him into a profession."25 When the civil
service had become a respectable middle-class profession, a major goal
of the reformers would have been met.
To achieve this separation, the Casey committee's chief
recommendations were to place the practice of making appointments
entirely in the hands of an independent commission, subject applicants
to an examination before appointment (although only a qualifying, not
a competitive, one), and have them serve a period of probation before
their final appointment. The committee also accepted a form of divided
service, recommending that it
would be advisable to grade the service in departments where the
nature of the work will permit, in such a manner as to separate the
mechanical from the higher duties, and to confine promotion in rank
to the class of officers engaged in the performance of the latter.26
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Promotion in the two grades "should proceed prima facie on the
grounds of seniority unless a junior be reported as better qualified for
the position, with full reasons for such report."27 The fact that all these
reforms had long been in force in Great Britain, and that they had
continued in force under successive governments, was, as far as the
committee was concerned, proof of their effectiveness in "purifying"
the administrative world.28
No new legislation was to emerge from any of this committee's
recommendations. This is not surprising, since it was merely a select
committee that had spent only one month preparing its report. Yet
whatever its shortcomings, the investigation had a positive impact in
that it helped spread the idea that an independent CSC was essential
to creating a separate sphere of professional public administration. This
idea would not disappear; rather it would grow in the years to come,
eventually forcing the political parties into relinquishing patronage, if
not in the name of democracy then at least for the good of democracy.
FIRST VICTORY IN 1882: A BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE
EXAMINERS
The reform movement gained its first substantial victory in 1882 on
the heels of the Mclnnis Royal Commission.29 Membership for this
commission was drawn mostly from the senior civil service, with the
exception of its chairman, Senator D. Mclnnis. The commissioners
"traveled over the Dominion, heard a host of witnesses, asked them
more than three thousand questions, received delegations from the
lower ranks of employees, investigated the British and American civil
services and produced a comprehensive study of superannuation."30
When it was over, Canada would have a new Civil Service Act and,
more importantly, an established pattern of administrative reform that
would, with a few interruptions, continue to accelerate until 1908.
The Mclnnis Commission began its report strongly endorsing
the reforms that had taken place a decade earlier in Britain. Although
they expressed certain doubts "as to whether the public opinion of the
Dominion is even now fully alive to the importance of a thoroughly
efficient Civil Service,"31 the commissioners felt there was "nevertheless
a feeling in the public mind that the interest of the public service
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had been subordinated to a greater or less extent to the purposes of
political parties."32 They were of the opinion that politicians, once they
realized "how much the prosperity and welfare of the country depends
on a pure and efficient Civil Service, will not hesitate to abandon a
patronage which is found to be injurious to the best interests of the
country."33 Their optimistic faith in the responsibility of politicians,
and the influence of an abstract "public interest," would remain largely
unrewarded, and the political parties would continue to make no
distinction between their partisan interests and the national interest
with regard to the civil service.
While rejecting the division of the service into the British two-tier
model, the Mclnnis Commission did strongly encourage the adoption
of the other two main components of the British system: open
competitive examinations and promotion by merit. The attractiveness
of these features was to be found in their ability to separate politics
from administration, creating a neutral bureaucratic apparatus. As the
commissioners suggested,
Men who had obtained their places by merit alone and as the
result of impartial examination could not possibly be open to any
imputation of political partisanship in office; nor would they be in
any degree influenced in the discharge of their duties by political
considerations."34
From this time forward, merit and impartial competitive examination
would become the tools reformers used to "purify" the administrative
apparatus, separating it from political control. In short, merit and
impartial competitive examination were enshrined as the first new values
of a responsible public service and would be the major responsibilities
of a CSC when it was established 1908.
The commissioners had great faith in merit and examination as a
means of creating an impartial civil service; they also argued that they be
used to determine promotions. In the commissioners' view, promotion
by examination was almost as important as entrance examinations,
because
the efficiency of the Service so largely depends on a good system of
promotion, that we have felt it necessary to emphasize the importance
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of avoiding such injustice as we have mentioned, and which can not
fail to be injurious to the best interests of the Service. Men whose just
claims are thus passed over become discouraged, they lose their self-
respect and hope for the future. Such injustice destroys all incentive
to emulation and all desire to excel. Nor does the mischief end there.
It affects the whole Service. It is destructive for discipline, and it
impairs the usefulness of those who witness as well as of those who
suffer it.35
According to this view, all subjective assessments of a candidate s
worth had to be eliminated from the personnel function. Open
competitive exams, promotion by merit, and the resulting conventions
of neutrality and non-partisanship would combine to remedy the
problems plaguing the public service by replacing the subjectivity of
patronage with the fairness and democratic egalitarianism of merit.
These reforms would also aid in the creation of a more dignified civil
service by moving the civil service toward professional status. As the
commissioners argued
The public service would, under such a system, be open to the public
instead of being, to a large extent, a closed corporation In the hands
of political parties. An opportunity would be given to all intelligent
and educated young men to obtain by their merits alone, a start in
a service in which promotion, by a continuance of intelligent self-
improvement and well directed official labour, would be certain.36
Again, the key element in bringing all these important innovations
to fruition was to be found in the establishment of a. CSC that was
as free from political influence as the "judiciary happily is." Although
the first Civil Service Act (1868) had created a Board of Civil Service
Examiners, it was easily ignored by ministers, and when it was in
fact used it provided an examination so rudimentary that only the
completely illiterate failed. The board contemplated by the Mclnnis
Commission, which was eventually established, was to be a precursor
to the CSC. It was to provide the public service with a system of
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competitive examination conducted all across the Dominion that
would rigorously test every candidate's character for both intellectual
and moral qualities. The establishment of this new Board of Civil
Service Examiners would clearly be the first victory and the first real
institutional innovation toward the development of a truly independent
Civil Service Commission.
Many of the Mclnnis Commission's recommendations were
accepted and appeared in a new Civil Service Act (1882), Canada's
second to date. The act created the Board of Examiners, which was
independent of party control; it limited the age of new employees
to those between eighteen and thirty-five; it began the slow process
of formally recognizing the deputy head as the administrative head
of the department and it authorized appointment to the civil service
only after an examination. Unfortunately, this act applied only to
the Inside Service, that is, the Ottawa-based public service, and was
regarded by politicians, in the words of John A. Macdonald, as merely
a means "to provide that men should write in a good hand, should
know the principles of arithmetic and possess a good common school
education."37 It was clearly not intended to eliminate patronage, at least
from the Prime Minister's point of view.
While the act was largely ignored after its passage, it nevertheless
provided a solid basis for the development of the Civil Service
Commission. Primarily, it brought a subtle change to the relationship
between the public service and the other institutions of government. The
public service was slowly gaining increased independence from the older
institutions at the same time as it was gaining increased responsibilities.
The civil service was coming to be regarded by a growing number of
politicians and intellectuals as an administrative means to political ends.
In addition, it was beginning to be seen as an important tool in the
further development of a national interest, a view that ran up against
the prevailing belief in the rightful dominance of vested interests. In
the end, the most concrete result of the passing of the Civil Service Act
in 1882 was the creation of the Board of Civil Service Examiners, the
precursor of the CSC that would conduct qualifying examinations and
limited promotion examinations. Despite objections on many fronts,
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the assault on the strictly political model of civil service appointment
was gaining momentum.
SCANDAL AND CORRUPTION: THE PATH TO REFORM
One of the arguments for creating a CSC was the need to eliminate the
ever-present corruption created by patronage. As something that forced
politicians to act, the issue of scandal and corruption would prove to
be central; indeed, it resulted in another 19th century royal commission
ten years after the Mclnnis Commission.38 The new royal commission,
chaired by George Hague, general manager of the Merchants Bank of
Canada, was appointed, all too typically, because "certain officials had
been guilty of serious breeches of trust; some had altered accounts,
others had accepted bribes; the Government had been defrauded in
goods it had bought due to corrupt civil servants."39 When the burden
of scandal proved to be too much for Prime Minister John Abbott to
withstand, he met opposition demands for action with the nomination
of the Hague Commission.
The Hague'Commission's origin in scandal explains the strong
emphasis that it placed on developing a sense of the national interest
at stake in the debate about how the civil service should be organized
and how it should operate. This would be an enduring theme among
those advocating for a more powerful public service. In testimony to the
commission, Auditor General J. L. McDougal commented that
the continuance of the notion that the management of public
business is the management of what belongs to the Government of
the day and not to all the taxpayers of the country
is the biggest defect in the civil service.40 For McDougal, the first step in
creating a public service operating in the public interest was to increase
the amount of deputy control; in fact, he felt that the deputy should
have "absolute control of every man in the department."41
McDougal's point was emphasized by most of the deputies who
gave expert testimony. A few senior civil servants expressed their belief
that "if the deputy-heads were too independent of the political heads,
they would rule the country without being responsible to the House."42
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But in the end, most agreed with Alexander Burgess, deputy minister
of the Interior, that the
permanent head of a department should be in a position to exercise
the functions of his office fearlessly and independently, which he in
many instances might not be able to do if his tenure of office were
dependent upon the favour of the Government.43
A fearless and independent deputy was the first major step towards
the ultimate goal of a fearless and independent civil service capable of
working in the public interest.
Deputies were clearly interested in acquiring the authority they
needed to fulfill their obligations, and deputies were trying to establish
an equal but separate relationship with ministers. Deputies wanted
to be supreme in administrative matters, with politicians supreme in
political matters. In their testimonies, deputies went to great lengths
to describe what they thought would be the ideal relationship between
themselves and their ministers.
In countries such as Great Britain where responsible Government has
developed into its highest form, the position is this, that while the
head of the department directs the policy thereof, the deputy head,
subject to such policy, directs its administration.44
In Canada, however, the minister was deemed to have excessive control
over the details of administration. Such ministerial involvement had
the advantage of bringing the administration of public business to
Parliament, but for the royal commissioners, it tended "to bring the
administration of public affairs somewhat too closely into contact with
politics."45
This latter view was perhaps best expressed by William LeSueur, an
early public servant/reformer who contended that the duty of a deputy
minister
is to furnish his Minister with full and accurate information upon
all departmental questions which the Minister may be called upon
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to decide, and to advise the Minister in the public interest. His
function is not to suggest to the Minister ways and means of turning
this or that contingency to political account, nor to cover with his
recommendation things which are advisable solely in a political
In short, the deputy was to be completely neutral, like the public service
as a whole. A classic bureaucrat and a classic bureaucracy were to serve as
the norm. "A public servant should not be required to navigate political
shallows, or take political soundings: his business one would suppose,
should be to steer a simple course in the safe waters of public duty."47
The desire was for a public service commanded by a deputy minister
who would ensure that it promoted the interest of the nation in an
impartial and efficient manner.
Rather than submitting a long list of recommendations that
might guide the government in pursuing a more rationally organized
civil service, the Hague commissioners chose to submit a draft bill. Its
principle recommendations were the appointment of a Civil Service
Commission to replace the existing Board of Civil Service Examiners,
the adoption of the principle of appointment by open competition
rather than the existing qualifying examination and the clarification of
the role of the deputy as administrative head of the department.48
The commissioners admitted that public opinion in Canada might
"not as yet be ripe for open competition." Nonetheless, they firmly
believed that their recommendations would improve the quality of the
civil service. As they put it,
Doors to appointments and promotions in the service will open only
to capacity and honesty, and no man or woman who aspires, as all
have a right to aspire, to any such position, will have occasion to seek
or use any influence less honourable than his or her own merit and
fitness for office."49
The dignity of the civil service would be improved, and so would that
of the people in it, knowing that their success or failure was related to
their own character, ability and capacity. By championing more rational
SENSE
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methods of selecting and promoting civil servants, the commissioners
were also reflecting a changed relationship between individual effort
and subsequent success in the job market. Merit in this sense is a classic
liberal principle in that it makes people responsible for their own
success or failure.50 Access to positions in the civil service was on the
way to becoming a right available to all Canadians with the necessary
qualifications. Formal recognition of this right, even in a limited sense,
was another fifteen years away, but the ideas paving the way forward
were now, at the end of the 19th century, largely in place.
BORDEN, LAURIER AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF
CANADA: 1908
Beginning in the early 1900s, there was a growing sense of frustration
among many MPs and, increasingly, among the general public, including
many in the business community. Most would have sympathized
with John Willison, Wilfrid Laurier's first biographer, who observed
that "there is surely a crying need for reform of the Civil Service in
Canada and the protection of honest and efficient public officers from
the spoils element which corrupts and bedevils the administration of
public affairs."51 This was unquestionably the predominant attitude
among most reformers by the early 1900s. The public service was being
harassed by selfish, ignorant and short-sighted politicians. What was
called for was the complete reform of the personnel system, which would
strengthen the hand of the public service through an emphasis on utility
and meritocracy, thereby protecting the true guardians of the public
interest. Most reformers now sought a new Civil Service Act that would
"take every place from top to bottom out of the hands of the politicians
who, both at Ottawa and Toronto, have shown themselves so unworthy
of being trusted with the power."52 The goal was to free the bureaucracy
from the grasp of rapacious politicians, and that required strengthening
the public service. Such reform would have to take place even if it meant
weakening a fundamental pillar of responsible government: ministerial
responsibility to Parliament. Indeed, the creation of the Civil Service
Commission implied, and indeed required, that Cabinet relinquish
some executive control and that Parliament accept less than complete
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accountability. Such were the feelings surrounding the need for strong
action that, when the time came to debate the proposed legislation,
neither Cabinet nor Parliament balked at the idea of losing some of
their authority. Indeed, in the debates about the legislation for a new
Civil Service Act, Conservative Party leader Robert Borden noted that
"it would have been much wiser to have framed the measure so as
to give the members of the Civil Service Commission an absolutely
independent status similar to that enjoyed by the Auditor General."53
Yet it was clear that the commissioners would be granted a great deal
of autonomy and independence, which, while not always used by some
of the early commissioners, turned out to be an essential feature of the
Public Service Commission as we know it today.
There was a willingness to accept independence for the CSC,
because Canadians were becoming more comfortable with growth in
government activity. Supporters of this view included the Conservative
Party, which was an early proponent of increased government ownership.
There was recognition that development of an industrial infrastructure
demanded "expert knowledge and technical efficiency of the highest
order, with a force trained and organized to handle such intricate
questions."54 The acceptance of a growing state made efficient by the
widespread use of experts may be taken as a modern example of the
Canadian willingness to use the state to provide direction and assistance
to the limited industrial economy that existed at the time. Whatever the
reasons, there was a growing consensus that the public service needed
to be increasingly independent and that this independence was related
to the CSC's independence. The accumulation of public business was a
natural and progressive state of affairs; the reforms were simply intended
to handle public business more effectively. Thus, public service reform
was motivated not only by a sense of moral outrage but also by economic
interests, by the business community, which wanted the public service
to be better able to manage the economy in the interests of business.55
There was a general belief that Canadian governments, at all levels, were
incompetent and inefficient, that the public was by and large ignorant,
and that there was thus a need for a new force that could deal effectively
with the various problems facing the state.56
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Reform would eventually come at the end of a two-year
parliamentary session between 1906 and 1908 in which the Liberal
government of Wilfrid Laurier had come under constant attack from
a Conservative opposition hoping to expose the corruption in the
ongoing administration of the government at the time and its inability
to move forward. There were of course new demands for new social
and economic policies, but both parties were hesitant to act, partly due
to the inadequacy of the machinery of administration at the time. But
Borden had decided to put the full weight of his party into a new tactic
aimed at discrediting the Laurier government.57 The Conservatives
ran a "purity in politics" campaign and continued it throughout the
remaining session of Parliament until the general election at the end
of October 1908. Of this time, one contemporary observer noted that
"it was a stormy Session and filled with angry debate and prolonged
discussion and personal charges; it was a scandal Session teeming with
Opposition allegations of corruption and maladministration."58
This session summed up what had become clear to most
Canadians: the public service was corrupt and ineffective due to
patronage appointment. The Liberal Party, like the Conservatives
before them, had lots of supporters continually clamouring for jobs and
private firms expecting rewards for their donations. One of Laurier's
early biographers noted that the governing party would not only fill all
the postmaster, excise officer and other jobs but participate in activities
well beyond: "Supplies must be bought from firms on the patronage
list, subsidy hunters, contracts seekers found the way smoother if they
subscribed to campaign funds."59 Indeed the distribution of patronage,
broadly defined, had arguably become the most important function of
government. It was noted at the time,
Sir Wilfrid frequently repeated the story of Lincoln, asked during a
crisis in the Civil War whether it was a change in the army command
or complications with foreign powers that wrinkled his forehead, and
replying, "No it is that confounded postmastership at Brownsville,
Ohio." No other subject bulked so large in correspondence; no
other purpose brought so many visitors to Ottawa. It meant endless
bombardment of ministers, ceaseless efforts to secure a work from
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the friend of a friend of the premier, bitter disappointment for the
ninety and nine who were turned away.60
The move to end this system began in 1907 under relentless pressure
from the opposition because of the scandals. The Laurier government
eliminated all patronage lists for suppliers. An Order-in-Council was
passed requiring that timber licences be granted only at public auction
and a new Elections Act forbid companies from contributing campaign
funds and set heavy fines for ballot tampering.
The presence of an increasing number of reform constituencies,
demands for more public policy, growing industrialization, immigration,
urbanization and ongoing scandals had forced the government's hand
beyond its earlier limited reforms. A royal commission was established
to investigate the civil service and was headed by John Courtney, the
deputy minister of finance.61 The Courtney Commission was to be the
most thorough inquiry to date, lasting ten months, and hearing over
200 officials and publishing 1,900 pages of evidence and appendixes.
Strongly dissenting from the Laurier government's view that the civil
service was satisfactory, it instead recommended the complete repeal of
the existing Civil Service Act. It stated what nearly everybody knew: that
patronage was alive and well in the civil service and that the 1882 act
had done little or nothing to get rid of it.
The Courtney Commission noted the litany of abuses that
the previous inquiries had observed and made many of the same
recommendations. The most far-reaching were as follows:
The service should be entirely free from political favouritism or
patronage; that appointments should only be made by merit after
competitive examination; and that for that purpose, a permanent
Commission of three officials should be created to deal with the
question of the service; that this Commission should be entrusted
with all examinations in connection with the service; that they should
cause different examinations to be made in the different subjects
required by the several classes employed in the Civil Service.62
Like the previous inquiries, the Courtney Commission did not want to
develop a two-tier system in the civil service but rather felt that every
position should be open to talent. It emphasized that
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the principle should never be lost sight of that promotion and pay
should in every case depend on individual merit, and that, therefore,
every individual in the service should, as it were, be under continual
appraisement and be eligible for promotion to any position in any
division of the service.63
It wanted to make the civil service a career open to talent and
representative of the best in Canada.
When a young man of great efficiency, who gives indication of force
of character, appears it is surely to the advantage of the country
that it should get the full benefit of his capacity as soon as possible.
To secure this he should have swift promotion instead of having
obstacles thrown in his course by narrow official regulations and
limitations.64
Despite these arguments, the act that eventually did emerge divided
the Inside Service in Ottawa into two broad categories, reflecting
perhaps the executives' awareness of the political nature of the senior
civil service.
Despite recognizing the importance of the formal institutions
of government in the creation of administrative responsibility, the
Courtney Commission would focus most of its effort on reforming the
civil service and not the overhead institutions. The guiding assumption
in the other inquiries had been that Parliament was strong enough to
withstand a weakening of the convention of ministerial responsibility,
especially since this convention had led to the rampant abuse of the civil
service for strictly partisan purposes. Like all the other inquiries, the
Courtney Commission was most interested in creating an accountable
administration, not more parliamentary oversight. It believed that
strengthening the civil service and strengthening Cabinet control would
result in responsible administration.
The passage of civil service reform legislation took place in the
lead-up to a federal election that was held on October 28, 1908, which
the Liberal party won again, although with a reduced majority. Even
though the election was fought on the Liberal party's substantial record
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of scandal and Borden campaigned aggressively on clean government and
a commitment to greater public ownership, the Liberals still prevailed.
Once the election was concluded, not surprisingly the government went
on to other matters and lost interest in reform of the public service. But
the CSC was created and it did begin its work to improve the quality
and professionalism of the public service of Canada, albeit with limited
jurisdiction for the Inside Service located in Ottawa. Ttie CSC that was
created had a strong legislative basis with substantial autonomy, but
it would quickly begin to find out how difficult it was in practice to
ensure that patronage appointments did not occur even in the Ottawa
public service, let alone in the service outside Ottawa, over which it had
no jurisdiction. The CSC was at least potentially powerful, however, in
that its strong statutory basis and independence and autonomy would
help shield the CSC from its detractors and allow it to create a strong,
effective public service in the years to come.
THE EARLY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION: 1908-1918
From September 1, 1908, when it was created, until 1918, when
its jurisdiction was extended to cover the entire public service, the
CSC faced numerous challenges, including regular challenges to its
legitimacy and jurisdiction. During this initial period, it consisted of
two commissioners appointed by the Governor-in-Council at the rank
and salary of a deputy head and a small staff7 not numbering more than
eight. The Laurier government wanted to ensure that the CSC had
sufficient status and made sure that those appointed to lead it would
be equivalent to deputy heads. A further indication of the independent
status of the commissioners was that they were not appointed at
pleasure like deputy ministers, but rather were appointed during good
behaviour for a fixed term. While they were appointed by the Prime
Minister, they were removable only by the Governor General on the
joint recommendation of the Senate and the House of Commons.
The creation of the two-person commission was also the first
attempt to ensure that the CSC would embody the representative
principle in its decision-making process. When introducing the
legislation that established the CSC, the minister noted in the House of
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Commons, "In this country we have people belonging to two different
original races and that fact will be recognized in the appointment of the
commissioners."65 The act came into effect on September 1, 1908, the
commissioners were appointed on September 4 and they began their
work on September 16. One of the first two commissioners was Michel
La Rochelle, a former secretary to Wilfred Laurier who had run as a
Liberal candidate in Quebec and who, given that partisan connection,
was not an ideal candidate.66 The other commissioner was Adam Shortt,
a well-respected Queen's University professor who had been a strong
advocate of civil service reform in the run-up to the legislative changes
of 1908. When the two commissioners took office, they inaugurated a
stormy decade during which they defended merit appointment within
the CSC's limited jurisdiction of the Ottawa-based public service.
This two-person structure quickly proved to be problematic and was
eventually replaced by a three-commissioner system with one of the
commissioners designated as the chair and exercising most of the
executive authority. The new three-person system had to wait, however,
because when he became prime minister in 1911, Robert Borden chose
to leave the old structure in place until Shortt left the Civil Service
Commission to become head of the Historical Documents Branch of
the National Archives in 1918.
Organizationally, the CSC began its life in 1908 by taking over
the activities of the existing Board of Examiners, which had been
established in 1882 under the Civil Service Act. The Board of Examiners
had always been a testing agency whose mandate was to make sure that
public servants were minimally literate and capable of the duties that
they were to perform. The secretary to the Board of Examiners became
the secretary to the CSC, the rest of the board's small staff transferred
to the CSC, and they began to hold examinations in Ottawa for a
small fee. The new CSC continued the work of the Board of Examiners
holding certifying examinations for persons that departments wanted to
appoint in the public service based outside Ottawa. But in 1908, a new
practice was instituted: when a vacancy became available within the
Ottawa-based public service, departments would indicate that they had
a vacancy and the CSC would fill the vacancy from its list of successful
examination candidates. This practice differed greatly from that in
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the United States, which had developed what was known as the rule
of three, in which the Civil Service Commission would forward three
names of qualified candidates to a department and that department
would select one of the individuals. In Canada, the CSC was to be more
authoritative in the matter of appointments.
The examinations that the CSC organized were, in the first
instance, aimed at two classes of entrants. Those at the lower levels
needed only to have a good high-school understanding of mathematics,
spelling, history and so on, but those at the higher levels needed to meet
a much higher academic standard. The examinations were an attempt
to test both for the job at hand and the overall academic suitability of
the candidate for a career in the public service.67 In some of its special
examinations, the CSC tested only for the specific job, but at the higher
levels the CSC clearly attempted to identify those with an ability to
progress in their career as a public servant. This approach contained,
of course, a not-so-subtle class bias, somewhat like the British model,
but it also contained, as would become clear, regional and language
biases because of the underdeveloped nature of higher education in
most provinces. These various biases were repeatedly criticized by MPs.
While the CSC did respond with an attempt to make its examinations
representative of the educational system across the en tire country and
not just the elite universities, the exams continued very much to reflect
the Anglo-American tradition, making it difficult for those growing up
in the more classic French system in Quebec to compete.
While the CSC that was established in 1908 was an important
precedent, it was a limited victory and ministers and departments
quickly reverted back to making political appointments, even in the
Inside Service, believing that the CSC should function really as a
certification agency and not as a central recruitment agency. The CSC's
ability to establish itself was further hampered by the coming of the
First World War in 1914. During the war, most hiring occurred with
no restrictions. As before, across the entire public service, no certificates
of qualification were issued, no general examinations were held and
no time limits for temporary employment were imposed. The public
service was in as much disarray by the end of hostilities in 1918 as it
had been at any time in its past, and it was in need of another major
jolt of reform.
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CONCLUSION: THE CSC AND THE CAREER PUBLIC SERVICE IN
CANADA
The CSC that emerged in 1908 was eventually to become an influential
participant in the creation of the modern public service as a result of
both its structure, which guaranteed its independence, and its desire to
ensure that merit drove the recruitment process. Forever eliminated was
the view of the public servant as a handmaiden of a political party. The
new vision, accepted, endorsed and facilitated by the newly established
CSC, was that the public service should become a neutral instrument,
impartially serving the various interests of the state. The public service
would become the preserve of, if not the virtuous, at least the competent.
It would be a mistake, however, to see this triumph of the CSC as a
mere accident of fate. Rather, it was largely the product of the strenuous
efforts of modernizers, mainly senior public servants, university-based
reformers and reform-minded members of Parliament, who saw the
creation of a CSC as the precondition for turning public service into
a respectable profession and ensuring that public servants would serve
the nation as well as act as a valuable resource to a succession of partisan
government leaders. While there were few explicit claims that the public
service was now a constitutional entity, the fact that the public service
was staffed on the democratic principles of fairness and equality, that it
had acquired new behavioural requirements and obligations and that it
was a statutory body gave the CSC some authority to oppose Cabinet
when it came to protecting the public service's new constitutional
position. The CSC would therefore be at the heart of the creation of
a "constitutional bureaucracy" in Canada.68 While the CSC would for
decades expend efforts to bring about an efficient public service, in the
end it would be its role in maintaining the constitutional conventions
of public service neutrality and non-partisanship that would provide
it with its legitimacy and its longevity. Public servants were acquiring
a similar constitutional position as the Crown, and based on the
conventions of anonymity and ministerial responsibility, public servants
would increasingly be like the Crown—unable to do any wrong!
By securing its new position of neutrality, anonymity and increasing
autonomy within Canada's system of government, the CSC freed the
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public service from the burden of partisan politics. Yet, ironically, the
CSC's gift of autonomy to the public service would also give it a role
in the policy process. As Professor Kenneth Kernaghan has noted more
recently, "While efficient staffing of the service required the separation
of politics from administration, the need for effective development and
execution of public policy drew administrative officials into the political
maelstrom."69 Thanks to the CSC, the public service was becoming less
a trough at which the parties fed and more a source of policy advice and
initiatives, a phenomenon that would end up creating, curiously, one of
the main problems for public servants in the future: "A civil service free
of detailed political control, trained in a purely instrumental science of
administration, and insulated from the political life of the community
will not be non-political: but it will be politically irresponsible."70 In
attempting to make the public service more responsible by freeing it
from patronage, the CSC would give the public service the opportunity
to be irresponsible. As many of the critics of merit-based reform
noted, patronage may indeed have had its faults but it did have one
political virtue: it brought the public service in touch with the political
community. Ensuring that the public service remained responsive to
the wishes of Cabinet, but also to the needs of the political community
more broadly defined, would become one of many balancing acts that
that new CSC would be asked to perform.
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We have studied with some care the Constitution and the duties of
the Civil Service Commission in Britain. Both bodies exist for the
fulfillment of the same purpose—to make impossible the admission
of unfit persons to the Civil Service, as the result of private influence.
As will presently be seen, however, the duties of the Civil Service
Commissioners in Britain are much less extensive than those
embodied in the Civil Service Act of Canada. We have been strongly
impressed by the greater freedom of the British commissioners
to concentrate upon the principal purpose for which they were
appointed, the selection of staff, (emphasis added)
Royal Commission on Technical and Professional Services,
1930, p. 18
The context of the First World War and pressures associated with
Canada's Union Government made conditions ideal for the passage
of a new Civil Service Act. In 1918, a new act was enacted, and with
amendments in 1919, it virtually eliminated patronage from the
entire public service, not just the Ottawa-based or Inside Service.1 The
demands of reformers had been met and the rope of patronage that they
felt was strangling the public service was finally severed. From this time
forward, the ties that bound the public service to political parties were
cut and the convention of neutral competence enjoyed some standing
in law. This was an important first step in a process leading to a more
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interventionist state in Canada, which required a depoliticized public
service capable of some self-direction. Yet at the same moment it seemed
to be recognized that the public service could regulate itself only at the
expense of external political control. The need for a neutrally competent
public service and the need for political oversight of the public service
would come into conflict over the next several decades.
The Civil Service Act of 1918 officially ended patronage
appointment and as a result the Crown prerogative was reduced and
there was now a formal separation of personnel administration from
general management. While all these changes to the power structure
within the institutions of government were substantial, it was the
separation of personnel administration from general management that
would have the biggest impact. This separation not only marked the end
of an unambiguous executive authority over personnel management but
also substantially increased the power of the Civil Service Commission,
which guarded, protected and promoted its new authority. Hiving off
personnel authority was a necessary step in bringing about merit-based
recruitment and promotion. It, in turn, ensured that new public service
values related to integrity, honesty, probity and impartiality could now
flow from a process of merit appointment, allowing public servants to
be dedicated but impartial servants of ministers. Public servants were
now expected to be servants of the state.2
Creating a separate sphere for staffing authority in the CSC was
a crucial reform for all concerned if genuine merit appointment was
to be achieved. Anything less would have been susceptible, or would
have appeared to be susceptible, to political influence. An independent
commission was established because there was a consensus to do so;
it was demanded by all parties. This separation of the administrative
from the political became an important and durable feature of
Canada's public service and resulted in a substantial shift of power in
Ottawa. An independent commission resulted in a deliberate system
of administrative pluralism that became a significant source of equality
and greater freedom for Canadian citizens, and worked to ensure that
the effective operation of government was achieved without too much
authority accumulating in the hands of the executive branch. Separating
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the political from the bureaucratic also reinforced accountability,
hierarchy and political control, while creating a separate neutral sphere
in terms of the ethical conduct and behavioural norms expected from
public servants.3
From the day it was given its expanded mandate through the Civil
Service Act (1918) and took on its modern form, the CSC began to
wrestle with the complexities and tensions associated with developing
this separate sphere of personnel management. Much effort focused on
creating a merit system for recruitment and promotion. Until 1908,
the idea guiding reformers had always been that the most efficient and
effective public workforce was to be identified through competitive
examinations open to all Canadians. Those who achieved the highest
results would have the first claim on jobs in the public service. Yet, by
1918, it was clear that appointment to the public service would never
be based solely on examination results and that other assessments of a
candidate's worth and suitability for a public service career would be
part of the operational definition of merit.
This chapter will explore three themes that characterized the CSC's
struggle to create a merit system that would find broad support among
Canadians between the two world wars. During this very difficult
twenty-five-year period, the CSC tried to ensure that appointment was
based on fairness and equity in terms of access, that the public service
Was operationally efficient and that public servants were not subject to
politicization in terms of appointment or influence. To achieve these
goals, the merit system had to be fair; however, exceptions to a strict
version of merit would quickly come to be accepted by the CSC and the
broader community. First, the case of women and veterans illustrates
how difficult it was for the CSC to live up to the ideal of merit in the
face of social and political pressures. Second, merit and a career system
were seen to be linked in the minds of many early reformers, but after
1918 it became obvious that strict adherence to merit appointment
and promotion would limit the potential pool of candidates for senior
positions to those recruited at the lowest ranks. The elements of
what made up a career service would need to be redefined to include
efficiency criteria that could only be achieved by recruiting professionals
and 'superior' individuals into the senior ranks of the public service.
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This was particularly important as the size of government and the scope
of activities of the public service increased. Third, the responsibility and
authority of the CSC was frequently questioned by MPs concerned
about an organization with significant executive authority not subject
to the traditional doctrine of ministerial responsibility and thus beyond
parliamentary scrutiny. The dangers of the autonomy accorded to the
CSC, and consequently, the public service, would be put on the agenda
by MPs but would not be seriously heeded by the government, which
continued to use new autonomous bodies with increasing regularity.
Concerns of growing bureaucratic despotism were overcome through
a variety of formal and informal control mechanisms centred on the
Cabinet and particularly the Treasury B'oard.
THE FIRST REDEFINITION OF MERIT: WOMEN AND VETERANS
Despite looming challenges, by 1918 the CSC was in its modern
form and would have no major reforms made to its structure or its
authority until 1967. While the Civil Service Act passed in 1918 was
not particularly new or original, it was nevertheless important because
it extended the power of the CSC to the entire public service and gave
it a number of new responsibilities regarding the organization and
classification of the entire public service. The key activity of the CSC
was the administration of competitive exams from which the CSC
would compile an eligibility list that became the basis of appointment
to all positions. Appointments were to be probationary for six months,
during which time the deputy head could either accept or reject the
appointment or extend it for another six months. Under this mandate,
the CSC was receiving over 100,000 applications a year by 1921 and
was conducting as many as 21,000 examinations in every region of
Canada with the help of hundreds of examiners. The CSC had grown
from a handful of people in 1908 to a large unit of more than 135
employees by 1920.
This organizational growth and activity was due to the new range
of responsibilities assigned to the CSC under the 1918 Civil Service Act.
Specifically, the CSC now had full authority to hold examination for
transfers and promotions in the public service, investigate and report on
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the operation of the Civil Service Act and any violations, report on the
organization of departments, make recommendations for the efficient
administration of the service, make an annual report to Parliament,
and compile an annual civil service list. The most important of these
new responsibilities were organizing the Inside Service and the Outside
Service, classifying all positions, defining the duties of each position,
and determining suitable salaries. By 1920, the CSC was at the centre
of personnel management in Canada.
However, with this new authority came new challenges. In
particular, the CSC began to search for ways to establish a merit
system to balance competitive examination with other important
values. Interestingly, the Civil Service Act of 1918 did not explicitly
define merit or the merit principle. It offered a description of the merit
system that focused on recruiting those fit for the duties they would
perform and ensuring that public servants would be prohibited from
any involvement with political parties. With regard to the recruitment
of qualified candidates, the Civil Service Act noted that
the examinations held by the Commission to establish lists of persons
eligible for appointment may be written or oral or in the form of a
demonstration of skill or any combination of these and shall be of a
character fairly to test and determine the relative fitness and ability
of candidates actually to perform the duties of the class to which they
seek to be appointed.4
With regard to the prohibition against partisan activity, the act noted
that no public servant "shall engage in partisan work in connection
with any such election, or contribute, receive or in any way deal with
any money or any party funds."5 It should be noted that nowhere in the
act was neutrality defined in terms of anonymity, secrecy or providing
loyal service; it was defined, rather, in terms of party political activity, in
the sense that party affiliation should not influence the public service.6
While these principles were straightforward, there were many exceptions
to the rules and indeed the act listed a host of exemptions, including
exemptions for language, locality, gender and age.
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Two examples of the original balancing act performed by the
CSC stand out. Women were actively discriminated against while
veterans were given special privileges that ranked them ahead of more
meritorious non-veterans on eligibility lists. Women and veterans
represented two different claims on public service employment and
had two different trajectories, but both groups would underscore the
malleable meaning of merit and a willingness on the part of the CSC
to respond to external social and political pressures. The CSC openly
denied the obvious merit of women, acknowledging that its policies
were based on sexual prejudice, while giving added privilege to veterans,
many of whom had problems in securing public employment without
the veterans' preference.
The issue of hiring women into the public service concerned the
CSC from its inception in 1908 and it accepted that it would need
to discriminate against women and restrict their role and eligibility
for promotions so that it could make public service attractive to male
candidates. In fact, the 1908 amendments to the Civil Service Act
allowed the commission, on the recommendation of deputy heads, to
specify the sex of candidates if it was felt that jobs clearly required a
male candidate. The CSC noted that certain work involving carrying
large files and books up and down ladders was not suitable for women,
nor were those positions requiring travel alone from Ottawa, because
"for obvious reasons, male clerks are required in positions involving
such duties."7 In its very first report to Parliament, the CSC observed
that women were much more eager to work for government, in all of
its divisions, for the salaries that the government was willing to pay.
However, appointments, especially in the higher first and second
divisions, were in fact limited almost entirely to men. The CSC observed
in its report that "were these positions open to women, there would be
no difficulty in securing candidates well qualified on the grounds of
ability alone to fill the position."8
The CSC was quite honest about the problem and starkly noted,
"It is freely admitted that there are women who have quite as good
executive ability as men, and who might, on the mere grounds of
personal qualification, fill the higher positions of the service."9 Yet, the
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problem was that if these positions at the bottom of the hierarchy were
open to women, this training ground for the male clerks would be lost,
making the ideal of an internally recruited career public service harder
to sustain. Women were restricted both in the sorts of clerical work they
were permitted to do and in the sorts of promotions they were eligible
for, so that junior male clerks would have the opportunity to move up
the hierarchy.
While active, discrimination against women would continue
for decades in a variety of forms, women entered the civil service in
large numbers during the First: World War and, with the coming of
position classification in 1919, they would begin to move in with
even greater frequency. However, the movement of women into the
civil service was part of the much larger social trend leading to the
feminization of clerical work that ultimately revealed that the use of
legislation and formal hiring policies was not meant to expand women's
opportunities but rather severely restrict such opportunities.10 In fact,
the CSC did not see women as suitable for middle or senior positions
and expressed concern that "the preponderance of women in the lower
echelons of the service would eliminate these positions as a training
ground for male officials."11 The feminization of the lower ranks made
the myth of a career in public service even harder to maintain because
it created incentives for outside recruitment of men into the middle
and senior ranks of the public service. While women were hired due
to the labour shortages caused by the First World War, and then the
Second World War, they were only permitted to occupy the lowest
echelons of the hierarchy and after both wars women were expected
to vacate their positions in favour of returning veterans. By 1921, the
CSC implemented a rule that barred women from permanent positions
within the public service.12 Women also faced a notorious marriage bar,
meaning that when a woman married, she was expected to resign her
position. This particular regulation lasted past the Second World War.
While women felt the negative effects of this disregard for the merit
principle, veterans reaped the benefits of an expanding and malleable
definition of merit. Specifically, the government engaged in a policy
of conscription during the First World War that was unpopular in
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many regions of the country and was reluctantly implemented towards
the end of the war. Conscription inaugurated a period in which the
country began to develop the notion of reciprocal obligations between
the state and citizens. Prior to the war, the state "made few demands
and imposed few obligations; but, in compensation, it performed few
services and gave little assistance. There were no mothers' or children's
allowances, and no pensions for the blind or the aged."13 However,
during the war, the state asked, and eventually legislated, that its
citizens die for services. The more that was demanded of citizens, the
more citizens could legitimately expect from the state. Thus, notions
of veterans' benefits and widows' benefits created the beginnings of the
modern welfare state.14
Topping the list of immediate obligations to veterans was the issue
of pensions and employment in the public service. Prior to the First
World War, veterans of conflicts involving Canadian soldiers, specifically
the Northwest Rebellion of 1885 and the Boer War of 1899-1902,
received grants of land and more generous rates of pay and allowances
when they were employed by the Canadian government as a form of
compensation. However, during the First World War, a more formal
system of pensions was deemed necessary to attract soldiers, especially
given the hostility of Canadians towards conscription. Indeed, the
minister of militia and defence at the beginning of the First World
War, Sir Sam Hughes, decided that it was necessary to take care of the
veterans of previous conflicts to ensure that those who were now being
encouraged to sign up would be assured of compensation in the event
that they were maimed or killed.
Consequently, public service employment was seen not as the
privilege of individuals involved in partisan politics but rather as the right
of those who had served the state in battle and especially of those who
had been injured in battle. As early as 1916, the various governments in
Canada agreed to the following rule: "that all Dominion and Provincial
Government and Municipal positions as they fall vacant be filled by
partially disabled men if they are capable of doing the work required."15
This was the beginning of the modern notion of employment equity,
which altered the notion of merit as established through competitive
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examination and made characteristics such as gender, race, language and
disability hiring considerations. Until the eve of the Second World War,
the Amputations Association of the Great War felt that such actions
on the part of Canadian governments "give expression to the wish of
the people of Canada who felt at that time and still feel that the public
services of this country would be enriched and rightly so by men who
had rendered faithful service to the State in the time of war."16
Eventually, the Civil Service Act included preferences for three classes
of individuals. These were pensioned veterans who were incapacitated
because of the war and could not pursue their former employment,
veterans who had been on active service and finally, widows of fallen
soldiers. Disabled veterans were granted the first preference.17 Preferences
resulted in a higher placement on the eligibility lists from which public
servants were hired when there was an opening. Veterans still had to
write the general examinations for the class of employment they were
seeking, but if a veteran received a minimum pass mark, this placed
him above those who received better marks but were not veterans. Of
course, this meant that the best qualified candidates were not appointed.
Instead, only the best qualified veterans were hired, a practice that had
the potential to negatively affect other groups.18 Veterans were granted
an absolute preference, as opposed to the American system, in which
veterans were given bonus points on civil service examinations: 10 for
disabled veterans and 5 for all other veterans.19
This willingness to engage in a broadening of the definition of merit
reflected the needs of the nation., the demands of political constituencies
and the preferences of political elites at the time. Nevertheless, it became
clear that various exemptions to the principle of open competition
would begin to collide. For example, an amendment to the Civil Service
Act created the "locality preference" requiring that local positions,
defined as any position outside Ottawa, be filled by an individual who
had resided in that locality for at least one year. This provision took
precedence over the veterans' preferences, but the rationale for giving
priority to residency was not clear.20 A language requirement was added
in 1938 prohibiting the appointment of individuals unless they had
knowledge of the language of the majority of the members of the public
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that they dealt with. Since departments were delegated the responsibility
of specifying the nature of language requirements, in Quebec, for
example, this meant that francophone non-veterans were higher on
eligibility lists for most public service posts than Anglophone veterans.
There were also a variety of age restrictions related to examinations and
older applicants were discouraged, and in some cases, restricted from
applying. While thirty-five was the age limit, it was generally accepted
that the service was always looking for younger male employees. Merit
was originally determined by competitive examinations, but this
simple procedure quickly ran into problems and was subject to a large
list of exemptions, some contained in the Civil Service Act of 1918
itself, related to languages, temporary appointments, layoffs, locations
of employees, age restrictions and nationality. Women and veterans
represent two groups of potential employees that exposed the contested
nature of merit. Even with all its independence and freedom from the
institutions of government, the CSC remained mindful of the needs of
Cabinet and Parliament and the overall mood of the nation in crafting
its policies and procedures as well as its definition of merit.
THE CLASSIC DILEMMA OF EFFICIENCY: POSITION
CLASSIFICATION vs. PUBLIC SERVICE ELITISM
The CSC would never actually adopt a merit-based staffing philosophy
based solely on success in national examinations. Early in its history,
it also demonstrated due regard for other characteristics that would
contribute to building an effective and responsive public service.
Balancing the building blocks of merit was never easy. However, while
merit needed to be broadened to accommodate new characteristics, the
merit system, in the form of position classification, quickly became a
source of controversy. Here, we witness the first echoes of the now familiar
theme that rather than protecting public servants from inappropriate
pressure from politicians, the CSC was creating a structure that was
better at protecting mediocre public servants and limiting the ability
of the public service to recruit the best and the brightest. The CSC was
coming to be viewed not as an agent of increased efficiency but rather as
one that reduced the effectiveness of the public service as an instrument
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of democracy. The problem for critics was that the CSC's system of
position classification did not really allow for considerations such as
"fitness" or "character" when selecting public servants. Thus, the public
service that was being built was not that of the superior generalist;
rather, it was becoming the preserve of the narrow specialist recruited
to a particular job and not to public service as a career or vocation.
Replacing patronage with merit was designed to rid the civil service of
the plague of inefficiency for the last time, but the system that was used,
based on the principles of scientific management, raised a number of
serious concerns lacking easy resolution.
The problem that would never be satisfactorily resolved involved
the desire to build a merit-based job classification system as well as a
classic career civil service in which recruitment into the lower ranks
would eventually be the source of civil service leadership. The problems
with combining these two goals appeared quickly. In 1919-1920, the
commission hired the noted American management consulting firm of
Arthur Young and Company to investigate and classify every position in
the civil service.21 The result of their efforts was a 678-page volume with
more than 1,700 separate classifications.22 This system of classification
would exist for decades and its impact still lingers in the public service.
It also brought about a great deal of conflict with deputy ministers and
probably represented the greatest threat to the very existence of the
CSC during its early years.23
At the time, position classification was based on the theoretical
principles of scientific management, which fit nicely with hierarchical
ideals supported by the CSC as it worked to establish a viable merit
system. As position classification was closely allied with scientific
management, it contained much of its zeal and its faith in progress,
reason and the ability of rational comprehensive planning to solve all
personnel management problems in the public service. Within the
classification movement itself, there was an emphasis on work as an
"abstract phenomenon, analytically separated from the worker. To the
practitioner of civil service classification this meant that what was to
be classified was always the job, never the person."24 This was its great
promise but, to many critics, its great weakness as well.
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Position classification would provide a foundation that would
permit the equitable treatment of public employees through the
accurate definition, orderly arrangement, and fair examination of all
public service positions. Initially, this seemed like a blessing in that it
substituted patronage with the more rational criteria of utility, achieve-
ment and performance. It was expected to advance the "principle of
equal pay and fair pay for equal work."25 Employees across the country
would be hired and paid according to the work that they performed and
the system would become fair, equitable and transparent.
Unfortunately, the enthusiasm and extravagant expectations for
reform were not matched by the classification scheme that actually
emerged and that inflicted long-term damage on the former ideal of
what a merit-based career public service should in fact look like. It
became apparent that this system created a rigid hierarchy that became
the antithesis of the ideals of a merit-based public service committed
to competence, character and a lifelong vocation of public service.26
The classification scheme proved to be so damaging to the idea of an
efficient, motivated public service that a Special Committee of the
House of Commons was established to examine a private member's bill
that advocated removing certain positions from the purview of the CSC
entirely and placing them once again in the hands of ministers and
deputy ministers.
The issue was to what extent the CSC should impose this rigid
position classification system on the entire public service. This Special
Committee accepted the necessity of eliminating patronage from the
service, but conversely
when the application of this principle seriously affects the prompt
and efficient administration of public business the interest of the
State and not the interest of the Civil Service is paramount.27
The merit system could not be allowed to become an impediment to
the ideal of a merit-based public service designed to create an effective
instrument of government. Thus, the position classification system
could not trump all other values in building an effective public service
based on criteria such as locality or language, or even less tangible
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criteria such as fitness for a public service career and character. The
biggest fear was that the regulations and salary structure contained
in the classification scheme would discourage qualified professionals
and experts from a public service career. Most professionals would be
attracted to the private sector, where they did not have: to write exams,
where their salaries were higher, and where their status was greater. The
merit system had to build a structure that would attract and promote
individuals with the skills and character needed to ensure that they
spent their career in public service. Because of these arguments, a bill
amending the Civil Service Actwas passed, allowing both manual labour
and professional categories to be removed from the control of the CSC
and placed in the hands of deputies.28
Noteworthy is this amendment's underlying philosophy: keep
the upper reaches of the public service free from excessive control by
the CSC. If efficiency and effectiveness were the primary concerns,
so the argument went, an excessive concern for fairness, equality and
other aspects of the merit system should not interfere with the efficient
implementation of the public will. Clearly, this was a new skirmish
for the CSC in the more or less ongoing battle between the needs of
fairness and the needs of efficiency. The CSC ended up defending both
positions in an attempt to broaden its definition of me rit.
Deputy heads, despite their overall acceptance of the CSC, were
concerned about the new merit system because it threatened their
ability to manage their departments. They were especially concerned
about losing their power to appoint professional, technical and other
senior personnel. Even Adam Shortt, former chair of the CSC, in
his new role as head of the Historical Records Branch, complained
about the practice, in which experts and professionals would no
longer be selected by deputies but rather through a time-consuming
national search. Yet, the CSC would not budge from its defence of
this new system, always insisting that it was fair and just. The deputy
community, not unreasonably, felt that promotions should be regulated
departmentally rather than through the CSC, which was beginning to
conduct, according to the deputies, useless and ineffective promotion
examinations. Eventually, deputies argued for a complete repeal of the
classification system, which they felt was "a positive hindrance to effective
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administration."29 Ultimately, they hoped to return to a system "divided
into a number of classes on lines similar to those established by the Civil
Service Act of 1908 or 1918."30 The aim was to divide the service into
two or perhaps three classes, with one elite class that would be closed off
to promotion from the others, with a few exceptions. Besides creating
an administrative elite, deputies also desired the complete control of
transfers, leave of absences, cost-of-living bonuses and other personnel
authority that had been accumulated under the CSC. Additionally, and
characteristically, they completely opposed any form of tripartitism
in the negotiations of salaries within the public service.31 What was
constant in these complaints was the deputies' desire to ensure that their
own ability to manage was not diminished.
It may not be surprising that deputy ministers would be
comfortable with abandoning the idea of a unified career service
based on job classification. More unusual was the eventual acceptance
of this view by the CSC itself. Charles H. Bland had been with the
commission since its inception in 1908, initially as a senior clerk, and
he eventually became its highly regarded chairman in 1935. He had
been an unceasing champion of examinations, probationary periods
and a host of other reforms which he hoped would greatly improve the
operations of the public service. Yet, as he came to see it, the greatest
problem in the public service was the myth that it was a career system.
[If] the entire service ... is to be recruited only from the lowest grades
and the higher positions are to be continuously and completely filled
by promotion, I think you are going to have a weakening in your
structure, perhaps not for a few years, but in ten or fifteen years you
will have a decided weakening.32
A key for a truly merit-based public service was the ability to recruit
highly skilled individuals who would be better able to deal with the
complex policy issues facing governments.
Bland was not a critic of merit, but rather he questioned the
rigid merit system that was making it difficult to recruit experts and
professionals. Of course, promotion to the highest positions always
needed to be open to those in the system. However, Bland warned,
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"If we are going to keep up the standard of the service, particularly
for executive positions, we must not only promote from the lower
grades, but bring in a modicum each year of material for executive and
administrative positions."33 Eland's idea was that "promotion will be
carried on just as before, but Instead of everybody coming in at the
bottom some will come in a few steps further up."34 This idea of a merit-
based administrative elite was simply an acknowledgement of reality
and came to be endorsed by most Canadian intellectuals of the day.
The emerging consensus, as articulated by W. L. Grant, president
of the Civil Service Reform League of Canada, was that a rigid merit
system might be justifiable at the bottom of the civil service more than
at the top because the bottom was where the worst abuses of patronage
had occurred.35 The merit system was not necessary at the top of the
hierarchy because merit was assured by the technical and intellectually
demanding skills of the job. However, a merit system that would
guarantee neutrality and non-partisanship was essential to ensure that
the bottom of the hierarchy did not again become abused by political
parties and politicians.
Throughout this period, there was growing popularity for some
exclusions to the coverage of the CSC and a willingness to accept
fragmentation in the operation of the merit system. This in itself is an
important indicator of the changes that were taking place in the political
and administrative culture of Canada during the interwar period. There
were growing demands for positive action from government requiring
quick responses by dedicated experts working in the public interest.
One way of making sure this quick action was taken in the best interest
of the nation was to ensure that a disinterested, but highly regarded,
elite was at the helm of the public service. Some even argued that this
form of elite rule was both inevitable and highly desirable in a liberal
democracy; it was the only way a liberal democracy could be saved from
its own mediocrity. An efficient bureaucracy would therefore require the
sacrifice of some of the democratic procedures and safeguards that were
coming to surround appointment to the public service in Canada. In
place of these democratic procedures would stand a responsible public
service elite conscious of the national interest.
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However, despite some willingness on the part of Chairman Bland
to consider modifying merit recruitment at the senior levels, the CSC
would remain committed to ensuring that the merit system prevailed
throughout the civil service from top to bottom, excluding of course
deputy ministers. The consequences of this hard line would be felt in
subsequent years, with managers engaging in phony promotions, grade
escalations and temporary appointments to circumvent the established
rules. Thus, the CSC, rather than building a professional, career-
based public service instead entered the business of building a control
structure that would come to frustrate public service managers for
decades. Its emphasis was on control and reporting, not on professional
autonomy and decentralized authority. Rather than being a personnel
management agency supporting line managers, the CSC was coming to
act as a management agency imposing control that would create conflict
and disagreement and lead to an early example of the problems now
associated with the so-called web of rules. 36
Specifically, one of the problems attributed to this "web of rules"
was the increased growth of non-departmental forms of organization
staffed by professionals and experts from outside the purview of the
CSC. The establishment of such forms of organization was symptomatic
of the growing complexity of policy-making and the contentious
environment in which policy was made, but also the desire to be free
from the burden of control imposed by the CSC. It also reflected the
growing conflict that existed between public service managers and the
CSC over issues such as promotions, discipline and transfers when
authority resided with the CSC and responsibility for results often
resided with the public service manager. This problem relating to the
division of responsibility between managers and the commission had
been apparent from the time the CSC was created. Yet, an important
tenet of public management within a democratic society was the new
view that authority for personnel management and policy must remain
somewhat aloof from executive authority despite the problems this
might create for managers.
Despite the recognition of the need to keep personnel policy
separate from political authority, problems with elite recruitment
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ultimately resulted in the appointment of the Royal Commission on
Technical and Professional Services.37 For Canada to prosper in this
new era of positive government, it needed the active, energetic and
creative use of the discretion that was accumulating in the hands of the
increasingly professional and expert public service. According to the
royal commission, the only limitation on state activity was
the quality of the Civil Service, which is called upon 1:0 investigate
many subjects of national importance demanding consideration by
the Government, as well as to make governmental policies effective
and governmental decisions operative.38
That these individuals could exercise such authority responsibly was
not a concern in that they were part of the "fellowship of science" and
capable of self-regulation in the public interest. That is,
It must be remembered that the staff of the technical, scientific and
professional services have fitted themselves for specialized duties
by undergoing a specialized and preliminary training; and that in
many cases the nature of their duties is such that no one who is
not intimately acquainted with the field of knowledge in which their
work lies is competent to form a judgment.39
In fact, many believed that being aloof from pure executive authority
could help protect the public interest and enhance organizational
efficiency. Not surprisingly, this view found less support among
members of Parliament in Canada, who were beginning to express
their alarm at the new power and lack of meaningful accountability of
the CSC and the public service. MPs felt that they had lost power to
the CSC and throughout the interwar years they became increasingly
critical of it. Most parliamentarians recognized that the new Civil
Service Act of 1918 was going to cause a "very considerable change" in
the balance of power in Ottawa,,40 This powerful CSC was seen by some
members of the House of Commons as the cause of a giant rift in the
traditional doctrines of responsible government, particularly ministerial
responsibility. In their view, eliminating patronage through the creation
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of the CSC meant weakening ministerial responsibility to Parliament.
The significance of this change becomes apparent when we consider
that for the first fifty years of Canada's existence the convention of
ministerial responsibility and its corollary, ministerial nomination, had
been synonymous with a responsible public service and had enjoyed the
status of a constitutional convention in the minds of many. By their
very nature, constitutional conventions do not change easily, quickly or
quietly and the acceptance of public service independence has always
been a contested concept,41
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION: PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC
SERVICE INDEPENDENCE
While the CSC continued to struggle with the notion of merit and the
position classification system, it also had to justify its own constitutional
legitimacy. For many critics, the CSC represented, in its fullest form,
the constitutional danger associated with the growth of non-traditional
governing instruments. While initially directed at the CSC, the fear
was later aimed at the Canadian National Railway, the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation, the Canadian Wheat Board and other
public boards and commissions that started to flourish in the 1920s and
especially the 1930s. Ironically, some of these bodies emerged to dodge
the controls imposed by the CSC. The fear of these new instruments
was noted by one disgruntled MP, who warned that
there has been a tendency in recent years in this Dominion, as in
others countries, to urge that national affairs will be best administered
by those who are not responsible to the peopleis tendency
has increased considerably in recent years, and as a consequence we
have had a perfect avalanche of boards, bureaux, and commissions all
administering in some degree the affairs of the people, and many of
them in no way whatsoever answerable to the nation.42
He went on to note that the attack on democratic government
reached its "culmination in 1918, when our Parliament created the
most irresponsible body which has ever been known in the history of
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Canada."43 He was referring to the CSC, "which has power of almost life
and death, at any rate, power oi influence or starvation, over thousands
of our fellow citizens, and power to expend millions of public money,
[but] is not directly or indirectly answerable to parliament."44 Another
MP concluded that the CSC was unconstitutional because it was in
violation of section 53 of the British North American Act, because
these rules and regulations, arrears in pay, new positions, are no more
nor less than an appropriation of some portion of the public money
and all this emanates outside of the House of Commons, which is
prohibited by this section.45
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, these anxieties were echoed by other
MPs, who were grappling with this new institution and its exact place
in Canada's scheme of responsible government. In their view, while the
CSC might have some independence from Cabinet, it should not avoid
responsibility to Parliament altogether.
Such anxieties were always due to the belief that the convention
of ministerial responsibility had been damaged by the creation of the
CSC. This view was even held by the deputy minister of justice at the
time, E. L. Newcombe. He felt that under the old system of patronage,
there "is a responsibility attached to that appointment, which is entirely
lacking now because the Government is not responsible, the member
is not responsible so far as I can see; nobody is responsible under the
present conditions."46 These views were vigorously supported by many
MPs, both government and opposition, who saw the creation of the
CSC as an assault not only on their own power but also on the essentials
of responsible government (as many had come to define it at that time).
Some public servants even shared these constitutional fears about the
CSC.
Notable in this regard was Sir Joseph Pope, under secretary of
state and Sir John A. Macdonald's first biographer, who was perhaps
the last exponent in the civil service of the Macdonald-Laurier model
of a constitutional civil service.47 Pope expressed his criticism of the
CSC and its practices in a number of ways. For example, he was of the
opinion that individuals should be rewarded for the effort they made
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and not.because of the position they held in the bureaucracy. "His
natural abilities, usefulness, aptitudes, quality of suggestiveness, age,
experience, and other personal factors should be taken into account in
determining his remuneration."48 Thus, Pope rejected the new system
of position classification and the principle of secure tenure because they
were rigid and inhibited the full and loyal performance of tasks due
to the protection provided by the regulations. An even more decisive
Indication of his views is his defence of patronage as a proper component
of responsible government:
One reads nowadays the most appalling trash in the newspapers
about the 'evils of patronage,' as though patronage was necessarily
an evil to be shunned. I wonder if these sapient journalists ever
reflect for a moment who is best fitted to exercise the patronage of
Government—the Ministers, for the most part men trained in public
affairs, responsible to the Crown and to Parliament for their every
action, or an inexperienced, unrepresentative and irresponsible body
such as the Civil Service Commission.49
These opinions led Pope to continue to regard the CSC as
unconstitutional because it was a creature of Parliament and was not,
as in the case of the British civil service, an executive agency created
by an Order-in-Council. As a result, the convention of ministerial
responsibility was damaged because the ministers' responsibility for
appointments was taken over by Parliament. Pope acknowledged that
while the CSC was unconstitutional because it destroyed the convention
of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, it was nonetheless legal.30 As
future events would underscore, the CSC actually began to embody a
series of new conventions related to enforcement of behaviour around
neutrality, anonymity, non-partisanship and independence and would
become a force in the creation of the new constitutional personality of
the public service.
While there may have been some people during the interwar
years who, like Pope, still felt that "patronage is the democratic way
of appointing to the civil service,"51 most party elites were glad that
the CSC had rid them of the nuisance of the large-scale patronage
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system of the previous era, which had always produced many more
dissatisfied patronage seekers than satisfied ones. There were also
growing constituencies such as farmers, businesses and even provincial
governments who were coming to depend on the services of the federal
government and believed that having an efficiently run public service
was more important than patronage. Especially delighted was Mackenzie
King who, from the early 1920s onwards, pushed for an entirely new
understanding of the position of the CSC and other independent
bodies. King eagerly defended the use of such bodies on the grounds
that they were all approved by Parliament, and "when parliament has
enacted a law which prescribes certain conditions and lays down certain
obligations, members of parliament, like the public generally, are obliged
to respect the law as it stands."32 If the House of Commons passed the
legislation that empowered the CSC, it would have to respect its own
decision. Indeed, during the debates that raged in 1907-1908, many
parliamentarians were very eager to see this responsibility removed and
handed over to an independent agency. They had been early proponents
of independence and a new constitutional position for the public service
as a neutral adviser to the Crown.
Subsequent generations of parliamentarians were less supportive.
Eventually, however, most MPs came to accept the fact that party elites
were not about to do away with the CSC; nor was Cabinet in any hurry to
strengthen parliamentary oversight of the civil service. As a result, most
MPs accepted the separation of administration from politics as well as
the conventions that surrounded that separation, including neutrality,
anonymity and non-partisanship. What they were less willing to accept
was the notion that the public service should have autonomy from the
executive; they were demanding a more efficiently managed public
service with more direct executive leadership. In this way, the public
service would be politically responsible to Parliament. An effectively
managed public service with politically responsible ministers was the
best that parliamentarians could hope for given the transformations
occurring in the political and administrative institutions of the time.
These changes led to a reformulation of Canadian doctrines of
responsible government in which the conventions of bureaucratic
behaviour took on increasing importance. In particular, Professor Robert
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MacGregor Dawson noted with irony that responsible government was
no longer as responsible as it had been in the past.
Democracy. succeeds simply because democratic controls do not
exist: The people think they govern through their representatives in
Parliament, but in reality they are being ruled by a trained and skilled
bureaucracy accountable to no one.53
According to Dawson, there were only two options: "efficient
bureaucracy on the one hand, inefficient democracy on the other."54
However, Dawson was not one of those who worried about bureaucratic
despotism.55 He went on to note, "Responsible government can be
worked in such a way as to use the best and avoid the worst features
of both alternatives."56 Dawson did not dichotomize the two; rather
he thought that administration and politics could be combined to
compose an efficient whole. To do this, it was necessary to elevate the
bureaucracy to a status equal to but different from that of government.
There were simply those officers who were political and changed
and those who were non-political and permanent. When it came to
a decision between efficient bureaucracy and inefficient democracy,
Dawson chose the former. The danger was that the merit system might
come to be regarded as encouraging "inefficient democracy" at a time
when the power of organizations and their managers, and people's faith
in them, were gaining ground.
Similarly, while MPs criticized the CSC, its product, the professional
public service, was coming to be seen as something that Canada needed
to develop and prosper. This view was common on both the right and
the left of the debate in Canada and many began to consider the civil
service as superior to Parliament and even to Cabinet because of its
ability to govern exclusively in the interest of the nation. Those on
the right used the public service as a check on the excesses of popular
democracy, while those on the left saw it as an ally in their attempts to
move society toward more populist goals. Both groups saw the public
service as more than a technical instrument responding to the will of the
executive or even Parliament. In the end, most Canadians came to agree
with the League for Social Reconstruction, which suggested that with "a
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well-trained and disinterested bureaucracy drawn from the best minds
of the nation the state could safely be given power without threatening
civil liberties."57 In fact, this is testimony to the ability of the CSC to
create a public service that not only had the support and respect of the
nation, but also was seen as a body that could clearly function in the
broad national interest in a way in which partisan politicians appeared
incapable.
CONCLUSION: REPRESENTATIVENESS, EFFICIENCY ,\ND
NEUTRALITY
This chapter has examined the problems that the CSC experienced as it
tried to find ways to create a public service that was at once representative,
efficient and neutral. Between the two world wars, the CSC was
struggling to find ways to balance its competing principles of social
and procedural equity, managerial efficiency and independence from
the partisan influence of both Cabinet and the House of Commons.
It needed to remain sensitive to requirements in terms of geography,
language and gender, strive for efficiency and ensure that it respected the
principles of neutrality and non-partisanship. Furthermore, there was a
steady growth of government activity, and with it came the acceptance
that "it [was] necessary to bring more expert and dispassionate guidance
to the Canadian democracy."58 Tlie motivation for establishing the CSC
in the first place was a growing belief that the public service had to
actively serve broader national interests as opposed to narrow partisan
interests.
The public service was also witnessing a plurality of new institutions
and evolving attitudes. This would continue to put pressure on the CSC
to move beyond its narrow focus on merit recruitment and begin to take
on responsibilities for the efficiency of the public service more generally
in terms of building an organization capable of providing policy advice
and delivering services. According to many critics, its procedures, aimed
at enforcing a rigid adherence to merit, were coming into conflict with
the need to organize the public service in a way that would bring about
maximum efficiency in its core activities. The CSC was beginning
to feel the heat from nascent unions, frustrated deputies and senior
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administrators, as well as aggressive parliamentarians about the paper
burden created by the merit system that it was building.
The CSC clearly felt that it both could and should further the
managerial aims of the executive while at the same time balancing the
guardian aims of Parliament. This was indeed the hope of those who
created the CSC with duelling functions, but inevitably the CSC would
be pulled in one direction more than the other over its long history.
The initial motivation for both the 1908 amendments to the Civil
Service Act and the new act of 1918 was clearly to make the CSC the
guardian of the principles of neutrality, merit and anonymity and to
foster professionalism, competence and independence, all in the service
of ministers. However, the CSC quickly came to take on important
personnel management functions that linked it with the executive
branch of government, including pay determination, promotion,
organization development, personnel counselling and a host of related
activities. Over its history it moved, both by intention as well as by
circumstance, to become more of a central human resource agency than
a parliamentary or constitutional overseer. The central tension between
its duelling responsibilities was one of the reasons that the CSC survived,
but it was also why it accumulated so many critics. At the end of the
Second World War, some were still demanding a rethinking of its roles,
and pressure would begin to grow to have the CSC become an agency
with much less executive power, or none at all.
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In the interests of good administration, it may frequently be
desirable, and sometimes necessary, for the Commission to be
empowered either to decentralize certain functions to a greater extent
than hitherto, or to delegate its authority (emphasis added) in certain
matters and under certain conditions to deputy heads.
Arnold D. P. Heeriey, 1958, 11
As a result of developments beginning directly after the Second World
War, the Civil Service Commission eventually handed over a number of
its key responsibilities to a more powerful Treasury Board while at the
same time delegating more authority to operating departments. What
brought about this simultaneous centralization and decentralization was
a growing managerial orthodoxy based on the belief that the division of
authority over personnel management hindered effective management.
Departments had long been interested in acquiring more personnel
authority, yet since the creation of the CSC they had been net losers of
administrative authority to both the CSC and later the Treasury Board.
From a departmental perspective, the result was an overly centralized
system of negative control. After the Second World War, even those
with a rudimentary understanding of the logic of management would
conclude that it was essential that authority be commensurate with
responsibility for a management system to be effective. This would
mean at a minimum getting authority over personnel management into
the hands of managers.
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The CSC had seen a number of changes already, given that it
had begun its life as a simple testing agency in 1882, progressed to
a recruitment agency in 1908, and expanded to a full service staffing
agency for the entire public service in 1918. During the post-war era
the CSC would become, for all intents and purposes, a full-service
personnel management agency. Throughout each of these phases, the
CSC faced serious challenges to its authority, its responsibilities, and
its legitimacy. Yet the CSC would continue to be given new authority
and expand its program offerings and overall responsibilities during
this period despite concerns that it was not the appropriate body
to take on such functions because of its independent status. By the
end of the 1950s, the CSC would recruit, classify and train; it would
advise government on personnel policy; it would regulate and conduct
research; it would investigate outside conditions and the efficiency of
the public service, and it would exercise appeal functions regarding
examination and promotion.
Simultaneous with this growth in responsibilities was the emergence
of counter-pressure for the delegation of its newly acquired authority. In
particular, three powerful post-war reports would make it clear that in
the minds of many knowledgeable observers, the CSC had accumulated
too many executive functions for a body with formal independence
from government. This was to be the central critique aimed at the CSC
until some resolution was reached in 1967. While the CSC had been
designed to increase the efficiency of the public service by protecting
public servants from political interference and by providing stable
career structures, according to critics this system was becoming the main
impediment to improved service delivery. The CSC's independence
was becoming less central to the cause of reform and, if anything, its
independence was now an obstacle in the path of further reform. The
protections offered by the CSC were viewed as a hindrance to effective
management, and the growing consensus was that these powers needed
to be removed, decentralized and disaggregated if the goals of efficiency
were to be met. The defence of merit was becoming a lonely pursuit in
Canada in the face of some powerful forces of decentralization.
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THE GORDON COMMISSION (1946): A NEW DEBATE BEGINS
The debate on the future direction of the CSC began with the
establishment of the Gordon Commission1 immediately after the
Second World War. The inquiry, which would shed light on what
influential Ottawa insiders were thinking about the direction of reform,
was headed by Walter Gordon, a business consultant with very strong
ties to the Liberal party. Given this connection one might expect that the
inquiry would merely endorse the administrative preferences expressed
by Mackenzie King and other leading Liberals. With hindsight we
can see that Gordon had greater ambitions in that he was attempting,
unsuccessfully as it would turn out, to create a new and sounder footing
for the newly expanded post-war civil service. Gordon shared his task
with two like-minded individuals: Major-General Edouard de B. Panet,
a former senior officer with the Canadian Pacific Railway, and Sir
Horace Hamilton, a former senior official in the British civil service.
The Gordon Commission report began by noting some of the
defects of the public service caused by the Second World War. These
included a lack of men of sufficiently high calibre in the senior and
intermediary grades, a lack of clear-cut responsibility for the overall
management and direction of the public service, a deficiency in
the machinery to facilitate the changes that were essential in a large
organization like the public service, and considerable delays in making
appointments and promotions at all levels of the service.2 These were
not new complaints; they were part of a well-rehearsed litany about the
failures of personnel management in Canada.
The one alleged defect that would have clear implications for the
future of the CSC pertained to the blurring of responsibility for the
overall management and direction of the service, a concern linked to
the problems associated with the division of responsibilities between
the CSC and the Treasury Board. Gordon, like most Canadian
commentators who have reflected on the CSC, was not an advocate of
divided authority and was uncomfortable with the ambiguous position
of the CSC. The way to bring about a reduction in this division of
authority was to move away from the growing division of responsibility
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over personnel administration that the Civil Service Act of 1918 had
created. According to the Gordon Commission, "The Treasury Board
has the authority in relation to all matters of establishment and
organization but not the immediate responsibility; the Civil Service
Commission has the responsibility but not the authority."3 In order to
have responsibility commensurate with authority this situation would
have to change. In fact, this "division of duties is the outstanding
weakness in the central direction and control of the service and [had
to] be eliminated."4 According to the growing managerial orthodoxy,
administrative responsibility could not possibly be obtained in a
situation in which authority and responsibility were divided.
The most suitable mechanism for overcoming the division of
authority and responsibility would be to centralize both personnel
and financial functions within the Treasury Board. In this argument
the CSC could not be strengthened because it lacked ultimate financial
control.5 Even more, the Treasury Board was the natural place for
this control to reside as it was a responsible body with a minister who
reported to Parliament. Additionally, the requirements of an effective
system of management as articulated by the emerging managerial
theories demanded a centre of executive control. But exercising this new
executive authority would "call for a positive approach rather than the
negative one hitherto followed in the exercise of financial control."6 The
desire to develop a more positive or proactive approach to management
would become a new theme and would require that public servants
be given an environment in which they were encouraged to do good,
rather than one that merely discouraged them from doing bad.
The Gordon Commission was really an attempt to rein in the CSC
and have it function more or less exclusively as a recruiting/staffing
agency. The Gordon Commission wanted to remove the CSC's duties
with regard to the numbers and grades of personnel required and
place this power in the hands of a new division of the Treasury Board
under the leadership of a director general who would have the rank
of a senior deputy minister. This person would become the director
general of the civil service with responsibility to the government, and
thus to Parliament, through the Treasury Board. The new agency would
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help facilitate transfers, examine candidates from outside the service
for senior positions, act as chairman of the official side in the recently
established National Joint Council and recommend policies concerning
working conditions.7 The Gordon Commission also recommended that
a personnel officer in each department be responsible for personnel
matters and assist and advise the deputy minister. It was also felt that
deputy ministers should have control of promotions in the departments
and that ministers and deputy ministers should have responsibility over
all matters of discipline. Finally, it was recommended that the absolute
veterans' preference be reviewed and amended in favour of a point
system that was used effectively in both the United States and Britain.
While all these reforms appear sensible and indeed many would
come to pass in the future, the Gordon Commission also identified
something that would trouble a number of reformers over the years:
the increasing accumulation of executive functions, central to the
operations of government, within an independent agency like the
CSC. The Gordon Commission's understanding of this duality was as
follows:
In order to remove the possibility of political interference the
Commission has independent status and is responsible solely to
Parliament. But, while the powers of the Commission as to who
shall be appointed and who shall be promoted are decisive, its
responsibilities regarding scales of remuneration, the organization
of departments and branches and the number of positions to be
established are restricted to the formulation of recommendations
which are not effective until approved by the Governor in Council.
In practice this has meant the approval by the Treasury Board.8
The CSC's activities fell into two categories: those relating to
its primary responsibility for recruitment and staffing, over which it
had complete control, and those for which its role was only to make
recommendations to the Treasury Board. The Gordon Commission
wanted to transfer to the Treasury Board all the CSC functions that
the CSC had no authority over, such as departmental organization,
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scales for remuneration and so on. The Gordon Commission noted that
"with the transfer to the Treasury Board of the functions referred to, the
Civil Service Commission would be in a position to concentrate on the
primary and all-important task of recruitment, in which regard there is
need for considerable improvement."9
Therefore, right after the Second World War we were again
hearing what was to become a refrain: the CSC should be restricted
to a recruitment agency. The Gordon Commission also noted that
recruitment needed to take place at various levels in the public service.
Like previous critics, the Gordon Commission was dismissive of the
notion that "the messenger boy who enters the Canadian civil service
has a Deputy Ministers baton in his knapsack."10 While the CSC could
do more training and development, in the end it also needed to bring
in the best products of universities as well as "outsiders" and train
them for senior public service leadership. In a similar vein, the Gordon
Commission criticized the CSC for not recruiting an appropriate
number of French-speaking Canadians, "due in large measure to the
existing system of classification and recruitment."11
Many of these recommendations and criticisms had to do with the
structure created in 1908, which was deliberately designed to reduce
the control of Parliament and Cabinet over recruitment and staffing
decisions. Indeed it appears that what Gordon and other critics wanted
to do was to end the paradoxical position of the CSC as a legislative and
executive agency by having it become a recruitment agency with limited
authority. Yet there was some recognition at the time that whatever
success the CSC had achieved was due in no small measure to its
overlapping responsibilities. As was noted by Professor J. E. Hodgetts,
rather than being a hindrance, the division of responsibilities created a
system that appeared to work well for all parties concerned:
TKe Treasury Board, believing that the CSC's reputation for
independence was in open question, maintained the CSC for
routine labour and as legitimizing agent for its own power. The staff
associations, believing that the CSC's reputation for independence
was valid and that it was a bulwark against patronage, supported
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the CSC's as their spokesman. The deputy ministers, believing that
the CSC had some independence from the Board, but also believing
it to be ineffectual, wished to maintain it as a means of fending off
the Board, which they feared as being all too powerful. And finally,
the government itself was thoughtfully guarding the guardians, by
making certain that two control agencies should be in competition,
rather than having one in command.12
A complex web of group conflicts and interests had emerged since the
CSC had come into existence and was putting it at the centre of a
growing system of administrative pluralism to create a balance of power
within the executive branch. The CSC, by using its ambiguous position
within the system of responsible government, found a way to survive by
juggling its multiple responsibilities. During the late 1940s and most
of the 1950s, the CSC was able to work with the Treasury Board to
modernize personnel policy. Yet the CSC was aware of the criticism
being levelled against it and
sought to improve its image with its departmental clients by taking
a more positive approach to recruitment and other services, while
quietly experimenting with the devolution to selected departments
of certain of its functions, such as control over promotions.13
The CSC continued to develop new methods of recruitment,
but it struggled with the classification system, which had grown
synonymous with the merit system. While adjustments were made
to eliminate classification in the professional, scientific and technical
grades, the CSC had a hard time attracting new recruits in many classes
due to low levels of unemployment and its own cumbersome methods
of appointment. There had always been a debate between those who
held that public service recruitment should be based on the selection of
people who would develop into career public servants and those who
thought that they should be hired for a particular position. This desire to
recruit for general ability had been expressed in the earlier Beatty Royal
Commission in 1930 and was taken up in the Gordon Commission as
well. Similarly, there was a fear that in the post-war period the various
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preferences for veterans, locality and so on were making merit less
effective and meaningful and therefore making the public service less
attractive to the most talented Canadians.
The push to build a public service that was efficient and responsive
to executive leadership, while at the same time representative of
Canadians and able to function independently, would remain at the
core of the CSC's activities during the period of growth after the Second
World War. However, this balancing act would finally begin to shift
during the brief reign of Arnold D. P. Heeney as chairman of the CSC.
His chairmanship resulted in an influential report out of which came a
new Civil Service Act in 1961 and the beginning of a move toward a new
balance of power in personnel management in Canada.
THE HEENEY COMMISSION (1959): PRELUDE TO A NEW
BALANCE
Arnold D. P. Heeney was one of the best known and influential of the
"Mandarins" and had the reputation of being a reformer. With these
two qualifications in mind Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent lured him
into the chairmanship of the CSC by offering him the opportunity
to completely review the Civil Service Act. He was encouraged to
continue with this task by the incoming Conservative government,
even though the new government was planning its own inquiry into
the public service. With a "bi-partisan" mandate, Heeney examined the
Civil Service Act and the role of the Civil Service Commission, and his
endeavours culminated in the passage of Canada's second Civil Service
Actm 1961.
Heeney believed that the increasing demands on government were
going to change the character of the public service. When the CSC
was created in 1908 it was possible to classify almost all civil servants
as clerks, but by the late 1950s this was no longer true. The CSC was
struggling to keep up with many of the challenges of recruitment.
Today the public servant may be scientist, medical doctor,
meteorologist, film maker, airport attendant, forestry expert, canal
operator; he may engage in any one of a host of occupations which
include every known skill and calling.14
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This growth in both the size and variety of specializations, as well as
the expanding areas of government activity, meant that public servants
were taking a more central role in the framing and administration of
public policy.
With this understanding of the new civil service in mind, Heeney,
though personally wed to the idea that the CSC should recruit the
"superior" person, was willing to concede that there was "a good deal
to learn from the specialist."15 In essence Heeney was a progressive,
not content with the traditions of the past. He wanted to continue to
innovate and improve the quality of the public service. Not only did
he want the bureaucracy free from patronage and maladministration,
he also wanted it to become more independent, more efficient and
capable of self-management. He wanted to encourage developments
toward a better civil service in the future.16 The trends he wanted to
encourage were related to the "increased importance and influence
of senior civil servants."17 The one tradition that Heeney did hope to
maintain was the British tradition of continual bureaucratic reform and
self-improvement.
What Heeney was trying to do was find ways to move beyond
the highly defensive nature of the CSC's operations, which he felt
had become a hindrance to good government. Heeney was aware that
recruitment by merit itself was not enough to build a successful public
service and that it needed to be supplemented; he would supplement
it with a philosophy of management that would envelop the entire
public service, particularly the senior ranks. While he regarded the
preservation of the merit system as his major task as Chairman of
the CSC, he also wanted greater "speed, flexibility, and simplicity"
in administration, leadership in developing sound and progressive
administrative techniques, clear division of authority and responsibility
and greater devolution of managerial authority to departments. A sound
philosophy of management was essential if public servants were to
develop the "capacity and sense of responsibility needed to maintain a
high order of managerial efficiency in the increasingly complex business
of government."18
The creation of a managerial philosophy was to be balanced with
a "clarification and preservation of the rights and obligations of civil
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servants to a degree consistent with efficiency in management" and
a "greater participation by employees in the processes leading to the
determination of their conditions of employment."19 At the time,
public servants had only two rights: the right to certain statutory
holidays and the right to a pension. Public servants' rights, like the
rights of all citizens, were emerging as a subject of considerable interest
in the country and would take on increasing importance in the practice
of public administration in the near future.20 Heeney felt that the
CSC's future lay in its ability to develop strong managerial capacity
in the senior service, and in the recognition of employee rights in the
remainder of the service. Yet the managerial revolution that would soon
sweep over the public service would always find the CSC somewhat
awkward, and executive leadership would pull more of these functions
toward the Treasury Board and later the Privy Council Office.
As always, the key to improved public service management and
regularized employee relations was clear authority and responsibility.
In this regard Heeney was willing to acknowledge something that for
the most part eluded early critics of the CSC: the CSC had essentially
been designed to be part of a system of checks and balances. As Heeney
notes, "This 'grape-shot' distribution of authority and responsibility was
deliberately designed as a system of checks and balances, and it is hardly
surprising, therefore, that it inherits the weaknesses implicit in such a
system."21 Despite his awareness that this system had been created with
the approval of the House of Commons, he was not in favour of it.
Indeed, it appears that anyone looking at the Canadian administrative
system sees a distribution of authority and responsibility that needs to
be 'fixed' by centralizing authority in a single executive agency with a
responsible minister. Yet this system of divided authority, the creative
compromise reached between Parliament and the executive over the
control of personnel policy in Canada, was important in shaping the
character of the public service, particularly by allowing the service to
function on more than the narrow value of managerial efficiency.
A realist, Heeney recognized that the needs of management were
going to change this situation and create a dilemma for the CSC:
The central issue is to resolve, so far as we are able, the conflict between
the freedom and flexibility which the administrator must have to do
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his job, and the control which Parliament, and the Executive must
retain in order to fulfill their responsibilities to the nation.22
Heeney went on to note with disappointment that the authors of the
previous Civil Service Act o£ 1918 "were not concerned to encourage but
to restrict executive initiative; administrative integrity and continuity,
not efficiency and dispatch, were their chief preoccupations."23 For
Heeney the central tension at the core of the CSC was balancing the
requirements of effective executive action and the demands of democratic
responsibility.24 Pressures to ensure effective executive management and
executive expediency were gaining ground over more traditional values
of equality of opportunity and the constitutional position of the public
service.
This growing tension could be resolved in only one way for those
in favour of a new managerial orientation. More authority would have
to be granted "to deputy heads, subject only to some form of post-facto
central control."25 This would mean a long process or increasing the
managerial autonomy of ministerial departments and establishing
post-facto controls to be exercised by the CSC. In attempting to
shift the CSC in this direction, the Heeney Commission made
fifty recommendations. Most of the recommendations focused on
traditional topics concerning public service reform and the role of the
CSC, including the organization of the service, position classification,
compensation, recruitment, selection, appointment and promotion,
transfer, discipline, hours of work and the veterans' preference; they
also dealt with two relatively modern themes: staff relations and
language qualifications. In most of its recommendations, the Heeney
Commission displayed simultaneously a tremendous amount of
administrative orthodoxy and a willingness to be influenced by the
surrounding intellectual environment.
Heeney wanted to maintain the merit principle in recruitment,
but he hoped it could be made more flexible. He wanted to see the
act administered more efficiently and more promptly while ensuring
continued respect for the basic merit principle. By the late 1950s there
was a need to protect merit, not because there was a fear that political
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parties would attempt to revert back to the old patronage system
but rather because it was essential to ensure a solid career structure
in which employees could be relatively sure of their advancement if
they displayed the correct behaviour. Merit was needed, not because
it helped keep political patronage at bay but because it represented a
desire to protect the norms of bureaucratic behaviour, thereby ensuring
loyalty and efficiency among civil servants.
Heeney felt that the rapidly developing economy and the
multiplicity of technical skills required in government had made
the traditional principle of open competition in determining merit
impractical. The skills being demanded by the public service were now
so far beyond those of a clerk that in most cases the meritorious were
appointed by necessity. Administrative necessity and common sense
were also needed to ensure that recruitment, selection and promotion
were dealt with efficiently, while respecting the spirit of the merit system.
Functions previously seen as central to the CSC could be transferred to
departments while the CSC retained post-facto control and an appellate
function. "The function of the Commission would become essentially
that of advice and audit and there would be new emphasis on the
primary responsibility of deputy ministers for the efficient organization
of their departments."26 Delegating personnel authority to departments
was an idea whose time was clearly at hand, and with it came a strong
desire to reduce the role of the CSC to that of an audit and appeals
agency.
Despite its desire to delegate, the Heeney Commission accepted the
fact that the CSC should be involved in the process of job classification
because an "equitable classification plan, centrally controlled is an
essential ingredient of a sound merit system."27 It was also felt that the
CSC, because of its independent position, should be involved in issues
of compensation and that it should become an independent arbitrator in
wage disputes.28 The most significant aspect of the recommendation on
pay determination is that it acknowledged that there should be employee
participation "in the process by which their salaries and conditions of
work are determined."29 Heeney stopped short of suggesting the "simple
and unqualified application to the civil service of the normal industrial
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pattern of collective bargaining."30 However, it is interesting to note that
this system was only ten years away from becoming the pattern of wage
determination in the public sector and that it would be Heeney himself,
as chairman of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining,
who would recommend it, albeit in the face of political pressure from
many quarters and the unanimous support of all political parties.
The Heeney report served as the basis for many of the changes that
occurred in the civil service in the following decade. It was especially
influential in the drafting of the new Civil Service Act of 1961, which
incorporated many of its recommendations. As Heeney noted in his
memoirs,
Although governments did not choose to implement all our
proposals, notably those regarding pay determination, the report
nevertheless formed the basis for many, if not most, of the reforms
effected in the administration of the service during the Diefenbaker
and Pearson administrations.31
These reforms centred on a delegation of authority to operating
departments, which were expected to use this new authority to increase
their operational efficiency.
The future direction of reform became clear with the passage of
the new Civil Service Act in 1961. Under the new act, the payment
of public servants became a matter of right, consultation with public
servants' associations on questions of remuneration and employment
conditions became legally mandatory, vague requirements regarding
bilingualism were introduced, promotional competitions were
extended, interdepartmental transfers were facilitated, the grounds for
civil servants' appeals were broadened and the power of the CSC over
the organization of departments was restricted to an advisory one.32 It is
no wonder that this act came to be referred to as the "Magna Carta of
the Clerk 2."33 At the same time, the 1960s marked the beginning of a
serious discussion of the right to strike, and the right of civil servants to
engage in more and wider forms of political activity.34
Becoming evident by the late 1950s was the recognition that
building an efficient and responsible civil service required more than
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the creation of a self-perpetuating and remote elite; the task required
the adoption of the principles of modern management.35 As CSC
Commissioner Ruth Addison pointed out, "The time is now past for a
defensive approach in the application of the merit system and the time
has now come to move forward in the field of public administration
in a more constructive fashion."36 As we will see, this would mean
the application of modern management techniques, the recognition
of employee rights, organizational autonomy and increased delegated
authority, as well as the increased use of all manner and variety of
professional civil servants. The CSC was moving well down the road
toward delegation of its authority after the 1961 act was passed. In
1963 the commission delegated full responsibility to deputy ministers
to conduct promotion and transfer competitions up to the most senior
levels. While standards were set by the CSC, departments were now in
a position to conduct such competitions, open to their employees only,
without referring these decisions to the CSC.
THE GLASSCO COMMISSION (1962): THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION AS AN AUDIT AGENCY
The Royal Commission on Government Organization, known as the
Glassco Commission, was established in I960 by Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker, who, with other prominent Conservatives, had been calling
for a major inquiry into the public service long before the 1957 election.37
Modeled on the second Hoover inquiry in the United States,38 the
Glassco Commission proved to be one of the most influential inquiries
into the role of the public service in Canadian history. It accomplished
what many reformers within the public service had been asking for
since the establishment of the CSC in 1908: a greater centralization of
administrative power over personnel in the Treasury Board, a reduction
in the influence of the CSC, an intellectual division of labour between
managers and non-managers and a decentralized system of financial
and personnel management centred squarely on operating departments
and agencies—in short, a stronger executive leadership focused on a
strong senior civil service, with oversight from a new, powerful central
agency.
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Tlie Glassco Commission recognized that to ensure better
management it would need to examine the old conflict between
the need for efficiency in the civil service and the need for political
control. This conflict, as old as the CSC itself, was at the very core
of many of the Glassco Commission's recommendations, which called
simultaneously for decentralization and centralization, devolution and
central control, and freedom for managers supplemented by central
agency guidelines. Yet, as has often been pointed out by its critics, the
Glassco Commission clearly favoured managerial elegance over the
cluttered world of democratic politics.39 As an agent established to
ensure respect for democratic principles in public service recruitment,
the CSC would not endear itself to this commission.
The Glassco Commission was aware that the "good management
is good government" adage was unacceptable to many Canadians,
particularly members of minority groups, civil libertarians and
parliamentarians. Consequently, there was a recognition that the
machinery of administration had to be made "responsive to the wants
and needs the Canadian people."40 The Glassco Commission also
acknowledged that "because of the generally recognized influence enjoyed
by the central public service, the confidence reposed in it throughout the
country will depend, in large measure, on how representative it is of the
public it serves."41 Even so, the Glassco commissioners were unwilling
to consider specific action such as quotas for any disadvantaged groups.
They simply wanted to find "positive ways of tapping the best human
resources in all parts of Canada."42
Changes in the political dynamic such as growing Quebec
nationalism might have been making the Glassco Commission's task
of modernizing the civil service along managerial lines more difficult,
yet many in Ottawa, including the Glassco commissioners, believed the
public service desperately needed modernization. Modernization had
become essential because of the errors of past reforms, most of which
could be characterized by an over-reliance on the traditional concept
of negative control favoured by the hierarchical approach, which often
supported the CSC's role in position classification. The problems all
centred on a proliferation of controls imposed on the public service
by the CSC. Even though these controls were imposed with the best
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of intentions inspired by the promotion and protection of merit, they
had come to represent serious fetters on the administrative capacity of
the public service, which weakened rather than strengthened the civil
service's sense of responsibility.43 According to Glassco, the only thing
that had saved the public service from the disastrous effects of excessive
control was its ability to create a very competent administrative elite over
the previous twenty years.44 And while building an elite might overcome
many administrative obstacles, ultimately, as others had argued, it could
not overcome the "burden of control." That would be achieved only
through modern managerial techniques designed to set managers free.
A further consequence of the burden of control imposed by the CSC
was the increasing use of non-departmental forms of administration.
"The costly, frustrating and unproductive character of the existing
system has been most strikingly acknowledged in the frequent resort to
the use of semi-autonomous boards, commissions and corporations."45
However, the lesson to be learned from the Crown corporation
experiment was that meticulous control and overhead supervision were
not necessary to ensure honesty and efficiency in government operations;
nor were they needed for conformity to public policy, democratic
responsibility or merit recruitment and promotion. For the Glassco
commissioners, the very existence of so many autonomous agencies and
Crown corporations demonstrated that managerial concepts developed
in the private economy could provide responsible public administration
that respected merit.46 Departments should therefore be set free so
that they could accomplish their mission, and if the example of the
Crown corporations was reliable, there should be no fear that Canadian
democracy would be imperilled by such devolution of authority to
specialist/managerial senior civil servants.
While the CSC was responsible for some of the negative controls,
the commissioners could not avoid the obvious fact that the Treasury
Board was becoming an even bigger culprit. The Treasury Board's
appetite for control had come to blur the lines of authority between
departments, central agencies and Cabinet, and it had become a
tremendous source of frustration, which discouraged "departmental
managers from accepting responsibility for their plans, and [led] them
to regard this responsibility as being shared with the Treasury Board
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staff."47 It permitted senior bureaucrats to escape responsibility by
claiming that they shared authority with the central control agencies,
particularly the Treasury Board. Controls designed to create a system
of democratic oversight were having just the opposite effect.48 This
led the Glassco commissioners to issue an ultimatum: either accept
the precepts of managerialism, in particular the increased need for
administrative discretion, or accept a continuation of the inefficiencies
of overly centralized oversight with the CSC and the Treasury Board as
the chief villains.
It is quite astounding how frequently the freedom/control dilemma
was seen as the central tension faced by the modern public service and
that the solution proposed was always greater freedom from the controls
of the CSC. Glassco, like those before him, attempted to resolve this
tension by creating more autonomy for departmental managers
supplemented by democratic/bureaucratic restraint in the form of
a reconstituted Treasury Board, complete with additional statutory
powers and its own minister. In essence, the Glassco Commission was
relying on ideas that had been percolating since at least the Gordon
Commission in 1946, and that had become part of the dominant
managerial orthodoxy.
Underlying the Glassco Commission's attempt to deal with the
freedom/control dilemma in this manner was a belief that bureaucrats
working cooperatively with each other in a managerial, goal-oriented
environment would achieve a new form of administrative responsibility.
This is clear from the commission's general plan of management, which
described a version of administrative checks and balances featuring a
structure of countervailing functions between departments, the Treasury
Board and the Privy Council Office as well as a much reduced role
for the CSC. While the commission wanted to strengthen the auditor
general, it also wanted to streamline the CSC into an audit agency.49
Beginning with the Glassco Commission, there would come to be a
series of reform proposals to have the CSC limited to a recruitment and
audit capacity and to put more authority in the hands of line managers.
Of course the Glassco Commission recognized that these various
agencies exerted a restraining influence on departmental ambitions
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and abilities, but it nevertheless hoped that, because central agencies
served broader interests and were staffed with officers familiar with the
needs of departmental administration, the agencies would be welcomed
by the departments as a source of guidance when new and unfamiliar
problems arose.50 The commissioners did not anticipate the sometimes
intense bureaucratic rivalry that was to emerge over the next decades
between these agencies. What they had in mind, rather, was a more
harmonious system of management based on rational objective setting,
cooperative agendas and decentralized budget-centred management.
The Glassco Commission is of course known for its dictum "let
the managers manage." It also recognized that it is inconsistent to
delegate responsibility and then ask for a detailed accounting of how
the responsibility was exercised. Its forthright views were motivated by
the changes that the advance of the welfare state was having on the
public service generally. The rapid growth of government signalled the
replacement of the traditional concept of the public service as a neutral
transmission belt with a new view that was coming to demand that the
public service begin to set objective standards of performance, create
long-range plans, make decisions and hold itself accountable to certain
standards of financial and social behaviour.
For the Glassco Commission one of the key ways to build a more
responsible public service was to unite it through a dynamic managerial
philosophy that would make the public service increasingly autonomous
from the control of executive agencies. The commission did acknowledge
the importance of other values in achieving a more responsible public
service, such as representative bureaucracy, suggesting, for example, that
more effective recruitment of French Canadians would be required so
that they would come to "share a proper feeling towards the federal
public service."51 But it also cautioned against adding more ministerial
departments and held favourable views regarding the growth of
independent organizational structures. While accepting that there was
room for alternative political values, in the final analysis, it wanted
to subsume all those values under the overwhelming need for better
management and bring a new technocratic/managerial approach to the
operation of the public service of Canada.
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The Glassco Commission led the campaign to unfetter manage-
ment, pursuing the trend toward more autonomy for departmental
administration. This movement would gain momentum shortly after
the release of the Glassco Commission report, when a new legislative
regime was established and the Civil Service Act was replaced by the Public
Service Employment Act (PSEA). The PSEA signalled a move toward
more employee and management rights, reflecting a much broader
recognition of rights, particularly minority rights, in Canada's political
culture. This recognition led to initiatives aimed at creating a more
representative bureaucracy. Such initiatives began in earnest in the late
1960s with the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,
which argued passionately and persuasively for a linguistically balanced
public service. Language-related demands eventually led to other long
overdue demands by women, aboriginal peoples and people with
disabilities. Thus while the CSC was to help create a more managerial
public service, it would also be asked to take on a more formal role in
helping the public service increase its own democratic legitimacy, based
not only on efficiency and constitutional principles of neutrality but
also, increasingly, on its ability to represent Canadians.
CONCLUSION: THE PUBLIC SERVANT AS PUBLIC MANAGER
The CSC always had an important role to play in creating a public
service that was staffed efficiently and effectively, protected from
unwelcome political interference, and reflective of broader social,
regional and cultural values. The public service that emerged from the
CSC's efforts was therefore able to play a role in helping to ensure that
governments remained within the bounds of constitutional propriety.
The public service had the necessary, but circumscribed, independence
to help balance the executive's need for effective action and Parliament's
desire for constitutionally appropriate action. This view of the public
service would be challenged by initial thrusts in the post-war era toward
a stronger managerial approach that sought to subject the public service
to more explicit executive leadership in an increasingly goal-oriented
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environment. That is, the self-denying gesture on the part of the House
of Commons and the executive guaranteeing the independence of the
CSC, and thus the public service itself, was unravelling in favour of
the executive branch. The system of checks and balances that had been
growing, in which an independent CSC played a critical role in helping
to ensure that politicians understood and respected the boundaries
between the political and the bureaucratic, was beginning to erode.
Pressures to bring about a more effective form of management had
always been great, but the new management style that was coming to
dominate discussions about public service reform would result in public
servants playing a more functional role. Little concern was expressed
about the appropriate balance between the legislature and the executive
that the CSC had .originally represented. The CSC was coming to
be seen as a nuisance standing in the way of the unassailable logic of
effective management. Bringing management consciousness to centre
stage would mean the slow erosion of the one resource that was the
product of a powerful CSC, and which is always in great demand in
any well-governed state: public service independence. The pressures
for a greater focus on management would almost by definition erode
professional independence and try to turn the public service into a
more goal-oriented organization, in which performance, not probity,
was the overarching value.
As emphasis on management grew, Canada was beginning to see
changes in the operations of the personnel policy regime that would
stretch the notion of merit to the breaking point. As noted in the first two
chapters, merit had always been based on more than open competition
and had begun to incorporate notions of fair and orderly processes
for purposes of pay, rewards, promotions and employee discipline,
in addition to a number of positive and negative exclusions based on
region, language, gender and veteran status. Merit, beginning in the
1960s and 1970s, would formally include language ability, gender, and
other sociological characteristics. Merit-based practices would bring a
variety of new procedures, including equity-based classification and pay
structures, more due process and appeal mechanisms, while allowing
employees the opportunity to form and join unions unless otherwise
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exempt by law. Far from being a simple linear concept, merit was set to
become increasingly weighed down by procedural and legal definitions,
and the notion that it represented the ideals at the core of career public
service would become increasingly distant.
The public service itself was going through a series of changes
that would see it all but abandon the image that it was merely a very
dedicated but impartial servant of ministers. As governments took on
more social and economic responsibilities, first during the Depression,
then during the post-war expansion of the welfare state, there was a
growing sense that this limited view could no longer be sustained. In its
place was a more managerial public service, one whose main concern
would become the efficient and effective use of scarce resources. If the
public service was to be an effective institution, the reformers now
wanted it to embody more than the classic principles of continuity
between different governments and the roles that had traditionally been
based on complex and ill-defined constitutional conventions.52 While
support for this more gentle view would never disappear entirely, the
direction set by the post-war reforms would be unstoppable and a more
technical view of the public service would come to dominate by the
1970s and 1980s. The CSC would be seen by many as an antiquated
institution supporting an outdated view of the public service, which
was rapidly acquiring a more technical role in the delivery of public
services.
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THE MANAGEMENT
ASSAULT ON THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION:
1967-1979
Being both operator and guardian over staffing, we are a safety valve
defusing an otherwise potentially explosive issue. It is an awkward role
to be sure: it does violate some of the simpler tenets of conventional
organizational wisdom. At the same time, the present PSC model
to my mind is essentially an inspired creation, taking into account
with considerable sensitivity the realities of the Parliamentary/public
service environment.
PSC Commissioner John Edwards, May 1, 19791
The decade immediately following the 1962 Glassco Commission
report was perhaps the most active period of administrative reform
in Canadian history. The Glassco Commission inspired a flurry of
decentralizing reforms contained in a new legislative framework: the
Public Service Staff Relations Act, the Public Service Employment Act
(PSEA) and the Official Languages Act,2 combined with several minor
amendments to other statutes, redistributed responsibilities among the
central agencies, departments and the new civil service unions. The
reforms were so intensive that, by the early 1970s, public servants were
feeling rather overwhelmed and were considered to be suffering from a
"saturation psychosis."3 In addition to the currents of reform washing
over the public service, there was also rapid growth in the size of the
public service, which added 74,000 new employees between 1970





These legislative developments, in particular the enactment of the
PSEA in 1967, were aimed at, among other things, making the renamed
Public Service Commission efficient and effective within a more limited
staffing role and thus a more valuable partner in the transformation of
the public service into a more managerially competent organization.
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of staffing processes, while
always a part of the PSC's mandate, crystallized with the report of the
Glassco Commission and was a key goal of the PSEA; this agenda was
given a further push with the appointment of J. J. Carson as chair of the
PSC. Having authored the Glassco Commission volume on personnel
management, Carson brought with him the zeal of a true believer in
the Glassco-style management reforms.5 Central to this new vision was
delegating staffing authority to departments based on the provisions of
the PSEA.
The new legislative framework was designed to allow the PSC to
focus on its core responsibilities for the merit principle, staffing, appeals
processes, and training and development services, as well as on its newly
acquired responsibilities in the areas of language training and internal
management consulting. With rhetoric of decentralization at a high
pitch, the PSEA permitted the formal delegation to deputy heads of the
authority needed to make appointments in their own departments.
The prevailing view now was that the path to a more managerially
effective public service was to allow the PSC to delegate more of its
authority to deputy ministers. The trend toward delegation of more
authority, which had initially begun under the Civil Service Act ot 1961,
had received new impetus and urgency with the Glassco Commission
report. The idea that managers needed the authority to make quick
decisions regarding staffing was now central to the whole agenda of
increasing the efficiency of the public service more generally. However,
the PSC noted, at the time, that it "intends to delegate its appointing
authority in accordance with a planned and controlled system which
will ensure the preservation of the merit principle as well as permitting
effective and economical staffing."6 Such delegation of authority
required that the PSC create selection standards that by law would be
"not inconsistent with" classification standards. While it took a long
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time to get a classification revision, as required by the new 1967 PSEA,
the selection standards were in place by 1969.
One thing the reforms of 1967 did not accomplish, however,
was to simplify or streamline the whole personnel system in the
Government of Canada. If anything the 1967 reforms made the system
more complex by introducing the Public Service Staff Relations Board
(PSSRB), which was assigned power to adjudicate grievances on issues
of discipline arising out of collective agreements. This meant that the
PSSRB and the PSC would both have systems of recourse and redress,
with the PSSRB focusing on discipline and the PSC on allegations of
incompetence, incapacity and improper selection. Confusion easily arose
between the two roles. What's more, the new PSEA relieved the PSC
of its responsibilities in matters of pay, classification and conditions of
employment, and transferred them to the "employer" in the form of the
Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) which, post-Glassco, was now hived
off from the Department of Finance with its own Cabinet minister
called the president of the Treasury Board and a secretary who had the
rank of senior deputy minister.
The establishment of public sector unions in the 1960s not only
complicated the personnel system but also reflected the expansion of
democratic rights in the public service. This was a step away from the
view of the public service as a servant of the Crown toward a view of the
public service as an institution with its own rights and responsibilities.
Public servants were less a part of a great chain of responsibility leading
to Parliament and instead were becoming possessors of rights and
interests of their own, a development that would bring them into conflict
with the other institutions of government. Naturally, considerable
debate ensued with the advocates of a more traditional definition of
responsible government, who felt that these changes would result in a
withering away of administrative responsibility through the minister to
Parliament. Yet, an emerging consensus held that democracy would be
better served if public servants were treated as other citizens. This new
consensus would be one factor in the slow erosion of the notion that
public sector employment was a "privileged" vocation; increasingly, it
would be regarded as just another line of work.
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This chapter will examine the transformation of the PSC's
conception of the public service between 1967 and 1979, the period
in which it had to deal with issues concerning minority representation,
emerging political rights of public servants that might threaten the
neutrality of the public service and the persistent view that the PSC was
frustrating the managerial ambitions of governments. In a sense, those
challenges were typical of the balancing act that the PSC had always
played as it reconciled competing imperatives around representativeness,
constitutionality and efficiency. However, pressures had mounted,
forcing it to accept the view that the public service needed to be a
more managerial organization with goals, plans and responsibility for
effective service delivery. In this environment, the PSC, unwilling as it
was to abandon its other roles, came to be seen not only as a brake on
reform but as an organization that was incapable of playing an effective
role as a component of the executive government and needed to be
relegated to the role of watchdog with audit powers arid relieved of its
executive authority. This was a view that found new advocates in two
major commissions in the late 1970s but that was resisted by the PSC
itself.
REPRESENTATIVE PUBLIC SERVICE IN CANADA: LANGUAGE,
GENDER AND RACE
The definition of merit has always been flexible, and issues of
representation have never been far from the PSC staffing equation.
Nonetheless, pressures for greater linguistic and democratic
representation reached a boiling point by the late 1960s and early
1970s. Hie idea that equality in public service employment could end
with the issue of procedural fairness and the ability of all Canadians
to apply for public employment was no longer adequate. More
proactive approaches aimed at encouraging greater representation by
francophones, women and aboriginal peoples eventually dominated
the debate about staffing and became an issue on the PSC's permanent
agenda. The PSC had long been targeted by criticism that it was the
actual cause of underrepresentation in the public service and therefore
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an unsuitable body to address the issue of inequality in the public
service. This argument had been expressed for decades and was based
on a clear decline in the number of French-Canadian public servants
overall, especially in the senior ranks, since 1918. According to this
view, the PSC was responsible because it allowed the continuation of
a position classification system in which deputy ministers and other
managers set position requirements that often favoured incumbents.
Underrepresentation of francophones was also blamed on the PSC
because it had failed to use its power under the earlier Civil Service
Act to report on the organization of departments. Critics in Parliament
had long argued that the PSC did not use its power to ensure that the
public service exemplified the democratic principle of representation by
population, which needed to be a requirement just as it was for other
political institutions such as the House of Commons and the judiciary,
which had guaranteed French-Canadian representation.7
The argument for a more representative public service had existed
at least since the publication of Donald Kingsley's Representative
Bureaucracy in 1944.8 However, it was not until the late 1960s and
early 1970s that the idea shed its "socialist" roots and was embraced
by all governments as a reform whose time had come. To be rejected
now was the idea of the public service as a clan of "Mandarins" who
would function as a caste existing apart from the society surrounding
it.9 The idea of a representative public service became a core concept
of public service staffing despite the controversy it generated. While
there was always a community that favoured a more elitist approach to
recruitment, the idea of a more representative public service moved from
the fringe of academia into the realm of major social reform, redefining
the legitimacy of the public service. The idea that the public service
should be reflective of the community it serves now in fact enjoys the
status of a truism, even if it is still less than completely realized.
Representative bureaucracy had always been a central feature of
arguments favouring a more democratic civil service.10 It was a tacit
admission that the public service had independent power and that, for
this reason, the public service, especially the senior public service, had
to become representative of the major social segments of Canadian
society. Recognizing that it needed to rethink its understanding of
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merit, the PSC came to the obvious conclusion in the early 1970s
that the existing merit system "[had] failed in one respect. It [had]
not given us a representative public service."11 The senior public
service was dominated by English-speaking males, creating barriers for
many Canadians. While francophones had made some progress, both
francophone and female participation was nearly non-existent in the
higher ranks, and aboriginal people were almost completely absent at
every level. The PSC, well aware that it had been applying the concept
of merit too narrowly, began to develop a dynamic concept for creating
a public service that would more accurately represent the people it
served. The PSC came up with individual programs aimed at French
Canadians, women and aboriginals in its first major efforts to improve
democratic responsibility through representation. While the PSC took
the lead in the development of these programs, by the 1980s the issue
moved up the agenda and the Treasury Board began to challenge the
PSC's leadership in this area.12
The model the PSC pursued favoured a passive form of
representation easily adaptable to concepts of representative democracy.
Passive representation "concerns the source of origins of individuals
and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror the total society,"
whereas active representation occurs when the individual public servant
is "expected to press for the interests and desires of those whom he
is presumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or some
segment of the people."13 While there was some feeling that passive
representation would lead to active representation, it is clear that the
PSC was only ever interested in passive representation, which meant
ensuring that the number of designated group members reflected
their numbers in society.14 The PSC has, in fact, never conceived of
public servants from minority groups as being representatives of the
social groups from which they emerge, nor have those public servants
been encouraged to think that: representing their respective groups is
or should be part of their role in the public service. Such a concept
would be inconsistent with responsible government and would mean
conceding the notion of the public service as an independent player in
public administration.
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The issue of language representation received its first impetus with
the Civil Service Act of 1961, which created an expectation about the
language qualifications of public servants based on the needs of the
population being served in a given region.15 The next significant push
came in the aftermath of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism,16 when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announced
that "the linguistic and cultural values of the English-speaking and
French-Speaking Canadians will be reflected through civil service
recruitment and training."17 Thus, merit came to be redefined in such a
way as to include the ability to speak French, an idea endorsed by Prime
Minster Pierre Elliott Trudeau when he noted in 1970 that "Canadians
whose mother tongue is French should be adequately represented
in the public service—both in terms of numbers and in levels of
responsibility"18 As a result of these clear directions from political
leaders, the PSC began a concerted effort to recruit more francophones.
The PSC also became the home of an expanded language training effort
that it would manage for the next forty years.
While pursuing its language programs and goals, the PSC also
began to respond to the long simmering issue of women's representation
in the public service and opened its Office of Equal Opportunity for
Women on the heels of its own report entitled "Sex and the Public
Service."19 Its efforts also received a significant boost from the Royal
Commission on the Status of Women.20 The PSC committed itself to
increasing the number of women in the public service and particularly
in the senior ranks of the public service. It began by involving more
women in the Career Assistance Program (CAP), which had begun
in the 1950s; it made sure that women's volunteer experiences were
rated in the same manner as other relevant experience; it developed
new small courses for women and it removed any male-only restrictions
from career areas. While the Civil Service Acts of 1919 and 1961 had
never actually endorsed discrimination, they had remained silent on
the matter, and the PSC had tacitly approved of deputies designating
certain occupations as being suitable for men only. The 1967 PSEA, on
the other hand, clearly stated that discrimination on the basis of gender
would no longer be allowed. By 1978, the PSC felt that it needed to
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devote a chapter of its annual report to the issue, noting that it " [did]
not see itself as having a mandate from Parliament to extend preferential
treatment, and hence its strategy in this field has been one of actively
promoting equality of opportunity."21 It wanted to avoid the experience
with the French language, in which the establishment: of quotas had
led to criticisms of "reverse discrimination". Maintaining that it had no
parliamentary mandate concerning women as it did with the French
language, it wanted to avoid anything that had the feel of affirmative
action. It was the view of the PSC at the time that the existing merit
system, with no restrictions on women, was adequate to increase the
representation of women.
The issue of aboriginal representation centred on education
qualifications, as had the decades-long debate on francophone
participation. There were almost no aboriginal public servants in the
1970s. In response, the PSC developed programs to help increase
aboriginal representation throughout the public service., Tliese included
programs that waived merit requirements for aboriginal people working
in the north and replaced education criteria with requirements such
as knowledge of native customs, ways and languages. While these
modifications proved of some benefit, they were clearly not having a
significant impact. Treasury Board President Donald Johnson suggested,
as a result, that the performance of deputy ministers be evaluated on the
basis, at least in part, of the number of aboriginal people they hired into
their departments. Yet, even here the government was never willing to
go so far as to legislate quotas, maintaining instead its notions of targets,
guidelines and encouragement.
From these early beginnings emerged programs that required
all departments to develop strategies to promote targets for all three
groups of employees; people with disabilities would later form a fourth
group. An Employment Equity Act12 eventually was passed and revised in
1995.23 But prior to these legislative changes, the PSC], as lead agency,
developed an anti-discrimination branch to investigate complaints of
discrimination in the public service based on sex, race, national origin,
colour or religion. By the mid-1970s, 67% of the PSC's budget was
spent on its many and varied training and development activities,
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while another 27% was spent on statutory functions related to staffing
and representational career development activities. The remaining
6% was spent on activities related directly to the merit principle,
including the development of selection and language standards and
of merit specifications of positions, which now included notions of
representation. While the PSC would share these responsibilities with
other agencies over the years, by 2004 full responsibility for ensuring
the implementation of the Employment Equity Act was transferred to
the Public Service Agency of Canada, which is now responsible for the
role of employer with respect to employment equity and the related
planning and accountability frameworks.24 Today, while there remain
critics of the pace of movement towards representativeness, a great
deal of progress has been made. French Canadians throughout the
public service have achieved representational equality, and it is only
the Executive Group that still requires new efforts toward this goal for
women and aboriginal Canadians.
The PSC moved on the issue of creating a representative public
service for two reasons that had evolved over time. First, it was a matter
of human rights. Second, one way to ensure that the power of public
servants was used responsibly was to make the public service broadly
representative of the citizens it served. By convention, public servants
were anonymous and could not be blamed or identified to the public.
Thus, a representative public service would serve as a means of making
sure that the public service was passively responsible. The true test of a
representative public service then was not that it had the same values
as the public it served but that it reflected Canadian society in terms
of education, social status, employment, gender and ethnicity.25 This
notion of statistical representation would remain central to the ideal of
a representative public service.
THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SERVANTS: NEUTRALITY
REDEFINED
While questions of representation were rising to the top of the agenda
and demanding an evolving and ongoing response, the constitutional
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rights of public servants began to evolve fundamentally. In the past,
neutrality had been linked exclusively to political party activity; the
Civil Service Acts of 1919 and 1961 had limited all engagement of
public servants with political parties so as to maintain the perception
that the public service was not in any sense subject to pressure by
politicians. Indeed, the PSC tended to regard any political activity as
part of a process of politicization. However, the outright ban on party
activity eventually gave way to the idea that public servants needed to
be considered as citizens and should not be banned from all political
activity. Political activity came to be viewed less as an indication of
politicization and more as a basic right that all citizens should be able
to exercise.26 Again, this change in attitude did not take place in a
revolutionary manner. It was a slow, piecemeal process of expanding
the political and constitutional rights of public servants in terms of
• partisan political activity and free speech, and of balancing those rights
against the requirement that public servants be supportive and be seen
to be supportive of the government of the day. The issue of non-partisan
appointment and public service neutrality may have become widely
accepted by the 1960s, but it was seen to have been achieved at the
expense of the rights of public servants.
Since 1908, the notion that the PSC would ensure a neutral
and competent public service had been central to its credibility and
mandate. Part of its success in creating a space of political neutrality
for the public service had been its ability to limit the political activity
of public servants to voting in elections. The goal had always been
to reassure the public at large that the public service was operating
in an impartial manner, but also to reassure Canadians that access to
employment in the public service was open to all Canadians, regardless
of their political affiliation. However, even before the Public Service
Employment Act, a variety of exceptions had begun to appear, and with
the PSEA, boundaries of permissible political activity were opened up.
The arrival of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982,
which expanded the free speech rights of public servants, advanced the
push for new rights even further.27
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At the core of the challenges faced by the PSC in the redefining
of political activity was a consensus in the PSC that no public servant
should be involved in politics or be vested with power to influence the
political judgment of the community. It was also recognized, however,
that public servants needed to be responsive to the public will as
expressed by politicians.28 This meant that public servants needed also
to be alert and submissive to changes in the public will as expressed
in political decisions. Hugh Heclo captured this notion well when he
noted,
Neutral competence does not mean the possession of a direct-
dial line to an overarching, non-partisan conception of the public
interest. Rather it consists of giving one's cooperation and best
independent judgment of the issues to partisan bosses—and of being
sufficiently uncommitted to do so for a succession of partisan leaders.
The independence entailed in neutral competence ... exists precisely
in order to serve the aims of partisan leadership.29
In order to do their job effectively, public servants in Canada were
expected to identify with the political leadership and not simply provide
the same sort of advice no matter who was in power. That is, not only
did public servants need to provide impartial policy advice, but they
also had to suggest what the likely political consequences of that advice
might be. As collaborators with ministers, public servants needed to
anticipate both political and policy consequences.
For decades, the PSC had maintained that the key value of staffing
the public service on merit principles lay in the fact that it politically
sterilized public servants (and therefore supposedly made them
impartial), and that this outweighed other values that might be attractive
to politicians, such as staff enthusiasm for policies, contributions by
public servants to the life of politics, or the right of public employees to
influence their employer through political means.30 Yet, pressure built
within the system and this concept of shielding the public service from
politicians by limiting their ability to participate in politics gave way to
a new view that public servants were less valuable if they were denied an
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ability to engage in political activity. At one point, Canadians may have
desired a public service that was free from any taint of partisanship,
thereby justifying a limitation on political rights, but opinion had
slowly shifted in favour of the idea that public servants should function
as complete citizens with complete political rights and privileges.
The political rights of public servants are closely related to
constitutional conventions surrounding neutrality, and changes in
one invariably lead to changes in the others. As Professor Kenneth
Kernaghan has noted, the elements of the doctrine of neutrality are
interdependent and
a substantial expansion of the political partisanship of public
servants may erode the reality and appearance of a politically neutral
public service by such means as increasing patronage appointments,
expanding public comment by public servants, reducing public
service anonymity and diminishing job security.31
The PSC had always been concerned with maintaining the confidence
of the public and the administrative efficiency of the public service.
Nevertheless, the Public Service Employment Act gave the PSC the
authority to determine whether public servants could seek election on
the basis of how their candidacy would affect their usefulness to the
public service. Even so, the PSC in its role as the guardian of political
neutrality felt that participation in politics was a clear threat to this core
value of neutrality.
The PSC had consistently argued that the public service had to be
neutral relative to the minister, the public and other public servants.
Of paramount concern had always been the notion that public servants
were required not only to be neutral but also to have the appearance
of neutrality. This became even more crucial as the public service
became more active in public policy as well as the various quasi-judicial
functions that it was acquiring as a result of the growth of government.
Also, for the doctrine of neutrality and anonymity to be effective, it
had to be clear that promoting or giving advantages to certain public
servants who had exercised their political rights would destroy the
morale of the public service and taint public service professionalism.
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Thus, political rights were often cast as something that would lead to a
new form of patronage.
For the PSC, the understanding that public servants needed
protection from political interference was crucial to finding balance.
However, public servants also needed to be able to exercise their right
as citizens to engage in political activity. This dilemma found some
resolution only after the arrival of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
in 1982 and after public servants took their individual cases to the
Supreme Court. Yet, in the meantime, what constituted acceptable
political activity remained a moving target and, in individual cases,
the PSC often had to exercise a great deal of judgment. The PSC was
shifting its focus from an exclusive concern with ensuring public service
impartiality by policing merit to a new concern about appropriate
limitations on the political activity of public servants, particularly those
without access to sensitive information or without any obvious conflicts
of interest. Pressures mounted in the 1970s to both define these rights
and protect public servants while ensuring that the decision-making
process was protected from public servants with declared political bias.
During the 1970s, federal employees began to participate in politics,
and disapproval of this participation led to the suspension of those
seeking political nomination. At the time, the PSC was accused of
acting in a high-handed manner in suspending individuals and not
allowing them an avenue of appeal.32 But this issue had struck at one
the PSC's core values.
By the end of the 1970s, it was clear that the political rights of
public servants would get a boost with the coming of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. In addition, the PSC was also becoming adept at
managing political rights on a case-by-case basis. The public service was
now so large, divided, classified and organized that it proved possible
to grant expanded political rights to large classes of employees who
did not come into contact with the decision-making apparatus of the
government and therefore in no way threatened to bring the public
service's neutrality into disrepute. It should be noted that demands for
improved political rights were coming not only from staff associations
and unions but also from those interested in expanding the idea of
human rights. This situation was typical of the way the PSC responded
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to pressure for change. Its actions were incremental and ad hoc and
suggested little in the way of overarching conceptions; they were related
to an immediate need to find a solution to a pressing issue.
THE LAMBERT COMMISSION: PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE MICROSCOPE
The mid-1970s saw a number of substantial changes at the PSC,
including the departure of Chairman John Carson, who had been a
staunch advocate of the new managerial orthodoxy, his replacement
by Edgar Gallant and the appointment of John Edwards and Anita
Szlazak as commissioners. The new commissioners supported the
PSC's traditional guardian role, more so than Mr. Carson, but they
also recognized that change was inevitable once the Liberal government
established two commissions to help clarify the PSC's role. These
major inquiries were the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Financial
Management (Lambert Commission) and the Special Committee
on the Review of Personnel Management and the Merit Principle
(D'Avignon Committee). While the PSC had not yet become an audit
agency as the Glassco Commission had called for in 1962, it had begun
to lose responsibility for personnel policy with the growing strength of
the Treasury Board Secretariat.
The Lambert Commission famously emerged out of the 1975-
1976 report of Auditor General J. J. Macdonnell, who noted, UI am
deeply concerned that Parliament and indeed the government - has
lost, or is losing, effective control of the public purse.'33 To rectify this
situation, the Lambert Commission, even more so than the Glassco
Commission, reaffirmed the need for more effective management and
put pressure on the PSC to vacate its last remaining positions within
the executive management framework and become responsible only
for preserving and monitoring the merit principle.34 In particular, the
Lambert Commission did not care for the PSC's original, far-reaching
executive role in personnel management because it felt that this role
gave the public service too much autonomy from government. While
the report was mostly concerned with financial control, it contained
many recommendations about personnel policy, many of which, if
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implemented, would have fundamentally altered the PSC. In the end,
this report had little impact due to the political turmoil in Canada in the
1979-1980 period, but it heralded a direction of change for the future.
The Lambert Commission followed the Glassco Commission's
lead in trying to increase the managerial role of the Treasury Board,
which ultimately assumed heavy new responsibilities for overseeing the
management of all aspects of government.35 The Lambert Commission's
recommendations for changes to the Treasury Board were
designed to clarify its role as the central agency responsible for
effective management in government of both personnel and financial
resources, and also as the primary instrument through which the
Cabinet calls departments and agencies to account for how they have
fulfilled their managerial responsibilities.36
The recommendations further strengthened the managerial orthodoxy
by imposing more Cabinet direction and overhead control over the
public service, which, as usual, meant a diminished role for the PSC.
For the Lambert Commission, this recommendation for more
executive control of personnel management had the advantage of
ending the old problem in which the PSC had executive authority but
was at the same time required to audit itself to ensure that its activities
were carried out within rules approved by Parliament. Lambert disliked
this process because he felt that accountability suffered
when the Public Service Commission, in effect, monitors itself
through its review systems. Consolidation of personnel management
responsibilities in the Board of Management would clarify the lines
of accountability for staffing on the one hand and monitoring staffing
procedures on the other.37
The Lambert Commission also pointed out the problem of the
lack of clear parliamentary oversight. In its view, the problem was
not being adequately addressed and had become obscured in the
obsession to facilitate both merit and efficiency. For example, there
were no parliamentary reviews of personnel management similar
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to the review of financial management that took place in the Public
Accounts Committee. Once again, underlying the problem was the
PSC's ambiguous position. "It is unclear whether the PSC should
appear before a parliamentary committee to account for the exercise
of its staffing authority, as well as to provide an independent assurance
that starling had been carried out on the basis of merit."38 While
Parliament needed an accounting of both, it was not clear that it should
be provided by the PSC alone. Rather, personnel management activities
needed to become the responsibility of the new secretary of personnel
management and deputy heads, and the PSC "should report directly to
parliament on its responsibility for ensuring that appointments within
the public service are based on merit and not subject to political or
administrative patronage."39
The Lambert Commission is perhaps the most dramatic example
of an attempt to turn the PSC into a classic parliamentary watchdog
agency. It argued that the independence of the commissioners had to be
guaranteed by having both Houses of Parliament ratify appointments
of commissioners for a period often years, by having salaries established
by statute and by ensuring that salaries were not subject to appraisal
procedures applicable to Governor-in-Council appointments. The
PSC had to be given enhanced power to request documents and be
able to require responses and explanations from the public service
whenever it deemed necessary. In essence, the Lambert Commission
wanted to ensure that the PSC would be capable of fulfilling three
core responsibilities. First, the PSC needed to examine the personnel
policies established by central agencies and deputy heads and make sure
that they were protecting merit principles. Second, the PSC needed to
hear appeals against staffing decisions that contended that the merit
principle had been violated, and provide statistical data on the number
of appeals heard and the number of appeals pending. Third, the PSC
needed to report to Parliament on instances where personnel policies
were not protecting merit principles and where departmental internal
audits revealed non-compliance with the merit principle.
This was the most radical vision of the PSC yet put forward. The
PSC would have the capacity to audit, but would be stripped of all its
executive authority for staffing; it would become an appeal body and an
The Management Assault: 1967-1979 113
audit body and move into a new category of parliamentary agent like
the auditor general. Yet, as radical as it may seem, it was this vision that
was implemented by the civil service commissions of the USA in 1978
and the UK in 1991.
There were two decisive directions set out in the proposals put
forward by the Lambert Commission. On the one hand, it wanted to
increase overhead control by Parliament and Cabinet by expanding
the mandate of various watchdog agencies, one of which would be the
PSC. On the other hand, it considered that the current weakness of
financial management in the civil service stemmed from a failure to
delegate sufficient authority to enable the public service to manage its
affairs in the pursuit of clearly defined objectives. In its view, if these
two directions were simultaneously pursued, a more accountable
government and administration would develop. In actual practice, this
would mean that the proposed board of management could ensure that
departments made realistic program proposals and carried them out
with economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Parliament would receive
clear comprehensive and consistent information on spending proposals
and achievements.
For the Lambert Commission, as well as for nearly every other
public service inquiry, in the final analysis the senior public service,
and deputy heads in particular, were the fulcrums of reform. Senior
officials represented the most important link in the entire chain of
responsibility. This meant that deputy heads needed to be accountable
directly to Parliament. At the root of the problem, according to Lambert
and others, was a fatal flaw in the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.
As Lambert argued, "Any defence of ministerial responsibility that did
not take into account the real and independent role of the deputy in the
administration of government would ultimately prove destructive to
the doctrine itself."40 This warning would be echoed over the years, but
it would be disregarded in Ottawa. The notion that the deputy should
be made formally responsible for the administration of departmental
activities based on goals and objectives agreed with the ministers was
somehow considered a reform that would divert too much power away
from Cabinet. The Lambert Commission was not the first group to
note that the constitutional conventions governing the Canadian public
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service were weak and required strengthening. If those conventions were
not strengthened, the public service would continue to be subsumed
under more direct political control.
However, the bulk of Lambert's recommendations focused on
making the senior civil service more managerial; this required giving
it more discretion, more autonomy and more power and assigning a
number of overhead agencies responsibility for providing the necessary
administrative checks and balances. The PSC would be but one of
those agencies. In attempting to create a bridge between a modern and
traditional approach to public administration, the Lambert Commission
emphasized the need to respect traditional parliamentary authority as
exercised through various watchdogs, including a PSC that would audit
merit and neutrality while accepting the expressed desire for managerial
autonomy. One critic, however, complained,
Commissioners have been childlike in their innocence, painfully
lacking in modesty where they had much to be modest about, and
inadequately informed about a number of crucial matters where
ignorance could have been readily dispelled.41
Most troubling in this critique was the implication that the
recommendations would actually lead to a massive centralization
of authority in the proposed board of management, which would
accumulate all of the PSC's operational functions along with more
financial control, tilting the balance of power to the centre and
undermining not only the authority of deputy ministers but that of
individual ministers as well.42
D'AVIGNON COMMITTEE AND MERIT IN DECLINE?
Despite its own willingness to accept the need for more effective
management in the Government of Canada and to help bring about
this goal, the PSC faced persistent concerns about the scope and clarity
of the legislative framework that had emerged in 1967. The legislative
framework was still viewed as an impediment to effective management
and, in particular, there was dissatisfaction with the confusion caused
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by the reforms affecting the PSSRB and the PSC, each of which
exercised appeal functions. The confusion stemmed from the fact that
individuals who appealed down one avenue were deprived of access to
the other appeal process. The growing perception was that people were
being unjustly treated through no fault of their own. To help remedy
the situation, the government established the Special Committee on
the Review of Personnel Management and the Merit Principle to
examine the problems arising from the Public Service Employment Act,
particularly as it related to merit, promotion and procedures for redress
and appeals in regard to appointment, promotion and demotion and
access to employee training. This inquiry, headed by Guy D'Avignon
and consisting of both government and union representatives, was
instructed to inquire into the operation of personnel management and
the merit principle, two activities at the core of the PSC's mandate.43
While some of the D'Avignon Committee's recommendations were
helpful in resolving the jurisdictional disputes over appeals procedures,
the committee was no champion of the merit system. Rather, it came
to view merit much like many critics of the PSC had since as early
as the 1920s: merit was a secondary consideration in the face of the
overwhelming need for effective personnel management in the public
service and the more pressing need for effective executive leadership
from Cabinet. Merit, rather than being a substantive value at the heart
of personnel policy in a democracy, was now commonly viewed as a
series of instrumental procedures centred on ensuring fairness, equality
and transparency but not on ensuring that new public servants had the
character and values associated with being a responsible public servant.
According to the D'Avignon Committee, the problems of
personnel management and merit could be traced, yet again, to the
absence of any philosophy of management or sense of organizational
leadership. In these circumstances, managers were poorly equipped to
manage, suffered from excessive and inflexible regulation governing
merit and slavishly adhered to universally applied merit rules at the
expense of efficiency and effectiveness. Many believed that the PSC
should concentrate on activities construed to "establish high standards
of managerial competence, to identify managerial jobs and develop
managers."44 This meant moving from a preoccupation with protecting
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the merit system toward a greater focus on developing a philosophy of
management and developing managers.
But what would that philosophy of management look like? The
D'Avignon Committee suggested that a philosophy of management
needed to occupy itself with the relationship between managers and
their employees, state the areas where high achievement was expected,
and specify appropriate performance criteria. Employees were more
productive if they knew what was expected of them. For this reason, it was
vital that the management philosophy be goal oriented. It was probably
impossible, and certainly unreasonable, to hold employees accountable
for failing to achieve goals that were not clearly specified at the outset.
According to the D'Avignon Committee, the greatest problem with
the public service was that it "simply lacks a system that defines goals,
secures the commitment of managers to their achievement, and feeds
progress reports to provide the mechanism for accountability."45
The D'Avignon Committee reflected the accumulated wisdom
of the two previous royal commissions, plus the new intellectual
orientation in the field of management studies, all of which urged that
managers be given the opportunity to manage while being subject to a
series of checks and balances provided by central agencies and oversight
bodies like the PSC, which would establish policies and procedures.
Nevertheless, as with the past two decades of reform, changes to the
PSC were difficult to implement. The committee pointed out that since
1920 there had been an ever-increasing burden of rules, regulations,
guidelines, directives and controls, which managers claimed were
sapping the system of its energy and limiting their ability to manage.46
This rigid system was "the very antithesis of modern management
philosophy" and while it could, in certain instances, prevent the
worst abuses associated with older management philosophies (that is,
patronage and corruption), it would never create the "results-oriented"
management that was needed.
As part of its desire to modernize the personnel management
system, the D'Avignon Committee, echoing a loud chorus of critics,
wanted to modernize the concept of merit. It had been repeatedly
pointed out that when merit was introduced in the 1920s, the vogue
in managerial thinking was scientific management. But academic
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and professional understanding of management and organizational
behaviour had evolved substantially over the years. D'Avignon noted,
Among the organizations that comprise the public service are found
structures, managerial styles and systems that reflect the entire range
of organizational theory. Yet our merit system is firmly rooted in the
school of scientific management and no other.47
What is striking about this statement is its lack of regard for merit as a
key value associated with the constitutional convention of a non-partisan
public service. There was no sense that merit was a value that had to be
maintained if the public service were to retain its status as an important
and independent institution of Canadian democracy. Indeed, by the
end of the 1970s, the notion of a constitutional public service based on
the core principles of merit and non-partisanship appeared to be rather
romantic. It was an era in which the public service was expected to
be responsive to politicians, citizens and managers, and there was little
acknowledgment of its broader role.
What emerged from the D'Avignon Committee was a desire to
create a more flexible merit system without returning to a patronage
system. The concern was not a return to political patronage; rather, it
was the old, ever-enduring concern that managers would create a form
of bureaucratic patronage. There was also a concern about the rise of
a closed career service that would be hostile to outsiders, particularly
regional minorities, racial minorities and women. As a partial remedy,
the committee proposed the old view that the PSC should continue to
promote a closed career service in the unionized or lower public service
but be much more open to talented outsiders in the more senior ranks.
The senior civil service should be open to outside recruitment whereas
the unionized parts of the public service should operate according to
the principle of entry-level recruitment and internal promotion.48
The D'Avignon Committee report is not, strictly speaking, a report
on the merit system at all, as the discussion of merit takes up only a small
portion of the entire text. In addition, the committee's views regarding
merit are generally unhelpful. The committee saw merit as something
that bound the hands of management and was in need of reform so
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that the government could "adapt the merit system to management's
needs."49 It also stressed the idea that merit should not be paramount
among administrative principles in the public service but rather should
reside alongside efficiency, effectiveness, sensitivity, equity and equality
of opportunity. Merit should "be designed to allow managerial flexibility
to deploy staff according to changing program demands and fluctuating
workloads."50 The message is clear: if merit interferes with management,
then the needs of management should prevail.
The D'Avignon Committee's only praise for the merit system came
in its approval of the distinctly Canadian practice of applying merit to a
particular job and not to the fitness of the candidate for a lifelong career
that would typically involve different kinds of work. This practice had
been in place since the 1919 classification plan and had ensured that
recruitment to the Canadian public service was never confined to the
entry levels but occurred at all levels.51 Its main advantage had always
been that it allowed elite recruitment into the senior public service,
and it was seen as something that was encouraged in the existing
legislation.52 The committee's only suggestion regarding this practice
was to amend the Public Service Employment Act to allow more direct
recruitment when it was in the public interest, as opposed to the interest
of the public service. This meant that the PSC needed to make sure that
outside appointments to the senior ranks were more representative of
Canadian society than before.
CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF THE PERFORMANCE PARADIGM
New views about the changing role of the public service generally
involved restricting the role of the PSC. Michael Kirby, principal secre-
tary to Prime Minister Trudeau, expressed a growing trend in his call for
a decentralized and disaggregated public service in which service delivery
was brought closer to citizens. He envisioned establishing revenue
dependency for units that offered services with market potential, private-
public competition and full costing of public services. The goal was to
make government managers subject to the strong economic incentives
that now exist only in the competitive business world, and this would
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make at least part of government decision making subject to the
same kind of discipline which governs decision making processes in
the competitive private sector.53
Clearly, Kirby's ideas were part of the movement toward what would
soon be referred to as "entrepreneurial government," and the PSC was
seen to be a major obstacle on the road to that goal.
There was growing pressure to see the PSC restricted to a recruitment
service at best or an audit agency at worst. It was supposed to focus on
the lower levels where it could provide efficient service while becoming
an audit or certifying agent to ensure that proper procedures were
fulfilled in the case of higher-level appointments. One commentator
noted that such a "slimming down would create a new role for the PSC,
more akin, on the personnel front, to that of the auditor general on the
financial front."54 The PSC as an audit agency with all appointment
powers transferred to executive control would remain a reform that was
very popular with external reviewers but one that could never find a
sponsor within government. No politician in Canada was willing to
remove the PSC's executive responsibility and, in so doing, renege on
the original 1908 bargain with Parliament.
Despite the reluctance to follow through on measures to downsize
the PSC, there was nonetheless a slow but growing acceptance that
the public service was an organization that had to modernize; it had
to transform itself from a servant of vague principles associated with
constitutional conventions into a more instrumental organization
in the service of the executive. Slowly, the public service was being
stripped of any moral content; the notion of merit as a substantive
value was being replaced instead by the view that merit amounted to
a series of instrumental procedures.55 This chapter has focused on how
the PSC was caught up in various attempts to play down the role of
merit and was increasingly asked to see its role as helping to elevate
the importance of management in the creation of a professional public
service. To some extent, the PSC was forced into this role. It appears that
merit had few friends and that everyone was calling for greater direct
executive leadership over management functions in order to make the
public service more accountable, more efficient and more responsive
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to political direction.56 While this was not the only trend during this
period, it does stand out as a key development in the post-1967 reforms
leading up to the 1980s, the decade in which politicians around the
world began to express great interest in public management reforms,
which collectively, if somewhat vaguely, would come to be called the
New Public Management (NPM). This managerial worldview arose
from a desire to overcome the constraining influence of the merit
system in the name of better management. Consequently, any agency
that represented an attachment to the old view of public service was
seen to be standing in the way of progress. It was at this time that the
PSC's counterparts around the world were put on the chopping block.
Yet, the complaints were not new. The PSC was, from the outset,
viewed as counterproductive to modernization. It was too slow, it
deprived managers of their rightful authority and its emphasis on
fairness and process meant that meaningful reforms were difficult to
implement. What those examining the role of the PSC in the 1970s
were suggesting was that if the Government of Canada followed
the requirements of managerial reform, the result would be a better
performing public service for Canadians. Public service reform was
coming to be seen as a technical activity that could be made to work
through clear lines of authority and concentrated executive power.57
There was little willingness to defend any other considerations beyond
those that would help improve performance. Emphasis was on the
nature of the work and its ability to achieve results, and no longer on
the earlier ideas of public service as a vocation that was part of a well-
ordered and well-governed society. As well, there was a growing lack of
interest in, and respect for, the professionalism and neutrality of the
public service, which the PSC had been responsible for maintaining.
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rOLITICAL NEUTRALITY:
|1979-2
The existence of a convention of political neutrality, central to the
principle of responsible government ... is not seriously disputed.
The Supreme Court of Canada, Osborne decision, 1991
After two decades of virtually uninterrupted Liberal governments,
the arrival in power of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1984
marked an important turning point in Canadian politics. The new
prime minister, Brian Mulroney, had few good words to say about the
public service throughout his campaign, going so far as to promise
that, once in office, he would hand out "pink slips and running shoes
to bureaucrats."1 Beyond concerns for efficiency and economy, the
responsiveness of the public service to the political executive was an
important concern of the new government, leading to debates about
the appropriate level of political influence over the staffing of the senior
ranks of the public service. As a result, in addition to the return of
the perennial debate about the need for greater managerial flexibility
in staffing, the Mulroney years also saw the emergence of new concerns
about the politicization of the public service, concerns that did not
disappear after the Liberal government returned to power in 1993. In
fact, the debate on the politicization of the public service acquired a new
dimension in the 1990s when some of the prohibitions against political
activities by public servants were found to be incompatible with the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms adopted in 1982, creating concerns that
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This chapter will recount the debates of the last few decades about
the principle of the political neutrality of the public service and the
events that challenged the traditional norms and policies associated
with this principle. We will see that, in the period from 1979 to 2006,
there was considerable disagreement about the meaning and value of the
political neutrality of the bureaucracy in a liberal democracy and, more
importantly, about the appropriate safeguards that should flow from the
desire to apply this principle to the staffing of Canada's public service.
Throughout these debates and events, the Public Service Commission
(PSC) played a key role in defending a strong version of political
neutrality, reminding critics of its value to democratic government.
But, as legitimate concerns about responsiveness to democratic control
and the protection of the fundamental political rights of public servants
gained in prominence, the PSC and its traditional conception of
political neutrality suffered some setbacks. As it had done when facing
other issues in the past, the PSC had to adapt and strive to find a new
balance among these competing values, all of which were integral to
Canadian democracy.
CONTROLLING A DISTRUSTED BUREAUCRACY: POLITICIZATION
FROM THE TOP?
As already noted, the election of the Mulroney government in 1984
represented a historical shift in power for Canada. After decades of
Liberal governments that had presided over the development of the
welfare state, the arrival of a Progressive Conservative government
committed to fiscal restraint and smaller government was somewhat
of a worrisome prospect for the federal bureaucracy. The feeling of
apprehension was mutual: several ministers and advisers of the incoming
government distrusted the public service and saw it as a potential
impediment to the implementation of its agenda.
While the new government might have harboured some prejudice
about the competence of public servants,2 the broader issue was their
responsiveness to political control. In the government's view, public
servants were invested in the status quo and excessively loyal to the
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social programs which they had built up over the preceding decades
under Liberal leadership and which they were now paid to administer.
As Peter White, a senior adviser in the Prime Minister's Office, put it in
a memorandum to the Prime Minister in 1985,
The Liberal Party, in office for 20 years out of 21 up to 1984, built
the public service that we have inheritedhese appointments
were made in a conscious and perfectly proper effort to fashion a
senior public service that would be compatible with Trudeau's style
and approach—the very style and approach that Canadian voters
so emphatically rejected in September 1984. It is idle to. think that
these men and women, who have spent most of their public service
careers designing and implementing the Trudeau/Pitfield approach
to government, could suddenly become strongly committed to
radically altering their own creation.3
In his note, White went so far as to say that more than half of
Mulroney's Cabinet ministers appeared to be "dominated" by the
"bureaucrats inherited from the Trudeau years" and that these senior
officials were hindering the government's ability to implement the
changes desired by the electorate.4
This view of the senior bureaucracy, in which the loyalty and
responsiveness of senior officials was believed to be clouded by a
combination of self-interest, past loyalties and ideological affinity
with previous governments, undoubtedly coloured how the Mulroney
government initially approached the issue of staffing the senior public
service. Establishing greater political control of the bureaucracy became
an important objective, and the government took a number of steps in
this regard.
First, there is no doubt that the government looked carefully at
the Order-in-Council appointments that were legitimately under its
control. For example, Peter White, who served as the Prime Minister's
special assistant for Governor-in-Council appointments at the time,
explicitly argued that the Prime Minister's Office needed to get involved
more intimately in the appointment and supervision of senior officials,
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especially deputy ministers, in order to ensure that the public service
did not become an obstacle to implementing the government's agenda.
As he put it,
To reassure [Canadians], [the government] must make an early start
on gaining control of the bureaucracy by identifying and installing
some of our own chief operating officers as outlined above. This
should not be done with fanfare and only at long intervals, but
routinely and continuously over the government's mandate. We
must also bear in mind that a handful of positions, in the PCO, the
PSC, the Treasury Board, DRIE, etc., are the key to effective control
of the bureaucracy.5
To gain political control of the public service, a new team of senior
executives needed to be progressively put in place. The Mulroney
government did move forward on this agenda, at least to some extent.
About a year after taking office, it had already made forty-five new
appointments at the deputy minister level.6 Within two years, "virtually
all the deputy ministers" had been changed and a new senior management
team was in place, a level of transfers that Peter Aucoin, in his study of
the new public management in this period, called "unprecedented".7
However, while these appointments were seen "as a way of quickly
establishing political control of the bureaucracy,"8 they brought few
political appointees from outside the public service into the senior
executive rank. The difficulty of the work, coupled with a relatively
poor compensation package, made it difficult to attract appropriate
candidates from the private sector. In the end, the Prime Minister
turned largely to experienced public servants to build his new team.
As a result, while a measure of personal and ideological affinity might
have been sought in making these senior bureaucratic appointments, it
certainly did not lead to a major, American-style "politicization from
the outside".9
A second approach to gaining greater political control of the
bureaucracy was to exert political pressure for certain appointments
to be made to positions covered by the Public Service Employment
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Act (PSEA). This tack was more worrisome from the Public Service
Commission's point of view. As Jack Manion, a former senior public
servant, would later recall, many Progressive Conservative politicians
were advocating for a more American approach to staffing, including
"by extending political appointments down into the hierarchy."10 For
example, in interviews for this book, a number of former executives
who worked for the PSC and for the senior personnel division of the
Privy Council Office in the mid-1980s remembered that several new
ministers had wanted to appoint their own senior officials at the assistant
deputy minister level. The interviewees recounted having had multiple
meetings with new ministers and their staff to explain why they could
not simply hire the people they wanted. Some senior ministers, such
as Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen, who was well known for his
aversion to the bureaucracy, were said to have particularly strong feelings
about the need for more extensive ministerial input into the selection
of senior departmental staff. While appointment requests were not
unheard of under previous governments, the distrust of many ministers
in the Mulroney government resulted in greater pressures on the PSC
to yield to ministerial preferences. In the end, PSC officials were able to
resist such pressures by pointing to the PSC's clear statutory authority
in the area of staffing as well as to its institutional independence from
the political executive.
A final, more innovative step taken by the Mulroney government
to reassert political control over the bureaucracy was the strengthening
of ministerial offices through, in particular, the creation of a new
chief of staff position in every ministerial office. In fact, for some key
ministers and advisers, such as Don Mazankowski and Tom d'Aquino,
strengthening the political staff working with ministers seemed to
provide the best means to counteract the power of the bureaucracy.] ]
While ministerial offices obviously preceded the Mulroney government,
they were smaller in size and rarely constituted a significant challenge
to the bureaucracy. However, under the new government, ministerial
advisers would be expected to play a larger role in the policy-making
process and to help ensure that the ministers' decisions were understood
and diligently implemented by their departments.12 To clearly signal
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this new status, the most senior policy adviser was given the title of
chief of staff, and the position's rank (and salary) was elevated to the
equivalent of an Assistant Deputy Minister (i.e. EX-04).
From the point of view of staffing and the merit principle, the
growth of ministerial offices presented a dual challenge. The first
challenge was that ministerial staffers were political appointees
who were exempted from the normal requirements associated with
the merit system. In this regard, the Public Service Employment Act
simply stipulated that ministers had the authority to hire their own
staff, including their chief of staff; their appointments consequently
fell outside the authority of the PSC.13 However, as Liane Benoit has
argued in a study done for the Gomery Commission, while the formal
authority of ministerial staffers may be very limited, their access to the
minister, their role in the policy process and their ability to speak "on
behalf" of ministers in the operations of departments provides them
with considerable influence.14 As a result, ministerial staffers represent
a set of actors who can often insert themselves into the operation of
the public service without having been elected or selected on the basis
of merit. In the long-standing tension between necessary bureaucratic
responsiveness and undue politicization, growth in the number and
influence of ministerial staffers would pose a danger of tilting the
balance in favour of the latter.
The second challenge concerned the priority rights granted to
political staffers who wanted to enter the public service after having
spent at least three years in a minister's office. Under the provisions of
the PSEA, senior exempt staff, such as chiefs of staff, legislative assistants
and policy advisers, had the right to be appointed, in priority, to a
position at an equivalent level in the public service. In effect, this meant
that these former political appointees could enter the public service,
at a fairly senior level, without being subject to the examinations and
competitions normally required by the merit system.
The virtues of this kind of system have long been debated.15 By
providing a measure of security to political staffers, it can help attract
people of high quality to important but short-lived jobs in politics.
And there is no doubt that many former political staffers who have
entered the public service in this way have turned out to be outstanding
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public servants and served loyally under governments of different
partisan stripes. However, the potential for abuse also remains real, and
a few instances of abuse can inflict considerable damage on the public
trust.16 In recent years, the "sponsorship scandal," involving the misuse
of public funds for the benefit of the Liberal Party of Canada and a
series of advertising firms,17 certainly brought this fact into focus. In
this case, the abuse of the government program was linked in part to the
priority appointment of a minister's former chief of staff to a director
general's position within the same department. In a matter of weeks,
a political staffer who had been involved in the bureaucratic decision-
making process for the attribution of funds to outside groups came to
directly head the same program as a public servant.18 While this priority
appointment remained a small aspect of the controversy, it was a vivid
example of the potential for abuse of the exempt staff provisions of
the PSEA, and it was no doubt the reason why the new Conservative
government repealed these controversial provisions in December 2006,19
as had been recommended by the Gomery Commission.20
Ultimately, the attempts by the Mulroney government to gain
greater political control of the bureaucracy do not seem to have resulted
in significant change, the presence of chiefs of staff and the stronger
ministerial offices having largely been described as "Ineffective" and
"unsuccessful".21 The desire to make more political appointments to
the senior bureaucracy did not yield much result either: there was no
influx of outside political appointees into the ranks of deputy ministers
and the anecdotal efforts to gain a greater say in the appointment of
senior executives below the deputy ministerial rank were quashed by
the PSC. After the initial period of distrust, like its predecessors, the
Mulroney government turned to the professional bureaucracy to help
run the government, and the Prime Minister began to urge his ministers
to rely on the professional public service to manage their departments
and to focus instead on their own ministerial and political duties. As
Paul Tellier, clerk of the Privy Council at the time put it, "The Prime
Minister started to realize after six months in power that he needed the
public service perhaps more than they needed him."22
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From the point of view of merit and the staffing system, this period
can nevertheless be seen as characterized by the re-emergence of debates
and concerns about the politicization of the public service. While it
would be prudent not to exaggerate the importance of the political
pressures placed on the staffing process at the time, one former PSC
executive believed these pressures to be sufficiently strong to describe
this period as "a crucial period for the PSC,"23 in that it found itself
having to fend off unusual pressures and affirm its independence. While
the events of the period do not seem to have seriously threatened the
integrity of the staffing process or the application of the merit principle,
they do remind us of the ongoing need for safeguards against the
politicization of the staffing process in a liberal democracy.
Moreover, as the particular case of the Mulroney government also
reminds us, in a representative democracy, there are always legitimate
concerns about the responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the direction
of the elected government. Security of tenure, political neutrality and
merit-based appointments are the foundations of a professional public
service that can best serve the country's long-term interests, but care
must always be taken to ensure that the implementation of a merit
system does not inadvertently result in an unresponsive bureaucracy,
unwilling to bend to the elected government's legitimate preferences.
Staffing a professional bureaucracy is thus always a challenging balancing
act, and the Mulroney government's efforts to exert greater control over
the senior public service at least serve as a reminder that the desired
point of equilibrium between political neutrality and responsiveness
remains a matter of debate.
THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SERVANTS: POLITICIZATION
FROM THE BOTTOM?
While the concerns and behaviour of the Mulroney government brought
to the fore the difficult balance between neutrality and responsiveness
in the senior ranks of the public service, over the same period, some
key court decisions also forced the PSC to deal with concerns about the
appropriate balance between the political neutrality of the bureaucracy
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and the political rights of public servants in the lower ranks of the public
service. It has been a long established principle that, in order to preserve
the political neutrality of the public service, it is necessary to curtail the
rights of public servants to engage in partisan political activities. As we
have seen, the protection of the political neutrality of the public service
has been a central function of the PSC since its inception in the early
20th century. However, the exact norms and prohibitions that must flow
from this general principle have been a more contentious matter. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the PSC was forced to change its policies
on this central issue.
The ideal of a neutral arid professional public service able to
independently provide policy advice and implement government policy
without political consideration requires that public servants be non-
partisan, and be seen as non-partisan by both the government of the
day and the citizens who interact with them. If, because of their visible
political engagement, public servants were to be known as partisan, their
loyalty to the government of the day might be cast in doubt. But, equally
problematic, their impartiality in the conduct of their duties might also
be questioned by the citizens who are forced to interact with them and
who do not share their politics. For example, a businessman with a well-
known political affiliation might come to doubt the Impartiality and
motivation of a tax official making a determination about tax matters
if it were well known that the official was extensively involved with a
different party. Many public servants hold positions that grant them
a measure of discretion in the implementation of the law or in the
distribution of public funds and to sow doubts about potential political
bias in the exercise of such discretion would undoubtedly be injurious
to Canadian democracy and public trust in the public service.
For these reasons, the Public Service Employment Act has long
contained provisions constraining the right of public servants to
participate in political activities. More specifically, before the PSEA's
reform in 2003, section 33 forbade deputy heads and other employees
of the public service to "engage in work for or against a candidate" in
an election, "engage in work for or against a political party," or "be
a candidate." However, the act also made exceptions to this blanket
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prohibition. It stipulated clearly that making financial donations to a
candidate or a political party and attending a political meeting were
not prohibited.24 Obviously, public servants also had the right to vote.
Moreover, employees, unlike deputy heads, could also seek nomination
and run for office, but only if they obtained permission from the PSC.
In order to grant such permission, and consequently a leave of absence,
the PSC had to determine that "the usefulness to the Public Service of
the employee in the position the employee then occupies would not be
impaired by reason of that employee having been a candidate."25
Over the years, these provisions had been the object of some
contention, but as the language of rights became more prevalent in
Canadian society, the issue of the political rights of public servants
became more salient in Ottawa. As the Special Committee on the
Review of Personnel Policy and the Merit Principle (the D'Avignon
Committee) observed in 1979,
The views of intervenors on the question of whether public servants
should be free to participate in partisan political activity ran the
gamut. Some clearly believed passionately in their right to unfettered
involvement and declared that no public service legislation would
extinguish that right. At the other extreme was the view that partisan
activity by any public servant was sufficient to cast a shadow on the
political neutrality of the entire public service. Our experience is
that the younger public servants are the most insistent on having the
freedom to participate in the political process.26
Perceiving a growing desire among public servants for political
involvement, the D'Avignon Committee believed that the widespread
prohibition against political activities was "out of step with reality" and
ultimately "unenforceable".27 Consequently, already in the late 1970s,
the committee was recommending that the PSEA be amended to grant
public servants a greater measure of freedom to engage in political
activities.
The scheme proposed by the D'Avignon Committee was inspired
largely by the British system and it followed from the principle, which
would become important in Canadian law as well, that the rights of
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employees to participate in politics should vary based on their rank
and functions. The committee did not dispute the importance of the
political neutrality of the public service or the fact that it enhanced
the value of the public service to the government and citizens, but it
believed that many public servants, due to the nature of their work,
could fully participate in the political process without comprising the
bureaucracy's impartiality As the Supreme Court of Canada would later
put it, the consequences of having known partisan ties are hardly the
same for a deputy minister and a cafeteria employee.28 The higher the
level of responsibility, the level of discretion and the potential influence
on government decisions, the more important political neutrality
becomes. The widespread prohibitions contained in the PSEA, which,
for the most part, applied in the same manner to all employee categories
and levels, were therefore considered to be excessive.
As a remedy, the D'Avignon Committee recommended in 1979
that the public service be divided into three groups for the purpose of
determining employees' rights to political participation. A first group,
comprising senior executives and senior managers, would be denied the
right to participate actively in the political process, but such individuals
would be allowed to make financial donations, attend political meetings
and vote. A second group, which would include employees who
performed duties that could be tainted by their political engagement,
such as those involved in personnel administration or the awarding of
contracts and grants, would see their right to political involvement made
conditional on the PSC's approval. Finally, a third group, comprising
all remaining occupational categories, would be granted "full freedom
of political action," including the automatic right to seek nominations
and run for office.29
At the time, the PSC strongly opposed such reforms. In its
opinion, the expansion of the political rights of public servants would
necessarily threaten the principle of political neutrality of the public
service. In interview, Edgar Gallant, PSC president at the time, recalled
that he did not see eye to eye with most deputy ministers on this issue
and that resisting these proposals was very important to him. He held
a strong view that public servants were professionals who should not
engage, or be seen to be engaged, in electoral politics and partisan
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activities. In protecting the professional reputation of the public service,
the perception of neutrality was as important as neutrality itself. To
allow greater, more visible political participation by employees in its
lower ranks would run the risk of breeding distrust in the entire public
service.
While it seemed to be part of a minority that was resisting an
expansion of political rights for public servants, the PSC was not alone.
Indeed, Gallant's adherence to a strong version of political neutrality
was later echoed by Supreme Court Justice William Stevenson, who
issued a dissenting opinion in a landmark court case on the subject:
The [PSEA] could distinguish between various levels of employees,
but, in my view, the case against partisan activities is a strong one
Once allegiances are known, the principles of neutrality, impartiality
and integrity are endangered. There is a danger within the service that
those seeking appointments and promotions will feel some incentive
to cut their cloth to the known partisan interests of those who have
influence over appointments and promotions. Visible partisanship
by civil servants displays a lack of neutrality, and a betrayal of that
convention of neutrality. The public perception of neutrality is thus
severely impaired, if not destroyed must say that to permit overt
partisan political activity is to come perilously close to abandoning
the principle of neutrality.30
It was this kind of strong version of political neutrality that underpinned
the PSC's opposition to changes to the PSEA.
However, while it was able to block these reforms in the late 1970s,
the PSC would be unable to prevent changes from being made to the
law in the years that followed. Two court cases proved particularly
significant in redefining the substance of political rights for public
servants between 1985 and 1992: the Eraser decision of 1985 and the
Osborne decision of 1991.31
The Eraser case involved a challenge by a Revenue Canada employee
who was fired after expressing strong public criticism of government
policies on the adoption of the metric system and on the constitutional
entrenchment of a charter of rights and freedoms. In newspapers and on
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radio shows, Neil Fraser, the regional head of the Business Tax Division
in Kingston, had repeatedly criticized the Trudeau government's policies
and the government itself, going so far as to compare the government
to the dictatorial government of Poland and to the regime of Nazi
Germany.32 He even wrote to the Leader of the Government in the
British House of Commons, criticizing the Canadian government and
pleading with the British government not to grant Canada's request to
adopt a new constitution.33 After several warnings, Fraser was dismissed
from the public service. He then appealed to the Public Service Staff
Relations Board and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Canada,
arguing that the government was placing undue constraints on his
freedom of speech in order to allegedly preserve the public service's
impartiality and effectiveness.
In the end, the Supreme Court upheld Fraser's dismissal. As the
Chief Justice put it, while not a constitutional case per se, the Fraser
case turned on the issue of the
proper legal balance between (i) the right of an individual, as a
member of the Canadian democratic community, to speak freely and
without inhibition on important public issues and (ii) the duty of
an individual, qua federal public servant, to fulfil properly his or her
functions as an employee of the Government of Canada..34
In rendering its decision in the case, the court provided some guidance
on how such balance should be approached. It made it clear that, while
the curtailment of public servants' freedom of speech was warranted
by the objective of maintaining an impartial and loyal public service,
public servants could not be "silent members of society" and had "some
freedom to criticize the Government."35 In the court's view, it was also
incumbent upon civil servants to ensure that the substance, context
and form of their public criticism were such that it would not impair
their ability to perform their job as loyal and impartial government
employees.36 In Neil Fraser's case, the adjudicator quite reasonably
inferred that the extensive and vitriolic nature of his criticism of major
government policies had indeed impaired his ability to perform his
duties.
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In itself, the Fraser case did not represent a major blow to the
political rights provisions of the PSEA, which remained intact. But
it was nevertheless significant for two reasons. First, it confirmed the
need to strike a new balance between preserving the impartiality of the
public service and protecting the political rights of civil servants. While
Fraser himself had clearly gone beyond the permissible limits, it was by
no means clear that the PSC's stronger version of political neutrality
struck the proper balance. As a former official of the PSC recalled in
an interview, "The Fraser decision encouraged people seeking changes
to the status quo, including union officials and some of their political
allies in Parliament."37 Second, in its reasons, the Supreme Court clearly
endorsed the view that "the degree of restraint which must be exercised
[on the right of political expression] is relative to the position and
visibility of the civil servant."38 In this way, the court indirectly endorsed
the general logic previously expressed by the D'Avignon Committee, a
view that clashed with the broader prohibitions favoured by the PSC.
It was a clear signal that a new balance, one that acknowledged the
political rights of civil servants to a greater extent, would need to be
found in the coming years.
The second court decision, which altered the definition of the
political rights of public servants more fundamentally, was handed
down by the Supreme Court in 1991 in the Osborne case. The decision
actually involved a series of cases relating to public servants whose right
to participate in various political activities had been denied by the
PSC. Osborne and Millar, two of the respondents in the case, had been
elected as delegates to the 1984 Liberal party leadership convention,
but they were then forced to resign as delegates after being advised by
their department that they would suffer disciplinary actions if they
failed to do so. Other respondents wanted to work, on their own time,
for various candidates in the 1984 election campaign. One wanted
simply to stuff envelopes from her home or the campaign office of
the party she supported. Another employee, who felt strongly about
the place of women in Canadian society, wanted to speak publicly in
her community about which party she believed had the best electoral
platform for advancing the status of women. In all cases, the central
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issue was whether the freedom of expression guaranteed by Section 2 of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was unduly restricted by Section 33
of the PSEA. The courts considered the cases together. Having lost their
trial in first instance, the public servants won their appeal in the Federal
Court of Appeal in 1988. Seeking to protect the integrity of the PSEA,
the PSC then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's Osborne decision dealt a significant blow
to the political rights provisions of the Public Service Employment
Act, invalidating subsections 33(1)(a) and (b). These two subsections
prohibited public servants from engaging in "work for or against" a
candidate or a political party, prohibitions that the PSC had strongly
defended over the years. In its reasons, the Supreme Court again
emphasized the importance of striking an appropriate balance between
the freedom of expression of civil servants and the legitimate constraints
placed upon this freedom for the sake of protecting the political
neutrality of the public service. It specifically found the prohibitions
on working for or against a party or a candidate to be excessively broad.
While the legitimacy of Parliament's objective—ensuring an impartial
public service—was never disputed, the means of doing so were found
to fail the "minimal impairment" and "proportionality" tests imposed
by the charter. The prohibitions of the PSEA went beyond what was
necessary to preserve the political neutrality of the bureaucracy, thereby
unnecessarily trampling a fundamental freedom of civil servants.
Again, in reaching its decision, the Supreme Court argued for
a more differentiated set of prohibitions, based on the level and type
of jobs. Pointing out that "a great number of public servants who in
modern government are employed in carrying out clerical, technical
or industrial duties that are completely divorced from the exercise
of any discretion that could be in any manner affected by political
considerations," the court stated that "the need for impartiality and
indeed the appearance thereof does not remain constant throughout
the civil service hierarchy."39 It thus built upon the Eraser decision,
similarly lending indirect support for the D'Avignon Committee's
original proposal to adopt the British approach to the regulation of civil
servants' political rights.
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In the end, the Osborne decision left the PSC in a difficult position.
While the provisions forbidding public servants to seek nomination
and run for office, except with the explicit permission of the PSC,
were left intact, other limits on political participation were not as clear.
Refusing to read new provisions into the act, the Supreme Court had
simply struck out the unconstitutional provisions, explicitly inviting
Parliament to redraft the impugned provisions and amend the PSEA.
But such parliamentary guidance would not be forthcoming, certainly
not in the near future, and the commission needed to clarify the nature
of the constraints remaining on public servants.
A few weeks after the Osborne decision was made public in June
1991, the PSC issued a statement announcing its new position. Signed
by the three commissioners, the commission's statement said that while
the statutory prohibition against working for or against a candidate or
a political party no longer had any force,
at the same time, employees should be aware that the principle of
a politically neutral Public Service remains intact. Therefore, in
engaging in political activities, they should exercise judgment and
consider their specific circumstances, particularly with due regard to
the loyalty they owe to the Government and to their obligation to
act, and be seen to act, impartially when dealing with the public.40
With respect to their right to criticize the government in public,
employees were simply referred to the 1985 Fraser decision.
The exact meaning of this statement of policy is unclear and it
certainly provided little guidance on what was actually permissible and
what was not. More of an exhortation to act responsibly than a statement
of rules, it no doubt reflected the absence of a clear legal foundation to
regulate the political behaviour of civil servants. Following the Osborne
decision, with the exception of the prohibition on running for office,
the commission seemed to have little legal recourse to prevent other
forms of partisan engagement by public servants. As a former official
of the commission put it, "The PSC, TBS and deputy.heads are not in
a position to do much when an employee engages in political activity
which is not acceptable."41
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A few years later, at the time of the 1993 general election, the
Treasury Board Secretariat issued a set of principles and guidelines,
drafted in close collaboration with the Public Service Commission.42
The Guidelines on Employee Rights and Responsibilities during an Election
remained equally vague. After informing employees that they could
engage in "activities of ,a political nature," the guidelines exhorted
them to remain loyal to their employer, the Government of Canada,
and exercise some restraint in their political involvement so as to
avoid jeopardizing the tradition of the public service as a politically
neutral institution. Employees were encouraged to consult senior
management if they had doubts about the political activities that they
were contemplating. Again, with respect to the public criticism of
government, employees were simply reminded that the Eraser decision
had held that a balance had to be struck between an employee's freedom
of expression and the public interest in preserving an impartial public
service.43 The exact nature of that balance, and how it could be struck,
was not explained.
This ambiguous situation, where the principle of political neutrality
continued to be deemed important but failed to be supported by clear
statutory provisions, did not sit easily with the PSC. Internally, the
commission, which was already wishing for more detailed statutory
provisions in the 1980s, discussed the rationale and potential outline
of a new law that would enshrine the principle of political neutrality. In
an internal document developed to consider new legislative measures,
it argued,
The integrity of the Public Service is at some risk: the TBS, deputy
heads and employees themselves do not know with sufficient
certainty where they standhe PSC's role as guardian of the non-
partisanship of the Public Service had stood for years. Ever since
Osborne, Millar its leadership) role has become blurred. Yet federal,
provincial and territorial general elections and by-elections are held
on an on-going basis and employees and managers continue to look
to the PSC (as well as TBS, now) for advice with respect to candidacy
as well as other political activity. The PSC stands to gain from its role
being clarified.44
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A new law could bring the necessary clarity. In particular, in
considering the potential content of such legislation, the commission's
staff was proposing that the new legislation create a restricted class of
employees and specify the activities that would be permitted, and those
that would not, for this class of persons. Then, those employees who did
not fall into that restricted class would enjoy broad freedom to engage
in all activities, with the potential exception of some specified activities
that would be universally prohibited. The restricted class would include
the entire executive group, employees having substantial management
duties or input in policy formulation as well as those exercising
significant discretion in implementing government programs, such as
making decisions on giving grants, imposing penalties or negotiating
contracts.45 Unfortunately, in the wake of the Osborne judgment, there
seemed to be little interest among politicians in tackling this issue in
Parliament.
In fact, the only attempt to amend the political provisions of the
PSEA in the early 1990s was an attempt to further weaken the law by
striking out the only part of Section 33 that was left unscathed by the
Osborne decision: the prohibition on seeking nomination and running
for office. In the early 1990s, concerns about electoral participation and
democratic practices led the Mulroney government to establish a Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, also known as
the Lortie Commission. The Lortie Commission tabled its report at the
end of 1991, making a wide range of recommendations to reform the
electoral process, and, somewhat surprisingly, it recommended that all
federal employees be granted an automatic right to a leave of absence to
seek nomination and to be a candidate in a federal election.46
Hie Lortie Commission's rationale for the proposed changes
rested largely on perceived contradictions in the current federal policy
on the political activities of civil servants. It pointed out that, under
the existing system, the government could always appoint individuals
from outside the public service, even people who had obvious partisan
ties, to deputy minister positions. Moreover, the priority rights granted
to ministerial staffers under the PSEA meant that a number of people
with very recent, high-level partisan ties were entering the higher
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echelons of the public service on a regular basis. It was also a common
practice for some senior civil servants to join ministerial offices for a
while, before returning to their public service jobs, in order to provide
ministers with needed expertise in policy and public administration.47
All these movements in personnel, the Lortie Commission pointed
out, amounted to an acknowledgment by the federal government that
professional public servants can have partisan, political experience and
still adhere to the norms of a neutral and non-partisan bureaucracy
once they are appointed, or return, to a public service job. If we believe
that partisan political activities, even recent ones, are compatible with
maintaining a neutral public service in the higher ranks of the public
service, the Lortie Commission asked, why would it not be the same
throughout the entire public service? This view also seemed supported
by the fact that several provinces already considered a leave of absence
to run for election to be the right of public servants, as opposed to a
privilege to be granted on a case-by-case basis.48
When it considered the Royal Commission's recommendation, the
Special Committee of the House of Commons on Electoral Reform
initially looked favourably upon the recommendation and considered it
as part of a package of legislative changes. Needless to say, the PSC took
a different view. Its president at the time, Robert Giroux, mounted a
strong defence against the proposal. Giroux and his two commissioners
wrote to Jim Hawke, chairman of the Special Committee, to express
their "serious concerns with respect to the proposal," arguing that it
could have "serious and potentially far-reaching effects on the political
neutrality of the Public Service."49 The commission also submitted a
brief to the parliamentary committee arguing strongly against the
amendment.
In these documents, the PSC pointed out that the impartiality of
the public service had been considered by the courts as an important
constitutional convention, even "an essential prerequisite of responsible
government."50 It also reminded the parliamentarians that the Mulroney
government itself, in the context of its administrative reform initiative
called "Public Service 2000," had recently reiterated its commitment to
the "scrupulously non-partisan character" of the public service, stating
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that this non-partisan character was needed for it "to be professional
and effective in supporting the Government of the day and providing
service to Canadians."51 By granting all public servants the automatic
right to run for office, Parliament would threaten this desired political
neutrality and could impair the usefulness of the bureaucracy.
In defence of this viewpoint, the commission relied on two key
arguments. First, it pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the Fraser and
Osborne decisions, had explicitly stated that, despite the need to allow
civil servants a greater degree of political expression, political neutrality
remained an important constitutional principle and that some balance
had to be struck between these two competing objectives. Moreover,
the court clearly thought that a public servant's level in the hierarchy,
and his or her public visibility, degree of discretion in distributing
sanctions or benefits and degree of influence on government policy
were all factors that should be considered before permitting the public
servant to fully engage in political activities. By granting an automatic
right to seek nominations and run for office to all public servants, and
taking away the Public Service Commission's discretion, the proposed
legislative measures would clearly run counter to this approach. In the
commission's words, it would "run contrary to the spirit of the Supreme
Court judgment."52 Without an authority like the PSC to judge each
case on its particular merits, no proper balance could be struck.
Second, the commission argued that there was no convincing
evidence that the Section 33 provisions created a significant barrier for
public servants who wanted to run for office. In fact, these permissions
were seldom denied. From 1967 to 1992, the PSC granted 230
permissions out of 256 requests, an approval rate of ninety percent.53
Moreover, none of the twenty-eight employees who, over that period
of twenty-five years, saw their application denied challenged the
commission's decision in court.54 In sum, the commission's discretion
both allowed it to prevent cases where excessive political engagement by
a public servant could have compromised the neutrality, or perception
of neutrality, of the bureaucracy and allowed the vast majority of those
who wanted to run for office to do so in perfect legality. From the point
of view of encouraging electoral participation, Section 33 of the PSEA
hardly seemed to be a significant barrier.
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It is not clear whether the commission's position would have
ultimately prevailed, as there appeared to be a fair degree of consensus
across parties on most of the proposed reforms. But the dissolution
of Parliament put a stop to the legislative process and, consequently,
Section 33 of the PSEA was left untouched. A few years later, in the fall
of 1998, Jean Chretiens Liberal government considered reintroducing
the snnu1 legislative proposal. In its internal debates, the PSC reached
the H I M Conclusion as in 1992 and intended to strongly oppose the
im.r'.u;-, inside the public service but also in a more public way, using
its independence as an agent of Parliament. As an internal memo stated
at the time,
[Privy Council Office] officials need to be informed that the
Commission would not support a move to reduce the Commissions
authority in this area. The Commission reserves the right to make this
view known to any parliamentary committee that may subsequently
study this matter.55
In the end, again, the PSEA was not amended, the provisions on running
for office were left untouched and another attempt at undercutting the
commission's remaining authority was pushed back.
Changes in the political rights provisions of the PSEA were finally
made in 2003, when Parliament adopted the Public Service Modernization
Act (PSMA) in an effort to overhaul the entire human resources system
of the federal public service. Since the PSMA represented such a
comprehensive legislative change, it presented an obvious opportunity
to clarify the government's policy on the political rights of civil servants.
However, it is interesting to note that the approach adopted at this time
varied significantly from the one considered by Parliament in 1991 and
1998. Largely driven by the senior public service, in the context of a
major initiative focused on improving the public service as opposed to a
specific measure to improve electoral participation, the 2003 legislative
reform did not seek to introduce an automatic right to a leave of absence
to run for office, but rather to inscribe directly in law the state of policy
resulting from the Supreme Court decisions of the previous decades
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and to restore the ability of the Public Service Commission to enforce
this policy.
Part 7 of the new PSEA explicitly recognizes, for the first time, the
need to reconcile the right of employees to engage in political activities
with the need to preserve the political neutrality of the public service,
and it allows employees to engage in such activities as long as they do
not impair their ability to do their job in a politically impartial manner.
Employees who wish to seek a party's nomination and run for office
must obtain the Public Service Commission's approval, and, for the first
time, this obligation extends to participation in municipal elections.
These measures apply to all employees of the federal public service,
with the exception of deputy heads, who are explicitly prohibited from
participating in any political activity with the exception of voting. This
new wording concerning deputy heads appears to further limit the
scope of their political participation since, under the older version of
the statute, they were also allowed to make donations to political parties
and individual candidates. Finally, the new PSEA clearly established
the Public Service Commission's authority to investigate any allegation
that an employee has violated these provisions on the political activities
of public servants. The PSC can even investigate alleged violations of
the ban on political activities by deputy heads, reporting its conclusion
to the Governor-in-Council, provided that the allegation is made by a
person who is or has been a candidate in an election.56
By restoring some of the PSC's authority to limit the political
activities of civil servants while taking into account the new legal
landscape brought about by the Osborne decision, the new legislative
measures tried to strike a new balance between the competing objectives
of neutrality, political participation and freedom of expression. But they -
were found lacking by some observers and stakeholders. For example,
Gordon Robertson, former clerk of the Privy Council, thought that
they were "completely in conflict with the principle of neutrality" and
he expressed great concern about their impact.57 Similarly, Donald
Savoie, a noted scholar of public administration, argued that the new
act should have simply outlawed political involvement by all senior
managers: "Every single executive or manager in the public service
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should have no interest whatsoever in partisan politics," he said. "If
they do, then they should do the honourable thing and leave the public
service."58 In contrast to these advocates of greater restrictions, Nycole
Turmel, president of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, argued that
the new provisions would amount to taking back "the right of federal
government workers to engage freely in political activities."59
However, despite these criticisms, the new provisions on the
political activities of civil servants attracted relatively limited attention
in the overall debate about the Public Service Modernization Act, which
focused to a greater extent on changes to the definition of merit and
on labour relations. As a result of the work of the parliamentary
committee that studied the bill, its original version was amended to
provide somewhat more flexibility for the PSC to grant leaves of varied
lengths for employees seeking to become candidates in elections. Other
amendments resulted in the strengthened authority of the commission to
investigate allegations of breaches of the political activities provisions.60
But, on the whole, these amendments subscribed to the overall approach
that now characterized the federal government's policy on the political
activities of public servants, and the proposed measures were adopted
with little change or resistance.
As a result, by the end of 2003, Parliament had brought back a
measure of clarity on how the federal public service should approach the
difficult balance between the political impartiality of the bureaucracy
and the rights of public servants to participate in the democratic
process. While the new law clearly represented a shift in policy from
the position historically preferred by Public Service Commission, it
nevertheless continued to rely on the commission, as an independent
authority, to guard the fundamental principle of the political neutrality
of the public service.
CONCLUSION: BALANCING NEUTRALITY, RESPONSIVENESS AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Between 1979 and 2006, as its political and legal context changed,
the PSC had to find ways to continue to protect the fundamental
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value of the political neutrality of the public service while ensuring an
appropriate level of responsiveness to political leadership and respect
for the fundamental rights of civil servants. As the events recounted
in this chapter have illustrated, finding a new balance among these
competing values and objectives was not easy. There is no doubt that
events, especially court decisions, pushed the commission to rethink
its definition of political neutrality, and how to best preserve it, to a
greater extent than it would have done otherwise. Ultimately, a new
compromise between the political rights of civil servants and their
neutrality in service of the state, originally resisted by the PSC, came to
redefine Canadian policy on the political activities of civil servants.
While blatant politicization at the top was resisted, this period
saw developments in this regard that became worrisome for some
observers of public administration. While ministerial offices were
somewhat reduced in size as a result of the Mulroney years, they were
now permanent and important fixtures of Canadian government,
entrenching a cohort of potentially influential staffers at the higher
levels of the Canadian government who were exempt from the merit
system and whose role in government decision-making and operations
was not always well defined. Also of concern was the appointment of
political staffers through the use of priority rights under the PSEA, but
that pathway into the public service was closed in 2006.61
However, while these developments could be regarded in some
ways as setbacks, this chapter has also shown how the PSC contributed
to ensuring that the fundamental value of political neutrality was
not simply sacrificed on the altars of political responsiveness and
participation over this period. It repeatedly reminded the courts of
the fundamental importance of preserving a politically neutral public
service, and it succeeded in pushing back attempts to automatically
grant leaves of absence to public servants wishing to run for office.
The commission also saw its role in preserving the political neutrality
of the bureaucracy reaffirmed with the 2003 legislative reform, in
particular with the entrenchment of new and clearer provisions in the
Public Service Employment Act. In fact, as we have seen, these legislative
changes even extended somewhat the coverage of the restrictions on
political activities.
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Clearly, then, the struggle over political neutrality in this period
cannot be seen as a simple story of politicization. In fact, not only did
political neutrality remain part of the set of fundamental principles
meant to be protected by the staffing system, but it was even clearly
and explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court as a constitutional
convention, most notably in the Osborne decision. It is worth
remembering that, in this case, the court stated that "the existence of a
convention of political neutrality, central to the principle of responsible
government ... is not seriously disputed" and that "while they are not
laws, some conventions may be more important than some laws. Their
importance depends on that of the value or principle which they are
meant to safeguard. Also they form an integral part of the constitution
and the constitutional system."62 In sum, despite the transformations
and setbacks over this period, the value of a politically neutral public
service remained an important part of the Canadian model of public
administration, and the Public Service Commission remained a central
actor in promoting and protecting this fundamental principle.
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merit, and protect employees."
— Robert Giroux, PSC president,
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When Brian Mulroney's government came to power in the mid-1980s,
concerns about recurring federal deficits and the fast-growing national
debt occupied an important place in public discourse. Government
downsizing and cutbacks were prominent issues in policy discussions
and the Progressive Conservative Party had made them significant
electoral issues in the lead-up to the 1984 election. Moreover, the oil
shocks of the 1970s, economic downturns, the ensuing crisis of the
welfare state, and the rise of a new, or revivified, conservative movement
in many countries also meant that the retrenchment of the state was
popular well beyond Canada's borders. In fact, as Professor Peter Aucoin
observed,
Mulroney's attacks on government generally, and the public service
in particular, obviously struck a responsive chord; four years of
international attention to Thatcherism, coupled with the rise of
neo-conservatism and extensive government and bureaucracy
bashing south of the border in two successive American presidential
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elections, had more than conditioned the Canadian polity to these
new forces.1
Seen as a conservative in the mould of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan, Mulroney himself had long been critical of the public service,
considering it "unresponsive, costly and largely ineffective" and wanting
to transform it so that it would operate more like the private sector.2
His views of the public service at the time were probably most vividly
captured in his oft-quoted remark that he would dismiss public servants
"with a pink slip and a pair of running shoes."3 Clearly, in 1984, public
servants had legitimate reasons to feel apprehensive about the new
government.
The formation of the Mulroney government seemed to herald
difficult times for the Public Service Commission (PSC) as well. In
some ways, the cumbersome and rule-heavy staffing system that it was
operating and overseeing seemed to be the antithesis of results-focused,
private-sector-style management. At a time when the new government
was resuscitating the Glassco Commission's mantra of "let the managers
manage,"4 the PSC appeared to embody an ineffective split in the human
resource function of the public service and it seemed synonymous with
excessive constraints on departmental managers. Moreover, the prospect
of budget cuts and layoffs suggested that the PSC could anticipate both
a decline in its own resources and a spike in the number of staffing
transactions that it would have to handle as public servants lost their
jobs or were displaced through governmental reorganization. The PSC
could very well end up having to deal with significant downsizing at the
same time as it would be fighting for its own integrity or survival.
As it turned out, while the downsizing and cutbacks were real and
represented a challenge for the commission in the late 1980s, their size
and effect were not as dramatic as might have been expected from the
government's initial rhetoric. The announcement of the first downsizing
program in 1985 certainly had an immediate impact on the level of
appointments to the public service: the number of appointments
dropped from 11,046 in 1985 to 7,627 in 1986, a stunning decline
of 33.1%, and the PSC had to turn its attention to dealing with the
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priority status of kid-off and surplus employees. But this effect quickly
subsided and normalcy returned: by 1990, new appointments had
reached 11,609, a slightly higher number than in 1985.5 Moreover, at
the end of the Mulroney government's tenure, the size of the public
service had remained essentially the same. The federal bureaucracy
numbered 223,598 employees in 1992, only a slight decrease from the
224,026 employees that it had when the Progressive Conservatives took
office in 1984.6
The reality was that the Mulroney governments eight years in
power amounted to much more for the PSC than budget cuts and
layoffs: those years were marked by successive attempts at reforming
the staffing process, first through policy changes and then through the
first changes to staffing legislation since the late 1960s. Throughout
this period, the commission had to answer renewed calls for greater
flexibility, economy and efficiency in staffing, while fighting for the
preservation of sufficient safeguards for protecting the merit principle.
It also had to fight off reforms that would have significantly curtailed
its own authority in the staffing system, reducing it to little more
than a parliamentary oversight body. The object of much criticism,
it nevertheless continued to act as an important counterweight in the
management system of the bureaucracy, trying to change its policies and
practices to meet government expectations for greater efficiency while at
the same time tempering the zeal of reformers by adhering to the more
traditional values and principles of the Canadian public service.
RESPONDING TO CUTBACKS AND THE RHETORIC OF THE NEW
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
The Mulroney government did not lose any time in setting the agenda
for the public service. On his very first day in office, the Prime Minister
appointed a ministerial-level task force to look at potential reforms, with
the purpose of decreasing the cost of the bureaucracy and improving its
efficiency by shedding some functions, but mostly by streamlining its
procedures. The Task Force on Program Review, the Prime Minister
announced, would find ways to simplify government programs, make
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them more accessible for citizens and delegate decision-making about
their operation closer to the frontlines of service delivery.7 As a sign
of its intended importance, as well as its orientation, Deputy Prime
Minister Erik Nielsen, a well-known critic of the public service, was
appointed as its chairman.
Indicative of the new government's philosophy, the Nielsen Task
Force operated under the guidance of an advisory committee composed
of private sector executives. A series of study teams made up of civil
servants and business representatives examined government programs,
and their recommendations were discussed with the private sector
advisory committee before being submitted to ministers. It was thought
that the heavy involvement of the private sector would help to bring
in new ideas to improve public management.8 In this way, much like
the Grace Commission that advised President Reagan on administrative
reforms in the United States in the same period, the Nielsen Task Force
was largely premised on the superiority of private sector management
and on the belief that the public service could not reform itself. It
constituted an external challenge to the public service and a signal that
private sector practices were deemed to be promising models for the
public sector.
At the same time as the Nielsen Task Force got under way, the
government's strong desire to bring significant changes to the public
service was equally underscored by the announcement of significant
cutbacks in personnel. In its first budget, tabled in May 1985, the
Mulroney government decreed a net reduction of 15,000 person-years
in the size of the federal bureaucracy, a target to be achieved by fiscal
year 1990-1991.9 The PSC itself faced significant cutbacks in personnel
that were proportionally greater than those faced by the public service
as a whole. As a result of the 1985 announcement, the PSC had to
eliminate 276 positions; at the same time, changes to language training
policy introduced by the Treasury Board meant that an additional 325
positions had to be eliminated in this program.10 As a result, the number
of employees at the Commission progressively declined, falling from
2,563 employees in 1985 to 2,017 employees in 1992.11 This twenty-
one percent reduction in personnel, at a time when staffing actions
were on the rise due to layoffs and reorganization, not only created
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capacity problems for the commission, but it also affected the morale
of its employees.12
These government decisions significantly affected the commission's
operations. The immediate impacts were related to the staffing actions
needed. to deliver on the government's commitment to reduce the
size of the workforce. Working with the Treasury Board Secretariat,
the commission tried to limit the effects of the downsizing by using
attrition as opposed to layoffs whenever possible and by retraining and
redeploying employees. It also put in place a Priority Administration
System to try to ensure that employees would be treated with fairness
and that the public service would retain as much of its talent "as possible
through the efficient reallocation of personnel across the system. In
sum, the commission sought to implement the government's decision
to reduce the workforce of the public service, while seeking to ensure
that the use of remaining personnel would be optimized and that the
system would not lose sight of the public service's commitment to
fairness in the treatment of employees.
However, beyond imposing these more immediate impacts on
operations, the public discourse of the incoming government, the creation
of the Nielsen Task Force and the announcement of the first wave of
cutbacks also sent a clear message to the PSC: the new government was
serious about an agenda of greater efficiency, streamlined procedures
and economy. While staffing had not been publicly singled out as a
specific target of managerial reform by the Progressive Conservatives,
it seemed clear to the commission's leadership that the well-known and
persistent dissatisfaction of managers with the rigidity and slowness of
the staffing process would eventually make it a prime target for reform.13
As recently as 1983, the Office of the Auditor General had identified
staffing as an area of particular concern for public executives, citing
excessive staffing rules as a key constraint to productive management in
the public service. Having interviewed about 170 senior executives, the
Auditor General reported,
Of all the constraints mentioned by public service executives,
staffing problems were viewed as the most persistent and frustrating.
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According to the majority of executives we interviewed, the number
of months it takes to staff a position is seen as an unreasonable length
of time, in view of pressing operational requirements.14
The Auditor General's report had already generated some reaction
within the commission, and work had begun on a new administrative
review of the staffing process. However, the arrival of the new government,
and its embrace of the new public management philosophy, brought a
new sense of urgency to these concerns.
With the appointment of a new president, Huguette Labelle, in
1985, the PSC decided to embrace the need for change by setting its
own agenda. A former senior official working with the Treasury Board
Secretariat at the time remembers how Labelle's appointment was seen
as a sign that significant reforms would be made to the commission.
Highly respected within the senior ranks of the public service, the
new president was presumed by many observers to hold views largely
favourable to managerial interests.15 But under her leadership, the
commission would proceed with caution in charting a course for
reform, mindful that, despite calls for more radical changes from
advocates of the new public management philosophy, the commission
played a unique role in defending some of the fundamental principles
and values of the Canadian public service.
Under Labelle's leadership, the PSC developed a new strategic
plan, published in 1985, which acknowledged the need for greater
efficiency but also carefully staked out its role as the guardian of merit
and political neutrality. In describing its mandate, the commission
clearly stressed its unique status as "a politically independent agency,
accountable to Parliament for the administration of the Public Service
Employment Act"16 Moreover, as if to warn the government against
possible encroachment on its territory, the plan asserted that "the resolve
of commission strategy is dependent on the category of responsibility
to which an issue relates."17 While it would respond as much as possible
to the guidance of the Governor-in-Council and the Treasury Board in
areas of shared responsibility (for example, training or the Management
Category), it would remain independent and set its own direction in its
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areas of statutory responsibilities. In these areas, the document stated,
"The Commission is secure in its authority to establish strategy and lead
the administration of the Public Service Employment Act"1*
It is only after clearly reaffirming the commission's independence
in the area of staffing that the strategic plan outlined the need for change
to adapt to the new management environment. But even then, it made
it clear that change would be made incrementally, with- caution. For
example, as if to dampen reformers' expectations, the plan stipulated
from the outset,
Major change is not likely to occur as it pertains to the appointment
of public servants on the basis of their professional and personal
qualifications as opposed to political affiliation or for services
rendered. But refinements to the effectivenessof the PSC's programs
and activities both as a department and as a central agency are a
continuing requirement within the context of the current public
service restraint environment.19 (emphasis added)
In other words, despite pressures for more radical changes, the
commission would mostly set out to alter its practices at the margins,
seeking improvements in the operation of the merit system without
fundamentally altering its nature. The need for greater efficiency
was acknowledged, but the commission remained committed to the
protection of other values also served by the merit system.
However, despite this cautious approach to reform, the commission
did promise some changes. As an organization, it exhorted its managers
to "internalize and personalize the habits of restraint, management
planning and creativity" needed to increase productivity "within a
static or shrinking resource base."20 But more significantly, as a central
agency impacting the entire public service, it committed itself to a
comprehensive review of the bureaucracy's staffing procedures, even
raising the possibility of pursuing legislative changes for the first time
since 1967.
At the administrative level, the commission was determined to
engage departmental managers to a greater extent. The 1983 Report
The PSC as a Cautious Reformer: 1984-1993 159
of the Office of the Auditor General had clearly pointed to a significant
degree of departmental dissatisfaction that needed to be overcome. To
address this weakness, the commission's strategy would focus on closer
collaboration with departmental managers in order to facilitate staffing
decisions at the departmental level and ultimately improve productivity.
A series of administrative reviews conducted with departmental
managers would serve to identify changes in rules and practices that
might improve performance. This collaborative strategy would guide its
efforts in the area of non-legislative renewal.
But to improve efficiency in the use of personnel, the commission
also proposed to amend the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA)
to facilitate the transfer of employees across positions. Observing
that Canadians expected more efficient services, the commission
announced,
The process of redeploying human resources must be accelerated and
be made more effective if it is to keep up with changing government
priorities and social needs. In this light, legislative changes will be
considered while retaining the fundamental principles of respecting
the public interest and the impartiality of the Public Service as
defined in the Public Service Employment Act of 1967.21
This legislative change—the introduction of the concept of
deployments into the PSEA—would eventually be made in 1992 with
the adoption of the Public Service Reform Act. But it is interesting to
note that, well before the launch of the system-wide reform process that
resulted in the new law, the commission itself was considering adopting
this change. In fact, having seen its efforts in this regard quashed by the
courts over the years, the commission long desired to see such flexibility
reconciled with the legal framework.22
Generally speaking, then, following the arrival of the Mulroney
government in 1984, the PSC embraced a modest agenda for reform.
Certainly, jt did not commit itself to the kind of new public management
thinking that eventually undermined its counterparts in the United
Kingdom, New Zealand or Australia; but neither did it simply stand
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as a barrier to change. It opened up its policies and practices for critical
review, including by departmental managers, and it worked on defining
legislative changes that would be needed to bring greater flexibility to
the staffing system.
THE QUEST FOR NON-LEGISLATIVE RENEWAL
As they sought ways to improve the efficiency of the staffing process,
reformers in the 1980s could hardly seek further delegation of the
Public Service Commission's staffing authority: in 1985, the PSC
could proudly state that approximately ninety-eight percent of staffing
activities governed by the Public Service Employment Act had already
been delegated to departments, a result of the efforts deployed since the
1967 reforms.23 The commission itself focused essentially on making
policies and auditing departments to ensure compliance with delegation
agreements and related policies. It also spent considerable energies on
recruiting new employees from outside the public service, staffing the
Management Category and handling appeals and investigations.
However, despite this extensive level of delegation, many
departmental managers remained dissatisfied with the insufficient
flexibility of the instruments of delegation, which were believed to result
in a slow, cumbersome staffing process. Moreover, the constraints placed
on the exercise of this delegated authority were seen to be excessive and
to be partly negating the gains in efficiency that were expected to result
from delegation. Even before the Auditor General's 1983 report and the
arrival of the Mulroney government, the commission was well aware of
these criticisms.24 Already in 1979, the commission had begun some
work on new instruments of delegation that would be better suited
to the specific needs of different departments.25 But, evidently, for
departmental managers, progress still appeared insufficient.
It is in this context that the commission launched a more
comprehensive review of staffing policies and practices in 1985.26
The so-called administrative reform exercise sought to find ways to
expedite the staffing process, eliminate unnecessary documentation
and procedures and allow the subdelegation of staffing authority to line
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managers whenever possible, without compromising on the protection
of merit and while ensuring the overall quality of appointments.27 The
initiative first took the form, of a series of six departmental-level studies
meant to identify various factors that might be affecting the efficiency
of the staffing process.28 The commission then launched an internal
review of its regulations and administrative procedures in order to
identify elements of the staffing process that might not be required by a
strict reading of the Public Service Employment Act and related decisions
of the courts and appeal boards. This internal review was assisted by
special panels of senior departmental managers, the Joint Consultation
Committee and the Advisory Committee on Personnel Policy. The
hope was that, through these reviews, superfluous procedures would be
identified and the administration of staffing would be streamlined by
their elimination.
The departmental studies yielded some interesting results. They
found that, on average, it took 143 calendar days, or about five months,
to staff a position through a closed competition (excluding the appeal
process). Half that time was spent on preparatory work, such as writing
the Statement of Qualifications and the guide used to rate candidates.
Open competitions, which in about eighty-five percent of cases involved
term appointments, were completed in forty-six calendar days. It took
twenty-five days on average to appoint someone already on an eligibility
list. Not surprisingly, the larger the area of competition, the longer it
took to complete the staffing process. For example, competitions that
were open to other departments took about a month longer to conclude
than those restricted to the hiring department.29 Clearly, there was room
for some improvement. But, for many executives at the commission,
these studies seemed to confirm that departmental managers, not the
commission, exercised the greatest control over the speed of staffing, and
that the commission's role in engendering delays was exaggerated.30
The commission used the results of the studies to launch an
innovative, departmental-based process of staffing reforms. Between
1985 and 1988, seventeen departments collaborated with the
commission in reviewing their internal staffing practices and worked
on resolving the problems they experienced in receiving staffing services
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from the commission. In each case, a working group composed of an
equal number of departmental managers and staffing experts from
the commission worked on resolving the problems identified by the
departments themselves.
The overall administrative reform exercise, combined with the
commission's internal review of staffing policies, yielded a lengthy list
of proposed modifications to the staffing process. But, in the end, it did
not yield profound changes. In some cases, more discretion was granted
to departmental managers in setting qualifications standards and using
assessment instruments. The commission also agreed in principle to
delegate the authority to appoint people from outside the public service
to term positions, without competition, in cases of emergency. This
new delegated authority was to be included, on a case-by-case basis, in
the delegation agreements of departments that would request it.31 These
policy changes, coupled with modifications to departmental practices,
generated some improvements. A study conducted in 1988 of three of
the participating departments showed a fifteen percent improvement in
the speed of staffing.32
However, on some more thorny issues, the commission clearly
resisted the erosion, or further delegation, of its staffing authority. For
example, despite departmental proposals to delegate and facilitate the
conversion of term employees into indeterminate employees, the PSC
defended the status quo. It argued,
In keeping with the merit principle, it would be theoretically ideal if
changes in tenure could only occur as a result of closed competitions.
The Commission considered the benefits and liabilities of this
idea and concluded that the status quo should be maintained.
The Commission will retain its authority to change the tenure of
employees from term to indeterminate without competition and
will exercise this authority in those circumstances than it considers
appropriate (e.g. skill shortages).33
Similarly, the delegation of authority to make certain types of
appointments without competition (for example, the reappointment of
a term employee to the same job after the term is over or the appointment
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of a surplus employee to a new position with a slightly higher maximum
rate of pay) under Section 5(c)(v) of the Public Service Employment
Regulations was considered but deemed to be legally impossible, barring
a legislative amendment. The PSC rejected the delegation of authority
to terminate the layoff status of employees (a status that comes with
some priority rights), to appoint coop students or even to approve
personality, interest and intelligence tests.34
While these are only some examples in a long list of issues
considered, they nevertheless illustrate the overall outcome of the
administrative reform exercise: while some additional flexibility was
introduced at the margins and some processes streamlined, the division
of responsibilities and the general constraints imposed by the merit
system were not significantly altered.
These meagre results may not be surprising, given the overall lack
of success of the early administrative reform initiatives pursued by
the Mulroney government. For example, around the same time, the
government's most high-profile reform initiative, the Nielsen Task Force,
essentially unravelled: out of the $7 billion in cuts it recommended,
only about $500 million were actually made and its report was soon
abandoned as a blueprint for reforming the bureaucracy.33 Similarly,
another process aimed at cutting down on central controls in the
same period, the Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability
(IMAA) project led by the Treasury Board Secretariat, also generated
few significant and lasting results.36 In this context, the results of the
administrative reform exercise do not appear out of step with the
times.
However, at the same time, those results clearly did not quench
the system's thirst for greater flexibility and efficiency in staffing. Only
a few years later, the Mulroney government would launch a new public
service-wide reform initiative, Public Service 2000, to seek further
changes in the area of staffing. Even the commission itself had explicitly
acknowledged the need to make more fundamental changes. In fact, in
order to build more flexibility and efficiency into the staffing regime,
the commission was now inviting the government to seriously consider
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amending the Public Service Employment Act, going even further than it
had in its 1985 strategy document.
The commission's position on legislative reform at the time is
captured in a speech given at the end of 1986 by Commissioner Treffle
Lacombe.37 Lacombe argued that, in the twenty years that had elapsed
since the adoption of the Public Service Employment Act, Canadian
society had changed and had come to demand greater efficiency in
the delivery of public services. To answer those demands, the public
service needed more flexibility in the use of its personnel, and since
the statutory framework governing staffing offered little flexibility,
especially following a number of court decisions on the definition of
merit, legislative amendments were needed.
In retrospect, it is surprising to see the list of legislative changes that
were being proposed by the commission back in 1986; many of them
would in fact come to pass in the following years. For example, legislative
changes needed to make it easier to transfer employees across the public
service as well as the inscription of the concept of "appointment to
level" (as opposed to appointments to specific positions) in the Public
Service Employment Act would become reality with the adoption of
the Public Service Reform Act in 1992.38 Moreover, Lacombe was also
advocating, on behalf of the commission, to inscribe into law, for the
first time, a definition of merit that would restore some of the flexibility
in hiring that he felt had been lost as a result of court decisions over the
years. Under the new definition, hiring the "best qualified" candidate
would still be required for initial appointments and promotions, but
in the case of transfers it would only be necessary to establish that the
candidate was qualified, given that the principle of merit had already
been applied when the transferred employee was last appointed to the
public service.39
These proposed changes demonstrate that the commission was
actively searching for ways to improve the efficiency of the staffing
regime. However, it was careful to do so while ensuring that it would
remain institutionally able to act as the guardian of the merit principle,
ensuring equitable access to the public service and preventing patronage.
As Lacombe stated,
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In order to ensure respect for the merit principle, equality of access to
the public service, and fair and equitable treatment of public servants,
we believe that the staffing regime must continue to be managed
by a central agency that answers to Parliament. This agency, while
maintaining complete and full responsibility for staffing in the public
service, should delegate or transfer some of its powers to deputy
heads in the interests of achieving greater efficiency and effectiveness
[translation].40
As we can see, the commission itself was advocating greater
flexibility in staffing procedures and supporting the delegation of staffing
authority to deputy ministers, but only in the context of a legislative
framework that preserved its independence and ultimately kept it fully
in charge of staffing. However, it is on this issue that it would soon enter
into conflict with the central leadership of the public service as it tried
to further reform the staffing regime in the early 1990s.
PUBLIC SERVICE 2000 AND THE DEBATE OVER INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
Upon its return to office after the 1988 general election, the Mulroney
government sought to revive its administrative reform agenda by
announcing the launch of a major initiative: Public Service 2000. In
contrast to the Nielsen Task Force, PS 2000, as it was commonly called,
was driven by the senior public service and looked less to the private
sector for answers to public-sector problems. Under the leadership of
Paul Tellier, clerk of the Privy Council, the reform process relied on a
series often task forces, each consisting of deputy ministers and assistant
deputy ministers. As Tellier himself asserted at the time, "The primary
focus of Public Service 2000 is on changing how people are managed"
and, with the objective of motivating employees, the key to success
would be "to move away from a philosophy of control to a philosophy
of empowerment."41 Given this objective, it is not surprising that the
work of PS 2000 largely focused on human resources issues, including
staffing.
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Even before the Task Force on Staffing had had time to do much of
its work, Tellier had made it clear that PS 2000 would be the occasion
to seriously re-examine the role of the Public Service Commission.
In a speech given at the University of Ottawa in March 1990, only
three months after the initiative was launched, he explained that a key
objective of PS 2000 was to clarify the distribution of responsibilities in
the area of personnel management. As he stated at the time,
Under existing structures, responsibilities are confused and,
consequently, public service managers have taken refuge in systems
of control. The personnel management system does not encourage
initiative in the way that it should, and it is not always clear who is
responsible for achieving results. A principal thrust of Public Service
2000, therefore, is to ensure that individuals have the authority to
get the job done and that we are able to hold them accountable for
their actions.42
To clarify the distribution of responsibilities, the Clerk believed,
it would be necessary to rethink the respective roles of departmental
managers, the Treasury Board Secretariat, and the Public Service
Commission.
The PSC, in particular, was seen as a source of difficulty, its
activities having created some ambiguity in the central personnel
function of the public service. In order to end patronage, the 1918 Civil
Service Act had given powers to the commission that went well beyond
the protection of merit to embrace the entire personnel function. And,
"under changing economic and political circumstances;, this mixture of
watchdog and executive functions within the Civil Service Commission
[had become] a source of recurrent problems."43 Notwithstanding the
reforms of the 1960s as well as the work of Gordon, Heeney, Glassco,
Lambert, D'Avignon and others over the years, this undesirable
ambiguity remained at the heart of the personnel management system.
It was now time to resolve it. In fact, Tellier asserted, PS 2000 would
take as a starting point that "established as the guardian of the merit
principle, the Public Service Commission [had] retained and acquired
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responsibilities for personnel management functions that do not sit
comfortably with its role as Parliament's agent."44 The anticipated result
of the reform process was clear: "For the Public Service Commission,
the changes will mean getting out of the management business and
focusing on its role as Parliament's agent in protecting the integrity of
the personnel system."45
However, despite this early statement of preferences by the
most senior leader of the public service, the outcome of the PS 2000
exercise would in fact be quite different. When the White Paper on
Public Service 2000 was finally released in December 1990, it did
recommend that the respective roles of the Treasury Board and the PSC
be better defined to achieve greater accountability for the management
of personnel and, overall, it did favour a stronger recognition of
the primary responsibility of the Treasury Board and departmental
managers for managing public servants. But the white paper fell short
of recommending that the PSC be strictly relegated to the narrower role
of a parliamentary watchdog. In fact, under the proposed scheme, the
PSC would remain vested with the powers of recruitment, appointment,
appeal and audit. The Treasury Board would be responsible for other
personnel management issues, including career development, training,
the allocation of resources to meet the personnel needs of departments
and the setting of personnel policy in support of deputy heads. Despite
the Clerk's original intentions, the white paper essentially proposed to
keep the central functions of personnel management divided. And,
while internal debates about the need for a more radical institutional
reform continued for some time after the white paper was released, the
idea had been abandoned by the time the government sought legislative
changes in 1992.
The main reason for this outcome seems to have been the absence
of sufficient support in the senior ranks of the public service. The
commission argued strenuously in favour of retaining its executive
authority over staffing, and many deputy ministers were actually
sympathetic to that view. According to the people interviewed for this
book, while there was widespread support for bringing an additional
measure of flexibility into the staffing process and finding ways to
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accelerate making appointments, many senior executives in the
public service were more apprehensive about significantly curtailing
the authority of the Public Service Commission.46 For one thing, its
authority over appointments was still seen as an important shield
against potential pressures by ministers to hire specific individuals. As
a former senior official with the Privy Council Office (PCO) told us in
explaining the lack of enthusiasm of many senior executives, "Deputy
Ministers often found the PSC to be convenient, and it certainly was
a useful tool to resist political interference in managing the public
service."47 For many executives, turning the commission purely into a
parliamentary watchdog seemed to carry an element of risk that could
endanger the principle of non-partisanship.
Furthermore, according to officials involved in the events at the
time, there was also considerable aversion to taking on an agent of
Parliament on an issue that could prove to be politically damaging to
the government.48 Over the course of 1991, as the government was
finalizing its legislative proposal resulting from the PS 2000 initiative,
the possibility of stripping the PSC of much of its executive authority
was still being debated in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. As
tensions mounted between PCO and the commission, now under the
leadership of its new president Robert Giroux, the prospect of having to
defend such a reduction in the commissions authority before Parliament
raised some concerns. As a former senior official with PCO recalled,
The Clerk did not want to take on a public battle with the PSC and
run the risk of losing the other parts of the reform. The PSC has its
act and, to change it, you would have to go to Parliament and run
the risk of being seen as weakening merit and democracy. Moreover,
the Clerk doesn't want the Prime Minister to spend political capital
on a battle that has no importance outside Ottawa.49
So, in the end, no fundamental institutional reform was put
forward. As summarized by the former PCO official, "It was a case
of 'achieving what you can achieve': making some legislative changes
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but leaving the PSC's role untouched so as not to lose everything."50
Another observer, who worked on personnel policy at the Treasury
Board Secretariat at the time, put it more bluntly: "The way I see it: the
system was ultimately unwilling to tackle the PSC."51
Whether it was a fear of external opposition or insufficient internal
support, the outcome of these internal struggles was the decision to
shelve the idea of a more fundamental institutional reform that would
have profoundly altered the commission's mandate. However, despite
this decision, the White Paper on Public Service 2000 nevertheless
succeeded in significantly reforming the staffing process. According to
an internal report, the white paper made eighty-eight recommendations
that fell under the PSC's mandate, and the commission implemented
most of them through changes to its policies and practices.52 Moreover,
even if most proposed changes involved relatively minor improvements,
the white paper did propose some more significant innovations
requiring amendments to the statutory framework. These amendments,
supported by the commission, eventually made up part of the Public
Service Reform Act, which was tabled in Parliament in June 1991.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1992
Even if the content of the bill undoubtedly disappointed the advocates
of radical institutional and legal changes in the area of staffing, the
tabling of Bill C-26, the Public Service Reform Act, in June of 1991
still represented a significant step forward in staffing reform. The new
bill constituted the first attempt to make important changes to the
Public Service Employment Act since its adoption in 1967, more than
twenty years earlier. The bill actually touched on a wider range of issues,
including labour relations and leadership in the public service,53 but it
is the introduction of new concepts in staffing and the promise of a new
measure of flexibility for managers that had the most significance for
the commission.
On the staffing front, the bill contained five sets of measures of
particular importance. First, with regard to appointments, the bill added
a new section to the PSEA, which would allow a candidate's merit,
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in circumstances to be prescribed in regulations by. the commission,
to be measured by an "absolute" standard of competence, established
by the commission, rather than through a process comparing him or
her against the competence of other candidates. The bill also amended
the PSEA to allow the commission to prescribe the standards to be
used in the assessment of merit, a power to be held in addition to its
existing authority to set the standards used in the traditional selection
process. Moreover, in addition to the usual criteria used in setting
such standards, such as knowledge, experience or language, the bill
introduced the possibility of considering the future needs of the public
service as an appropriate criterion.
Although meant to be used only in a limited set of circumstances,
this second method of determining merit, based on an absolute
standard rather than a relative one, represented a significant shift in how
selection based on merit was viewed by the commission and the federal
public service. Following a 1972 decision by the courts, merit had come
to be defined as finding "the best persons possible" for each position
to be filled.54 While the PSC had originally continued to insist that
merit could still be defined in absolute terms, another decision by the
federal court, issued in 1982, had clearly put an end to this approach,
making unavoidable a comparative assessment of the merits of various
candidates.55 In this context, the introduction of an absolute standard
of competence under the Public Service Reform Act can be seen as an
effort to release the commission from undesired constraints placed on it
by the courts. As it turned out, about ten years later, the public service
would go even further along this path by defining merit as "meeting
the essential qualifications for the work to be performed" and stating
in law that considering more than one person was not a condition
of meritorious appointments.50 In this sense, the 1992 amendment
also constituted a first step in a longer process to change the general
approach to merit.
Second, in order to provide for greater flexibility in the management
of personnel, the Public Service Reform Act also introduced the concept
of "appointment to level." While the standard approach of appointing
individuals to specific positions would continue, an amendment to the
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Public Service Employment Act would allow the commission to appoint
some individuals to a class of positions at the same level in the public
service, thereby allowing them to be moved from one position to an
another at the same level without having to go through a lengthy merit-
based appointment process.
The "appointment to level" concept was not a new one. Almost
twenty years earlier, the Finkelman Committee had proposed this
approach in its Report on Employer-Employee Relations in the Public
Service of Canada.57 The idea had also been indirectly picked up by the
Special Committee on the Review of Personnel Management and the
Merit Principle (the D'Avignon Committee), which recommended in
1979 that the Public Service Employment Act be amended to indicate
that merit could be determined not only for a specific set of duties but
also for a group of positions.58 With the passing of the Public Service
Reform Act in 1992, the concept would finally be entrenched in law.
Unfortunately, over the next decade, as it went about implementing
the new law, the commission found that "appointments to level"
were difficult to use broadly because remaining legislative and policy
constraints, such as the classification system, were still position based.59
But, at the time of its adoption, the concept seemed to hold some
promise for enhancing the career development prospects of employees
and providing more flexibility in matching employees with the needs
of departments.
The "appointment to level" concept was also intimately linked to
the idea of allowing deputy heads to deploy their employees to other
jobs within their organization. In this regard, a third amendment made
to the Public Service Employment Act sought to ease the conditions under
which employees could be transferred from one position to another.
Section 22 of the Public Service Reform Act added a new part to the
PSEA regarding "deployments," defined as "the transfer of an employee
from one position to another". Under the new provisions, deputy heads
gained exclusive authority to make deployments to or within the part
of the public service under their jurisdiction. Such deployments could
be made only with the consent of the affected employee and, while
under some circumstances they could result in a change of occupational
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groups, they could not result in a promotion or a change in the tenure of
office of the employee. These transfers would be made without applying
the principle of merit and without having to consider the priority rights
of some categories of employees, such as laid-off workers or people
returning from a leave of absence or benefiting from priority status
due to previous employment in a ministerial office. The amendment
would grant some flexibility to deputy heads to move employees around
their organization, while expanding the options of employees wanting
to move to other positions for greater job satisfaction or development
opportunities.
Before the adoption of the Public Service Reform Act, transfers
had been handled by the commission through the Transfer Exclusion
Approval Order, which permitted the movement of employees within
the same group and at the same or a lower level by excluding such
actions from the application of the Public Service Employment Act on a
case-by-case basis. In the past, the commission had attempted to exempt
employee transfers from the application of the merit principle, arguing
that it was unnecessarily constraining given that merit had already
been ascertained at the time of the employee's previous appointment.
But the regulatory and policy measures used over the years to try to
make transfers a more flexible tool for staffing some positions had all
been struck down by the courts, which insisted that transfers had to
be considered appointments under the existing legislation.60 Therefore,
unless the commission used its powers to exempt these staffing
decisions from the law's requirements because it deemed such action
to be in the interest of the public service, the usual rigidities of the
regular appointment process had to be applied to transfers, and this
included holding competitions and allowing appeals. In this context,
the introduction of deployments into the staffing system in 1992
might have been a measure of flexibility demanded and welcomed by
managers, but it also corresponded to a long-standing preference of the
commission that had been denied by the courts.
A fourth significant change brought about by the Public Service
Reform Act concerned casual employment. Again with the objective of
providing managers with a greater degree of flexibility, the act added
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a new section to the Public Service Employment Act that allowed the
PSC to appoint any person to the public service for a maximum period
of ninety days. These appointments would be exempted from all the
provisions of the PSEA, except those specifically dealing with casual
employment, and would therefore be conducted outside the merit
system. The use of casual employees was seen as a way to meet short-
term or urgent staffing needs, and it essentially created a new category
of employees for the public service. While they did not have to meet the
requirements imposed on indeterminate or even term employees, casual
employees would not be eligible for the benefits granted to these other
categories, including the right to take part in closed competitions.
Finally, a fifth change concerned layoffs. This time, the change
was prompted directly by the difficulties that the government had
experienced with contracting out in the late 1980s. At that time, the
Mulroney government had attempted to contract out some government
operations in an attempt to reduce costs and improve efficiencies.
However, in some cases, staffing legislation had proven to be a barrier
to contracting out as the affected employees could not be laid off. For
example, in a decision that was later confirmed by the Federal Court of
Appeal, the Public Service Staff Relations Board found in March 1990
that the government had violated a collective agreement by contracting
out the jobs of 278 clerks at Revenue Canada. In its reasons, the board
argued that the government could not lay off these employees because
the decision to do so was not motivated by a real lack of work for the
affected employees, one of the valid justifications under the law. The
Public Service Reform Act rid the system of this barrier by amending
Section 29 of the Public Service Employment Act to explicitly state that
deputy heads could lay off employees whose services were no longer
required due to the transfer of work or functions outside the public
service.
The Public Service Reform Act was a wide-ranging piece of
legislation. In addition to the changes described above, the statute also
brought about a number of changes to the management of eligibility
lists, employment equity programs, appeal procedures and other aspects
of staffing and labour relations. But the five changes outlined here—the
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introduction of the possibility of using an absolute standard of merit
as opposed to always relying on a competition among candidates,
the possibility of appointing employees "to level," the introduction
of deployments, the adoption of a more flexible regime for casual
employees and the acceptance of layoffs due to outsourcing—illustrate
clearly the overall thrust of the legislative reform: the desire to enhance
the efficiency of the staffing system by introducing greater flexibility for
managers to fill positions, move employees around the public service
and facilitate the use of outsourcing strategies.
The content of the Public Service Reform Act also illustrates how
the commission itself was an advocate of greater managerial flexibility
in staffing. Some of the act's measures, such as the new standard for
determining merit without comparing candidates, the possibility of
considering the future needs of the public service in selecting the best
qualified candidate in competitions or the more flexible management
of eligibility lists, were not recommended by the PS 2000 Task Force
on Staffing, but they were included in the legislation at the instigation
of the PSC. Some of the other amendments, including the controversial
creation of deployments, had been recommended by PS 2000 but
were in fact measures that had been advocated by the PSC for several
years. Moreover, in some cases, such as layoffs, absolute standards or
deployments, the amendments contained in the Public Service Reform
Act specifically sought to re-establish practices that the commission or
the government had tried to adopt in the past but that had subsequently
been prohibited by the courts.
Clearly then, the commission was not dragged into inscribing
greater flexibility into the staffing legislation by the government and
senior public servants. It actively sought out many of those changes. In
fact, during an interview for this book, a former executive who worked
on the Public Service Reform Act for the commission remembered how
the PSC was willing to entertain even more wide-ranging legislative
changes, including some relating to the definition of the merit principle,
but was turned down by PCO officials, presumably due to concerns
about the reaction of unions.61 While not as comprehensive or bold as
might have been expected at the outset, the Public Service Reform Act
brought forward the most significant changes in years.
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THE PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM ACT m PARLIAMENT: A
POLARIZED DEBATE
Bill C-26, the bill to enact the Public Service Reform Act, was not
well received when it was tabled in Parliament. The Liberal members
representing the Official Opposition in the House of Commons
considered the bill to be flawed and incomplete and tabled two motions
that would have sent it to a parliamentary committee for a pre-study.
Both motions were defeated by the government. The New Democratic
Party also opposed the bill, arguing that it would weaken the PSC
and the merit system as well as weaken public sector unions and fail
to protect workers. During the debate at second reading, opposition '
parties essentially characterized the legislative proposal as an attack on
the merit principle that was sure to create a system that would allow
managers to make arbitrary staffing decisions. Government members
defended the bill on the ground that it would modernize the public
service, making it leaner and more efficient.
The antagonistic tone of the debate on the floor of the House
was an indication of what was to come at the committee stage. The
bill was referred for a detailed study by a legislative committee in
February 1992 and the committee, naturally dominated by government
members, held about two-and-a-half months of public hearings on it.
The testimony given by witnesses who appeared before the committee
was overwhelmingly critical and opinions were sharply divided between
managers and employees.
Union representatives were unanimous in condemning the changes
related to labour relations but also those dealing with staffing. Not
surprisingly, the amendment facilitating layoffs due to contracting out
were roundly condemned. But the introduction of deployments was
also strongly opposed. For example, in his testimony, Daryl Bean, head
of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, argued that "the government's
proposal with regard to deployment [was] so tilted in favour of
management and so open to abuse as to be totally unacceptable."62 Other
union leaders concurred, criticizing the bill for constituting an attack
on the merit principle, weakening the PSC, and simply representing
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the interests and preferences of the senior management of the public
service.63 Even well-known academics, such as Gene Swimmer and
Barbara W. Carroll, and social activist organizations, such as the
National Action Committee on the Status of Women, worried about
the weakening of merit and the PSC.64
Despite this barrage of opposition, the bill did have a few
supporters. As could be expected, the Association of Professional
Executives of the Public Service of Canada (APEX) supported the
legislation. Its representatives argued that the new measures would
improve the staffing system and provide more flexibility for executives
so that they could adequately fulfill their managerial duties. In the
end, they believed overall morale would improve.65 The Public Policy
Forum, a well-known non-profit organization interested in the public
service, also supported the bill, speaking favourably of the introduction
of deployments but regretting that the government had not used the
opportunity to address the thorny issue of the political rights of public
servants.66
In the midst of this debate, the PSC clearly sided with management
and offered a strong defence of the new measures regarding staffing. The
commission's president, Robert: Giroux, was one of the first to testify
before the committee in March 1992. In his opening remarks, he argued
that the bill was essentially "about the reconciliation of efficiency and
fairness in human resources management to better serve the people of
Canada."67 He added,
The dynamics of today's workplace demand more flexible staffing
arrangements than the present act permits if we want to give the best
possible value when providing services to the public.... In summary,
the Bill, as I see it, represents very much a balancing act—balancing
the very real need for a more effective Public Service with the equally
compelling need to preserve merit, and protect employees.68
Of course, this central preoccupation—the need 1:0 strike a balance
between competing values in a way that would serve the interests of
Canadians—again placed the commission in an uncomfortable, and
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somewhat ironic, position. Having recently had to fend off, inside the
public service, the managerial interests that would have reduced it to a
parliamentary oversight body, it was now publicly seen as being too close
to those same managerial interests. As the commission itself defended
the proposed amendments to the Public Service Employment Act,
others were fighting these changes in order to protect the commission's
authority and its role in the staffing regime.
In the end, owing to the strong parliamentary majority held by the
Mulroney government, the Public Service Reform Act was adopted, with
minor amendments, at third reading on November 30, 1992. After a
quick review in the Senate, it received Royal Assent a few weeks later, on
December 17, 1992. The legislative changes undoubtedly represented
a win for the advocates of greater efficiency and flexibility in staffing
and, at the time, they were viewed by many observers as an undue
encroachment of managerialism on the traditional values and principles
of the public service.
But for those involved in the reform process, at the commission as
well as at the centre of government, there was a sense that the changes
were limited, the imperfect result of arduous internal debates about
how to better organize the central functions of personnel management.
Eight years later, the Office of the Auditor General was dismissive
of the changes adopted back then, considering them to be "minor
changes," which "have fallen short of expectations."69 Even today, many
former officials whom we interviewed feel that the Public Service 2000
initiative and the subsequent adoption of the Public Service Reform Act
were missed opportunities. Former officials with the Treasury Board
Secretariat and the Privy Council Office regret that the system failed
to fix the problem created by the fragmentation of responsibilities for
personnel between the Treasury Board and the PSC. Former officials with
the commission believe that it may have been an undue obsession with
institutional reforms that resulted in the forgoing of the opportunity for
more substantive legislative and policy changes. In any case, despite the
positive fact that the first legislative changes had been made to staffing
legislation in over two decades, much dissatisfaction persisted.
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CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Public Service Reform Act in 1992 appears to have
ended an intense period of debate about the appropriate mandate of the
PSC and its role in the staffing process. Even before the election of the
Mulroney government, the work of the Office of the Auditor General
in the early 1980s had already brought long-standing departmental
dissatisfaction about staffing to the fore. Then, the new government's
rhetorical embrace of the new public management movement and its
push for administrative reform renewed the age-old quest for greater
efficiency and flexibility in the staffing process. As always, the PSC's
appropriate role was a prominent theme in these debates.
The events examined in this chapter illustrate how, in contrast
to a common misperception, the commission was more than willing
to reform itself and the staffing process. While it is clear that it
resisted, with success, more radical institutional reforms that would
have threatened its independence as the guardian of merit and non-
partisanship, it did favour significant reforms to staffing rules, seeking
to ensure greater managerial flexibility. And while the efforts launched
by the PSC itself to revise staffing rules may have been of limited
scope, the commission collaborated actively in the more fundamental
legislative changes of 1992, advocating many of them even before
they became the object of system-wide attention. In short, this period
illustrates how the commission cannot simply be presented as an
obstacle to reforms, a perennial defender of the status quo in staffing.
In fact, the Mulroney years revealed the Public Service Commission
to be an active reformer, acknowledging the importance of efficiency
in staffing and actively seeking greater flexibility for managers. But
the commission was a cautious reformer, always preoccupied with
maintaining a balance between efficiency and the competing values of
equity and non-partisanship. As it pushed to build more flexibility into
the legislative framework or attempted to find further opportunities for
delegation, it was also clearly willing to fight to preserve its vital role as
an independent agency with the necessary clout to preserve the desired
balance of values.
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For the merit system over the coming years, guardianship of values
will be the predominant theme.
Public Service Commission, directional statement, 1999
The formation of a Liberal government following the general election of
1993 seemed to offer the opportunity of a new beginning for the federal
public service. The Progressive Conservatives, initially distrustful of the
bureaucracy and steeped in the rhetoric of cost-cutting and government
retrenchment, were returning to the Opposition benches in a state of
disarray. The Liberals, under the leadership of Jean Chretien, a politician
expected to be more supportive and respectful of the bureaucracy
because of his many years of ministerial experience In Ottawa, were
back at the helm. Their detailed electoral platform, known as the Red
Book, did not pay much heed to the issue of public administration, a
fact not surprising in a electoral platform, but its general tone seemed
more positive about the role of government in Canadian society.!
In fact, the Liberal party's thirteen years in power witnessed the
most significant changes to the public service in decades, including in
the area of human resources management. Only a few years after the
Chretien government took power, a renewed sense of urgency about
the country's finances led to some of the most dramatic cutbacks in
the history of the Canadian public service. But beyond major cuts in
personnel, this period also saw the most fundamental and comprehensive
reform of the public service's human resources management system
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since 1967. As we will see in this chapter, throughout the 1990s, the
Public Service Commission (PSC) itself sought to adapt to a changing
context: it progressively revamped its approach to delegation, placing
greater emphasis on respect for core values and accountability for
results, and it came close to radically reducing its involvement in service
delivery and focusing more exclusively on oversight. However, with the
adoption of the Public Service Modernization Act in 2003, those efforts
were overshadowed by more profound legislative and institutional
reforms: the definition of merit was modified in the pursuit of greater
managerial efficiency, and the PSC lost some of its functions in favour
of a strengthened focus on the oversight of merit. In sum, as it was
approaching its centenary, the PSC was returning to its essential
mandate—protecting the merit principle—while the very meaning of
merit was continuing to evolve.
PRESERVING THE PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
Despite their efforts at cost-cutting, the Progressive Conservatives left
the federal government in a difficult fiscal position when they lost power
in 1993; the new Liberal government found itself facing a very critical
international financial press. The subsequent turbulence of international
financial markets in 1994 created an even greater sense of urgency for
a drastic turnaround in government spending. As a result, the need to
control expenditures more effectively and reduce the size of government
remained a driver of administrative reform. To deal with the situation,
the Chretien government launched a major reform initiative, known as
Program Review.
Between 1994 and 1996, Program Review led to a major
restructuring of the public service. Over a three-year period, cutbacks
amounted to $29 billion out of annual program spending of about $120
billion.2 While a portion of these cuts were realized through a reduction
of federal transfers to provincial governments, they still had a significant
impact on the operations of the federal public service. In particular,
roughly 45,000 positions were eliminated—an astonishing reduction of
186 Defending a Contested Ideal
nineteen percent of employees in the core public administration.3 Most
departments were affected by the cuts, some in particular. Transport
Canada, for example, saw many of its activities transferred to local
authorities, autonomous agencies or private-sector organizations. While
this may be an extreme case, the department went from the equivalent
of 19,881 full-time employees in 1993 to 4,258 in 1999, and its budget
fell from $3.9 billion to under $1.6 billion over the same period.4
Program Review also aspired to be a 'rational' exercise in the
redesign of government as opposed to a more traditional, across-the-
board exercise in budget cuts. While there is considerable debate about
whether these ambitions were realized,5 they certainly had an effect
on the process that was adopted to secure the cuts. While central
agencies set expenditure reduction targets for each department, deputy
heads were asked to design reform plans in order to carry out those
reductions in their respective departments.6 To do so, they were given
a set of questions to guide their work. The questions were meant to
steer executives through a systematic examination of their departments'
programs and operations. Executives were expected 1:0 question and
rethink what their departments did and how they did it, especially
in light of the changing socio-economic environment. For instance,
each program was to be reviewed to determine whether the public
interest still required that it be maintained and, if so, whether it could
not be offered as effectively by the private sector or by another level
of government.7 The end result, it was hoped, would not simply be
a cost-cutting exercise but a strategic review of the role of the federal
government at the turn of the century.
There is no doubt that the Program Review exercise created some
challenges for the PSC. As an organization, it experienced its own share
of cutbacks. Between 1992 and 1998, it downsized its staff by 960
full-time employees and its annual budget was cut by $43 million.8
Moreover, as a central agency dealing with personnel, government-wide
cutbacks of such magnitude also presented a considerable challenge. As
Ginette Stewart, a commissioner of the PSC at the time, would later
recall,
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Program Review, with its staffing controls and employment
reductions, had a major impact on the PSC. Responsible for
administering priority entitlements and workforce adjustment, the
PSC and its partners concentrated on providing support mechanisms
for those affected by government restructuring: career counselling,
resource centres, workshops, job matching and referral services to
public service positions and outplacement networks with other
employers. The PSC also assisted departments by participating in
development and career-management programs to maintain an
adaptive, competent and professional Public Service. As well, the
PSC worked with the Joint Career Transition Committees, a co-
operative venture by the employer and the bargaining agents to
facilitate change.9
Special measures were also taken by the commission, in
collaboration with the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board
Secretariat and deputy heads, to support assistant deputy ministers and
lower-level executives impacted by the restructuring.10
Over this period, the PSC devoted a large part of its efforts to
ensuring that affected employees were treated equitably despite the
massive changes brought about by Program Review.11 The commission
worked to ensure that the rights of employees as well as the requirements
of the merit principle were respected in the midst of tremendous changes.
It also actively cooperated with other central agencies and departments
to facilitate the movement of remaining employees and support the
transitions of those who had to reorient their careers. Through these
efforts, the commission demonstrated how, more than a simple
oversight body, it remained an active member of the management team,
working closely with other agencies to facilitate administrative changes
and optimize the public service's use of its human resources.
However, in addition to the challenge of dealing with the effects of
the cutbacks, Program Review had another impact on the commission:
it triggered another internal process of reflection about the PSC's
essential mandate and how best to fulfill it in an environment that
had significantly evolved over the years. Like other departments, the
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PSC was also targeted by Program Review and it received the series
of questions intended to guide the internal review of its programs and
spending. Ruth Hubbard, who had recently been appointed president
of the commission at the time, remembers that the executive team
originally found that the questions were difficult to apply to a central
agency, let alone one that was also an independent parliamentary agent.
But the intent of the exercise was clear and she decided to use the
opportunity to engage the commission in a broader reflection on its
role in the context of an evolving public service.12
To pursue this reflection, in addition to some purely internal
discussion, the commission launched a series of learning workshops,
involving a select group of senior public servants, academics and
other experts. The discussions at the workshops held in the context
of this Learning Series, which began in the fall of 1996, helped the
commissioners explore the emerging challenges facing the public
service and think about how the PSC should respond to them. One of
the key issues to emerge from this reflection was the need to reaffirm the
importance of a professional public service to the country's democratic
governance.13
In the late 1990s, this concern became an important theme for the
PSC's leadership. With the globalization of socio-economic relations
and the shift toward a knowledge-based society, values such as efficiency,
innovation and flexibility came to occupy a more prominent place in
public discourse about government. In a fast-changing environment
where the needs and problems of citizens were increasingly diverse and
complex, governments were being called upon to quickly provide better
adapted responses; but to do so they had to be flexible, results-driven,
innovative organizations. The legitimate pursuit of these objectives,
fuelled by the growing prominence of the new public management
discourse, led to a widespread condemnation of the traditional
bureaucracy and to the embrace of results-driven management as a
way of reinventing the public service of many industrialized countries.
On this score, Canada might not have been the most adventurous
reformer, but it was part of the pack, and the culture of its public
service had changed significantly over the years.14 For the Public Service
Commission, the guardian of some of the most fundamental values of
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traditional public administration, the potential erosion of these values
in the face of the growing popularity of public management was cause
for concern.
In the latter half of the 1990s, the PSC began to publicly reaffirm
the importance of a professional public service, rooted in the traditional
principles of merit-based appointments and promotions, non-
partisanship and enough independence to allow public servants to "speak
truth to power" in the public interest. In its annual reports for fiscal years
1995-1996 and 1996-1997, the commission dedicated entire chapters
to "the essence of a professional public service," reminding Parliament
not to lose sight of the importance of these foundational principles as it
pursued public sector reform.15 For example, in its 1995-1996 report,
it affirmed,
'Getting government right' will mean optimizing both administrative
efficiency and the traditional virtues Canadians associate with their
public institutions. A vital challenge in the short and medium
term—in addition to building the new Public Service through
recruitment and reinvestment—is preserving the essence of a
professional and politically neutral Public Service. The hallmark of
that professionalism is the ability to give the government of the day
the best possible advice without fear or favour, based on objective and
impartial reflection on the long-term public good, to loyally carry
out the orders of the democratically elected government, to obey
the law and to act with probity in the public interest. In addition
to being highly competent, a professional Public Service has to be
nonpartisan, and entry and promotion must be based on merit. As the
parliamentary agency which safeguards merit and nonpartisanship,
the Commission believes it has a responsibility to remind Canadians
that an institutionalized, professional bureaucracy is a cornerstone
of our Westminster-based form of democracy. The final chapter of
this annual report aspires to instigate a broader discussion about the
importance of safeguarding fundamental democratic, ethical and
professional public sector values as the search continues for more
flexible ways of governing Canada in the interest of Canadians.16
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In subsequent years, the concern about safeguarding the
fundamental values of the traditional public service did not subside.
If anything, it probably deepened as the public service continued to
evolve.
One of the important events that brought into even sharper
focus the potential erosion of the merit principle due to managerial
reforms was the creation of agencies with a distinct administrative and
legal status in the late 1990s. At that time, more than 50,000 public
servants were moved out of the core public service to join separate
agencies with distinctive employment regimes. The most notable case
was the creation of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency in the
spring of 1999, which took 43,000 employees out of the core public
administration. Thousands of public servants also left for the newly
created Canadian Food Inspection Agency or Parks Canada.17 While an
important objective pursued by the creation of these agencies was the
improvement of service delivery, the desire to make efficiency gains by
escaping the more rigid staffing regime of the core public service was
also a prominent goal. As separate employers under the law, the new
agencies were no longer subject to the Public Service Employment Act
and no longer fell under the authority of the PSC.
The creation of these agencies undoubtedly reflected a significant
level of frustration with the staffing system among government and
public-service decision-makers concerned that it constituted an
enormous drag on efficiency. But the creation of these agencies was a
significant blow to the application of the merit principle in appointing
public employees. Before it became a separate employer, Revenue
Canada accounted for about a third of the appointments made to and
within the public service, a stunning proportion of appointments that
now escapes the reach of the PSC.18 As public administration scholar
Donald Savoie pointed out, this innovation resulted in a two-tier
public service, where one tier is seemingly presumed to be naturally
more impervious to political pressure to make partisan appointments.19
At the time that the decision was being considered, the commission's
president strongly opposed it, causing some tension with the Privy
Council Office, but to no avail.20
It is important to note that the commission's concern regarding the
erosion of the traditional values of a professional public service never
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constituted a denial of the need for greater efficiency or managerial
flexibility. In fact, its active support for legislative changes earlier in
the 1990s and its endorsement of further changes in the following
years show that the commission remained committed to these goals.
Once again, the issue was rather one of balance. Having a public service
staffed with competent and non-partisan civil servants able to advise
the government of the day without fearing for their career advancement
was as important for the future well-being of the country and the
effectiveness of its government as having one that was innovative,
efficient and capable of adapting to its changing environment. The
challenge was to find ways to reconcile these legitimate and important
objectives without neglecting one at the expense of the other.
In the late 1990s, as the commission struggled with this challenge,
and what it meant for its future role in the public service, its response
turned essentially on two related initiatives: one that sought to further
delegate staffing authority to deputy heads within a stronger framework
of accountability; and another that considered the radical curtailment
of its involvement in service delivery in favour of a stronger oversight
role.
RETHINKING DELEGATION: ACCOUNTABILITY AGREEMENTS AND
VALUES-BASED STAFFING
The PSC's commitment to delegation had remained unwavering since
the adoption of the Public Service Employment Act m 1967. Throughout
the 1990s, the commission pushed for even further delegation of its
staffing authority to departmental heads, with maximum flexibility for
managers. However, as a result of its own experience and in response
to criticism from managers (insufficient delegation and flexibility)
and employees (too much delegation to distrusted managers), the
commission also decided to adopt a new approach to delegation: one
that would emphasize respect for the values underlying public service
staffing, a less prescriptive delegation framework that would allow
departments to customize their staffing systems and departmental
accountability that would be based less on individual transactions and
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more on overall staffing outcomes. This shift in approach came as a
result of two main reviews of staffing policies and practices.
First, early in the decade, the commission established a consultative
committee on the Review of Staffing Delegation composed of
departmental, union and private sector representatives.21 The process was
extensive: no fewer than forty-nine consultative groups were convened as
part of this initiative, involving various categories of managers, employees
and stakeholders. The schism between managers and employees was
evident, and the commission concluded, among other things, that it
had to improve employees' confidence in managers.22 The strong union
opposition to the 1992 amendments to the Public Service Employment
Act, which provided enhanced flexibility for managers, was largely
a reflection of the distrust felt by many employees. More and better
accountability for the use of delegated staffing authority was needed
to improve the reputation of the staffing process and build confidence.
To address this problem, the commission worked on the
development of a new delegation instrument: the Staffing Delegation
and Accountability Agreement (SDAA). Each department would
negotiate such an agreement, which, signed by the deputy head, would
become the basis for rendering accounts for departmental performance.
By using broad indicators and focusing on staffing outcomes and the
overall integrity of the staffing system, this approach would counter
the tendency to react to individual events and, since agreements were
negotiated case by case, they could be tailored to the specific circumstances
of each department.23 In this way, expectations would be clearer and
more attuned to departmental requirements: something to assuage both
employee representatives and managers. Moreover, departments were
expected to share their annual performance report with their employee
representatives and report on the feedback received.24 Implementation
of the Staffing Delegation and Accountability Agreement was delayed by
the 1993 restructuring of departments and then by the 1995 Program
Review, but it nevertheless progressed gradually throughout the decade.
By 2001, the near totality of the core public administration was covered
by the new system.25
A second review conducted also helped confirm this broad shift
in approach. Commissioned in the summer of 1995, the report of the
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Consultative Review of Staffing was tabled in July 1996. The review was
originally launched in response to departmental complaints about the
excessive time required to fill positions, and it was tasked with finding
ways to make staffing simpler and more efficient.26 Involving central
agencies, managers, union representatives and various human resources
experts, the initiative generated an exceptional level of consultation with
stakeholders. At these consultations, PSC officials were struck by the
intensity of interest in change that they encountered27 and, eventually,
the review led to a broader agenda for non-legislative reform, known as
staffing reform.28
The Consultative Review of Staffing final report, which was
sanctioned by the commission, strongly endorsed extensive delegation
of authority to departments, but it also advocated a loosening of the
constraints placed on departments for the exercise of their powers.29
Departments needed to be encouraged to fully use their delegated
authority to redesign their own staffing operations, involving employee
representatives in the process. But for this kind of renewal to work,
the PSC had to ensure that its own staffing framework, within which
departments must operate, was not too prescriptive. The commission had
to focus less on detailed rules and more on the values that underpinned
the staffing system. Accountability had to focus more on results and
less on process and transactions. In this way, values-based staffing, as
it would come to be known, was largely premised on a well-known
bargain: fewer rules and constraints in return for more accountability
for achieving results.
As we can see, the general approach underpinning the Consultative
Review of Staffing report had strong affinities with the approach to
delegation and accountability that the commission was progressively
developing over this period. Hence, it is not surprising that they became
entangled together in the broader agenda of staffing reform pursued by
the commission after 1997. As former commissioner Ginette Stewart
observed, these reforms were founded
on the core belief that Deputy Heads, under existing legislation, can
be delegated staffing authorities specifically tailored to their needs
and with fewer conditions — if the delegation is accompanied by
customized delegation and accountability agreements.30
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These initiatives also illustrate clearly the overall direction that the
commission was taking during the 1990s: focusing less on the direct
control of staffing transactions, moving from a rules-based to a less
prescriptive, values-based staffing framework and placing more emphasis
on accountability for results by departments. There is no doubt that this
shift in direction tended to play up the oversight and accountability
dimension of the PSC's mandate. Thus, in conjunction with the PSC
leadership's growing concerns about the challenges being posed to the
traditional public service, this shift contributed to a reconsideration of
the commission's historical role in the delivery of staffing and related
services.
RECONSIDERING THE PSC's ROLE IN SERVICE DELIVERY: THE
1999 DIRECTIONAL STATEMENT
As we have seen, one of the effects of Program Review at the commission
was that it triggered a period of intense reflection about what its role
should be at a time when the public sector was undergoing significant
transformation. This thinking led the commission to pay increasing
attention to the fundamental values and principles associated with
a professional public service in a Westminster-type parliamentary
democracy, a preoccupation that was reflected in its annual reports
to Parliament in 1996 and 1997. As a parliamentary agent entrusted
specifically with the protection of one of those fundamental principles
(independent appointments based on merit), the commission was
naturally concerned that those principles and values, essential for
maintaining a professional bureaucracy able to administer the law fairly
and for providing competent,, non-partisan advice to government,
might be eroded in the new context. In an environment overtaken by
management, who should care about the fundamental issues of public
administration and about the unique role of the bureaucracy in a
parliamentary democracy if not: the Public Service Commission?
However, this preoccupation naturally raised a number of
questions about the commission itself. In the new environment, where
departments enjoyed unprecedented authority and flexibility, did the
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commission need to change in order to play its role in protecting the
professional public service? If independent oversight of departmental
staffing was becoming the commission's key role, was it well prepared
to fulfill this vital function? In particular, to what extent was a
strengthened oversight function compatible with the commission's
continued role in the delivery of human resources services? These issues
were discussed intensely by PSC officials as they considered the future
of the organization. Then, following a series of strategic retreats held in
the fall of 1998, the commissioners adopted a directional statement,
which proposed a new orientation for the commission.
The directional statement, entitled A Strengthened Focus for the
Public Service Commission of Canada, proposed to radically cut back
the commission's involvement in the delivery of human resources (HR)
services in order to devote itself more fully to the independent oversight
of departmental staffing systems.31 Over the years, it argued, the PSC had
substantially changed how it safeguarded merit by moving away from
the direct control of staffing (doing it itself) and toward more indirect
forms of control (by delegating staffing to departments, prescribing
how it should be done and then conducting periodic verifications
and demanding accounts). But, at the same time, it had continued to
deliver some staffing services and HR programs to departments. The
result had been a source of some confusion and ambiguity both for
departments and for employees of the commission: Was the PSC truly
an independent guardian of merit, exercising oversight and demanding
accountability from departments, or was it more of a service agency
focused on pleasing and meeting the needs of the same departments
that were its clients? Was it one of a handful of agencies offering HR
services to departments or a unique agency safeguarding on behalf of
Parliament the integrity of a crucial element of the HR system? As the
public service was adopting a staffing model that made oversight and
accountability ever more important, greater clarity was needed on these
matters.
For the PSC, while the move away from the delivery of HR services
would be historic and difficult, it nevertheless seemed necessary. It is
worth quoting at length the directional statement's rationale:
196 Defending a Contested Ideal
Throughout its history, the Commission has sought to balance its
independence with the need to work with government to effectively
apply merit. One important element of early thinking which remains
to this day and which now requires clarification is the Commission's
program and service delivery role as an adjunct to merit. While the
Commission has already begun to change the way it safeguards merit,
moving from directly controlling and carrying out appointments to
delegating staffing authority to deputy heads, it continues, at the
same time, to deliver a variety of human resources programs and
services. Because of this, the PSC finds itself increasingly present at
tables comprising the very officials whose staffing decisions it may be
adjudicating, reviewing or auditing.
The Commission questions today the assumption that performing
these program and service delivery functions truly represents the best
means to bring about merit. It is the altering of this premise that is
the essence of this Directional Statement. With the reinforcing of
deputy head responsibilities for good people management and the
PSC's own extensive delegation of powers to them, the Commission
is of the belief that it need no longer safeguard merit through 'doing'
but, rather, through strengthening oversight.
In other words, while being mindful of the need for special attention
in areas such as senior appointments and initial entry to the Public
Service, the PSC's fundamental responsibilities would be clarified
and strengthened if it no longer delivered services in precisely the
same domains that it oversees. As a matter of principle, the PSC
cannot optimally oversee its delegated authorities while being part of
the system of program administration itself. Against this backdrop,
therefore, the PSC intends to divest itself of its program and operational
responsibilities and strengthen its focus on its fundamental mandate,
the safeguarding of merit.32 (emphasis added)
This proposal—to divest itself of most of its program and
operational responsibilities in favour of a more exclusive focus on the
oversight of delegated authority—undoubtedly represented a bold
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gesture on the part of the commission, and it certainly illustrates how
the PSC has been willing to rethink its role in ensuring quality public
administration over the years.
Divesting services would mean the loss of resources and employees,
which, some people thought, might reduce the PSC's clout and influence
in Ottawa. But it would help provide greater clarity of purpose, with
the commission's energies being refocused on its core mandate. As the
Directional Statement unequivocally stated,
Simply put, the PSC is involved in too many product lines which,
taken together, divert energy and attention away from the main
task of ensuring that the principles it was created to maintain are
indeed protected and promoted— Modern public sector human
resources management requires excellence in both the delivery of
human resource services and the oversight of merit. The Commission
believes the time has come for these two functions to be separated.33
As officials of the commission argued at the time, this separation
of functions would allow the government, if it wished to do so, to
create a new, truly integrated HR service provider.34 Thus, reorienting
the commissions mandate would strengthen oversight, and at the
same time, if the government moved toward better integrated service
provision, create an opportunity to increase the efficiency of the overall
HR system.
The directional statement was not a definitive statement of policy.
Rather, it painted a picture of where the commission should be heading.
To become a reality, it needed to be supported by the senior leadership
of the public service, not only because the separation of functions it was
proposing would involve a significant reallocation of responsibilities
among central agencies involved in the HR system but also because,
even if legislative changes were not required, programs would have to
be transferred out of the PSC and they would have to go somewhere.
Support of the key actors in the system was crucial.
But, as it tried to move forward, the PSC obtained mixed support
among senior public service leaders. While many senior deputy
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ministers supported the overall thrust of the proposal and the idea
of better integrated HR service delivery, they also expressed concerns
about the system's ability to effectively coordinate HR policy if the
PSC were to become further removed from the management team of
the public service. At the time, the Clerk of the Privy Council Office
(PCO) was talking about a more corporate (whole-of-government)
approach to HR management in the public service, and it was not clear
whether the commission's proposed course of action would contribute
to this objective. In fact, the directional statement was not received
with enthusiasm at the PCO when it was officially sent to the Clerk in
January 1999.
In any case, a full debate of the directional statement, as an
image of the future of the PSC and its role in the HR regime, was
significantly hindered because of inopportune timing. Not only was
the system preoccupied by other management issues, such as Y2K and a
difficult reform of the universal classification system, but the directional
statement also arrived at the PCO as the Clerk, Jocelyne Bourgon, was
about to leave her position. As a consequence, serious consideration
of the proposal would have to wait for a new clerk to be in place. As it
turned out, by the time the new clerk settled in, the debate had shifted
to the need for more fundamental and comprehensive HR reform, a
debate triggered largely by the release of a very critical study by the
Office of the Auditor General in April 2000.
Even at the PSC, the directional statement was relatively short-
lived, a victim of changing circumstances. While the commission
released it publicly in the spring of 1999 and announced publicly that it
would pursue "a very active, open and transparent consultation process"
on its new direction,35 the statement was in fact soon abandoned as a
blueprint for thinking about the commission's future. Before the end
of the year, its strongest advocate, Ruth Hubbard, had left the PSC
presidency. The two commissioners who served with her, Ginette
Stewart and Mary Gusella, also left around the same time.
The new president of the commission, Scott Serson, did not readily
endorse the divestment of most staffing and HR services, thinking that
the PSC would remain more influential and better positioned to ensure
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respect for the merit principle by continuing to balance both roles. And
a few months later, in its 2000 annual report, the commission effectively
shelved the directional statement:
The Commission believes its leadership role in the human resources
management (HRM) system will be enhanced through the
implementation of the values-based approach described above. The
Commission will continue to monitor carefully the interplay of its
two important roles of independent Parliamentary overseer and key
player in the HRM system. The issue of an appropriate balance of
these roles will be revisited if there is any indication that the effective
oversight of merit is impeded in any manner.36
Despite its limited direct impact, the directional statement had
clearly raised an important issue that would not simply disappear in the
following years. The more staffing authority delegated to departments
and the fewer the constraints placed on them to exercise it, the more
vital the commission's oversight role would become. To what extent
could the commission vigorously play this oversight role, including
through audits and investigations, while at the same time remaining
significantly involved in operations and offering services to client
departments? Was there a need to rethink the activities of the PSC to
allow it to focus better on its essential mandate: safeguarding the merit
principle? Because they were germane to long-term trends in staffing,
these questions would soon return as key issues. But, by the end of
2000, they had already become part of a much larger debate about the
need to modernize the whole HR framework of the public service.
TRIGGERING COMPREHENSIVE REFORM: THE AUDITOR
GENERAL'S 2000 HR STUDY
As the PSC was working on redefining its own role, pursuing its
delegation and accountability agenda and reconsidering its role in
delivering services, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) was
conducting a major study of the human resources management regime
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of the public service. As we have seen in previous chapters, it was not
the first time that the auditor general would take a critical look at the
bureaucracy's management of its human resources. But, released as
part of its report in 2000, this study, Streamlining the Human Resource
Management Regime: A Study of Changing Roles and Responsibilities,
would be a landmark, a particularly hard-hitting critique of the state
of personnel management in the public service calling for fundamental
institutional and legislative reforms.37
Written under the direction of Maria Barrados, assistant auditor
general, who incidentally would become the president of a reformed
PSC three years later, the report conveyed the sense that action was
urgently needed to resolve some key personnel management issues,
especially in light of upcoming challenges, such as the major waves of
retirements and the growing need for knowledge workers in a modern
public administration.38 Extremely critical of the state of staffing and
human resources management, the OAG's report observed that staffing
remained "a major source of frustration" for managers and employees
alike.39 Despite repeated efforts to make the system more flexible,
managers essentially viewed it as "unduly complex, inflexible and
inefficient," and many employees were even sceptical that it led to fair
hiring decisions.40
The OAG's diagnostic for the ills of the staffing and human resources
management system focused largely on its excessive regulation. The
report argued that much of the administrative burden on departments
resulted from policies and regulations imposed by the PSC and the
Treasury Board to ensure that the relevant laws, and the related and ever-
expanding jurisprudence, were respected/As a result, despite successive
waves of delegation of authority to departments, managers remained
entangled in a web of cumbersome rules. For example, the report
pointed out that the Treasury Board's personnel and pay administration
manuals contained more than 12,000 pages of instructions in 1997.41
The system's complexity was such that, according to various studies,
departments had to develop policies and rules of their own to ensure that
their employees complied with the requirements of central agencies.42
The outcome was clearly inefficient: staffing a new position that had to
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be classified took almost eight months, and the public service employed
about three times the number of HR professionals as the standard in
the private sector.43
In order to improve staffing, the OAG advocated "substantial
change—even legislative change."44 For example, changes to the Public
Service Employment Act would be needed to provide departments and the
Public Service Commission with greater flexibility in the appointment
and deployment of personnel. But in addition to these modifications,
there was also a need to deal with the excessive fragmentation of the
responsibility for human resources management in the public service.
The responsibility and related accountability for improving human
resources management needed to be clarified and, for the OAG, there
was no uncertainty about it: the responsibility and accountability
of deputy heads, the leaders of departments and agencies, had to be
strengthened. As it argued,
The underlying philosophy should be that deputies have the authority
to act at their own discretion in all areas except where the centre
has chosen to prescribe policy, and those areas should be limited to
the minimum essentials. It is crucial that new responsibilities and
deputies' accountability for acting on them be set out clearly.45
Clearly, decades of an approach emphasizing the delegation
of authority had successfully presented deputy heads as primarily
responsible for administering a centrally prescribed framework but
had failed to make them HR leaders by making human resources
management an integral part of their management responsibilities.
Reforms were now needed to take these additional steps: empower
them, set clear expectations about HR management and hold them
truly accountable for their performance.
The role of the Public Service Commission in all this was left
rather undefined by the OAG. The OAG observed that there was
agreement on the vital role played by the commission in protecting
the merit principle. But the report advocated a renewed dialogue with
Parliament about how the commission should fulfill this function, and
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it stated that the possibility of legislative reforms should be part of the
discussions. Consideration also had to be given to the appropriate extent
of the commission's involvement in delivering services that were not
central to the protection of merit.46 However, the report did not include
any explicit calls for removing the commission's staffing authority or
for changing its unusual institutional position as an independent
parliamentary agency also exercising executive powers of appointment
to the public service. Observers looking for a clear signal in this regard
were left noting repeated exhortations in favour of clarify ing the division
of responsibilities among agencies and a passing observation that the
"reluctance to tamper with the independence and role of the Public
Service Commission has been a factor [in the Public Service's past
inability to resolve key HR issues]."47 Thus, while it clearly advocated
strengthening the authority and accountability of deputy heads in the
area of human resources management, including staffing, the report's
views on the appropriate role of the PSC were not as clear.
Initially, the report of the Office of the Auditor General did not
generate much enthusiasm for reform. The Public Service Commission
reiterated its support for reforming the staffing system so that it would
be based more on values and less on rules. But it pointed out that,
following its review of staffing in the mid-1990s, steps had already been
taken in this direction. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the OAG, the
commission believed that much progress remained possible under the
existing legislative framework. At a minimum, more work was needed
before concluding that amendments to the Public Service Employment
Atwere necessary. Finally, in a clear attempt to caution the government
against undertaking radical reforms in the search for greater flexibility,
its official response to the OAG also stated that "efficiency, while
unquestionably important, forms part of a larger balance of values"
associated with staffing the Public Service of a democratic country.48
Maintaining this balance, the commission argued, is necessary to ensure
that Canadians remain confident in the public service.
In the higher echelons of the public service and the government, the
initial response to the OAG's report was similarly lukewarm. Amongst
the myriad of important issues faced by the centre of government, a
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significant overhaul of the human resources management regime
would consume a great deal of energy, would likely prove disruptive
and hardly seemed a political priority. Moreover, as the Office of the
Auditor General itself reported, there were "concerns, notably among
deputy ministers, about the practicality of pursuing such fundamental
reforms."49 Consequently, the government's initial response to the
report was marked by a distinct lack of enthusiasm. In its official reply,
the government stated that it was "considerably more optimistic than
the Auditor General on such matters as collective and individual deputy
minister responsibility, accomplishments in staffing reform, and the
flexibility inherent in the current legislative framework."50 Pointing out
that committees of deputy ministers were already at work on such issues
as recruitment and workplace well-being, it declared itself confident in
the possibility of effectively modernizing human resources management
without legislative change.
However, after a few months, this initial reluctance gave way to
some genuine support for change. In early 2001, in its third report, the
Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation (the
Strong Committee), which advocated the development of a long-term
human resources strategy for the public service, endorsed the Auditor
General's recommendation for structural reform of the HR regime.
Then, a few months later, the final report of the Advisory Committee
on Labour-Management Relations in the Federal Public Service, the
Fryer Report, also advocated significant changes to the human resources
management regime, this time to the legislative framework concerning
labour relations.51 Within a short time span, the government had
received consistent and strong signals about the need for institutional
and legislative change.
The general election of 2000, which resulted in a comfortable
Liberal majority, seemed to present a measure of political stability and
commitment that would make significant reforms possible. Upon its
return to office, in the Speech from the Throne read on January 30,
2001, the Chretien government committed itself to administrative
reforms that would allow the public service to attract the skilled
workforce needed in a knowledge economy and society. As it stated,
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The Government is committed to the reforms needed for the Public
Service of Canada to continue evolving and adapting. These reforms
will ensure that the Public Service is innovative, dynamic and
reflective of the diversity of the country—able to attract and develop
the talent needed to serve Canadians in the 21st century.'2
In this context, enjoying clear political support and responding
to growing calls for legislative changes, Mel Cappe, clerk of the Privy
Council and Head of the Public Service, took steps to set the bureaucracy
on a path of reform.
SEEKING A NEW BEGINNING: THE PUBLIC SERVICE
MODERNIZA TIONACT
The Clerk of the Privy Council's Eight Annual Report to the Prime
Minister on the Public Service of Canada, tabled in March 2001, was
largely dedicated to the need to build a modern, people-centred public
service in order to meet the challenges of a knowledge-based society,
especially at a time when large-scale retirements would soon create
significant recruitment challenges. In the report, Cappe announced
"the beginning of a phase of more fundamental reform," which would
lead to a cultural shift that would bring managers to see that people
management is an integral part of good management.53 But, "today's
human resources management laws," the Clerk warned, "do not allow
us to move quickly enough on the transformation to a modern, people-
centred public service. More fundamental change is required."54 Also in
the report, he asserted that "no matter how you look at it, it is clear that
we are not able to keep pace because our current people management
regime is too linear, inflexible and complex" and that "to keep pace
and better support the efforts of public servants at all levels, we need
to move from our incremental approach to a more fundamental reform
of the legislative framework for human resources management in the
Public Service."55
Once reformed, the legal framework would continue to ensure
the protection of merit, representativeness, non-partisanship and
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competence, but it would also ensure that management would be
responsible for all aspects of personnel management, and authority for
personnel management would be pushed down as far as possible in the
departments' hierarchy.
The Clerk's report and other statements, coupled with the Speech
from the Throne, undoubtedly represented an unequivocal and
strong endorsement of significant legislative reforms by the centre of
government. Moreover, the Clerk's declaration left no doubt about the
overall orientation of the reforms to come: flexibility, efficiency and
transfer of authority to departmental managers were the order of the
day. However, to make these reforms a reality, much work remained
to be done on the specifics of the legislative changes. To do this, on
April 3,2001, the Prime Minister appointed aTask Force on Modernizing
Human Resources Management, headed by a senior deputy minister,
Ranald A. Quail, who would report to the Clerk of the Privy Council.
At the political level, the president of the Treasury Board, Lucienne
Robillard, a senior minister with a long experience of the public service,
was given responsibility for looking after this initiative and ultimately
shepherding the resulting legislation through Parliament.
The recommendations of the Quail Task Force, and the eventual
changes that it led to, were significant and wide ranging, affecting
not only staffing but also labour relations, training and development
and the regulation of political activities by public servants. Many of
the changes that it advocated eventually made up part of the Public
Service Modernization Act, which was enacted by Parliament in
November 2003.56 With regard to staffing, significant changes were
made to the public service's approach to the merit principle as well
as to the distribution of responsibilities among central agencies and
departments. The overall thrust of the reforms, in keeping with the
Clerk's initial direction, was to emphasize greater flexibility in staffing
rules and further delegation of authority, inscribed in the legislation
itself, to departmental managers. Overall, the adopted measures clearly
were the most fundamental and wide-ranging changes to the public
service's human resources management framework since 1967.
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In examining these changes and their impact on the Public
Service Commission, two sets of issues appear particularly important:
the debates over institutional reforms, dealing mainly with the
independence of the PSC and the distribution of roles among central
agencies, and the legislative changes that sought to make staffing more
efficient, especially the new legislated approach to the implementation
of the merit principle. We will now look at these issues in turn.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: A REDISTRIBUTION OF ROLES
A key objective of the 2003 reforms was to clarify responsibilities
for human resources management in the federal public service. In
this regard, the reformers' main desire was to see the responsibility
and accountability of deputy heads for managing their organization's
personnel increased and more clearly affirmed in the law. As it has
often been pointed out in the past, deputies had come to be seen as
the operators of a centrally prescribed framework that: left them little
room for judgment and leadership. There was a sense that personnel
management had often been a neglected dimension of their managerial
responsibilities, a situation that was not tolerable in an environment
where talented and motivated people had become the most precious
resource of departments and where recruitment and retention were
becoming increasingly difficult.
To address this concern, the Public Service Modernization Act
included some important provisions. The preamble of the new Public
Service Employment Act explicitly affirmed that staffing decisions should
be made at the lowest possible level within departments: delegation of
staffing authority, from the PSC to deputy heads then from deputy heads
to lower level managers, was to be the core philosophy of the staffing
system.57 In the same spirit, the preamble also provided that managers
should enjoy flexibility in staffing arrangements. Furthermore, the
PSMA also amended the Financial Administration Act to transfer some
of the Treasury Board's authority for personnel management to deputy
heads, especially in the areas of training and development, termination
and demotion and the setting of standards for disciplinary actions. The
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exercise of the new powers would be subject to policies and directives
issued by the Treasury Board, but deputy heads would be at the helm
and accountable for their performance. Finally, as a way to heighten
the importance of human resources management, the Treasury Board
was also tasked by the new legislation to table in Parliament an annual
report on personnel management in the core public service.
While there seemed to be a widely shared consensus on the need
for clearer and more extensive delegation of human resources (HR)
management to deputy heads and managers, a trend supported by the
PSC, there was no consensus on a second issue of institutional reform:
the distribution of roles and responsibilities among central agencies with
responsibilities for human resources management. As we have seen in
previous chapters, the "ambivalence of central personnel management"
has long been as a source of problems for HR management in the
public service.58 The HR modernization initiative presented yet another
opportunity to consider simplifying and clarifying the way personnel
management was dealt with centrally. And, more particularly, it again
raised the question of whether the PSC should retain its executive
authority over appointments or whether it should confine its role to
reporting to Parliament on the results of its audits of staffing actions
undertaken by departments. In the latter model, staffing authority
would be fully transferred to the employer.
Like many commissions and task forces over the years, the Quail
Task Force, wanting to end the historic split in central personnel
management responsibilities for the sake of efficiency, proposed to
change the mandate of the PSC and to turn it solely into a parliamentary
agency. Not surprisingly, the commission, represented by its president,
Scott Serson, argued strenuously in favour of retaining its executive
authority.59 Serson, like many PSC presidents before him, believed that
the protection of merit required a strong and independent commission.
In his view, a commission that relied almost exclusively on its power
to take departments to task by tabling audit reports before Parliament
would likely lack sufficient levers to ensure strict adherence to the
principle of merit. With a more delegated and more flexible staffing
model, there seemed to be an even greater need for a strong and
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independent body capable of exercising direct authority in the event
of incompetence, defective systems or abuse of discretion. In his view,
in order to prevent abuses and retain the confidence of Canadians, the
public service needed a PSC with one foot still firmly planted on the
executive side of the fence.
In the senior ranks of the public service, the debate about the
institutional position of the PSC proved to be difficult, and deputy
ministers were divided on the best course of action. As the debate
intensified, there were growing tensions between the Commission, the
Privy Council Office and some deputy ministers, and, at one point, the
president of the commission stopped attending the regular meetings
of the Committee of Senior Officials.60 As the head of an independent
agency, Serson also met with the President of the Treasury Board to
share some of his concerns about the threat to the PSC's statutory
authority. As in the early 1990s, there were also concerns about the
PSC taking a strong public position against the reform and publicly
doubting its future ability to protect the merit principle if it lost its
executive authority over staffing.61
In its 2002 Annual Report, at a time when the Privy Council
Office was still considering reform proposals, the commission had
already warned against an eventual curtailment of its independence.
Emphasizing the link between its institutional independence and the
protection of the key values of neutrality and equity, it had stated,
Public Service neutrality is in large part a function of the
accountability of deputy/agency heads to the Commission, who in
turn is accountable directly to Parliament. Deputy/agency heads and
the Commission are therefore protected from direct pressure from the
government of the day in making appointments. This protection for
deputy/agency heads from partisan influence should be maintained
in the new system— Another possible threat to merit would be an
excessive emphasis on efficiency in staffing, at the expense of the
values of fairness, transparency and equity of access. At present we
are responsible for ensuring an appropriate balance among all the
staffing values. In a modernized system, the Commission should
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have a way to guarantee that this balance continues to exist. At the
heart of these issues is the continuing need for an independent agent
of Parliament, working to protect merit in co-operation with—but
not subject to—the Government in its role as employer.62
In the end, after what has been described by former senior officials
of the commission as a very difficult period, the Privy Council Office
decided not to strip the PSC of its statutory authority over staffing.
Once again, the PSC had fended off an attempt at reducing its role to
one of a parliamentary oversight body.
Ultimately, in fact, as a result of amendments introduced during
the parliamentary consideration of the Public Service Modernization
Act, the commissions independence was even strengthened. First, new
provisions served to clarify the commission's governance structure and
the leadership position of the organization's president, turning the
jobs of the two commissioners into part-time positions and officially
designating the president as the commission's chief executive officer.
While the president had always had a unique leadership position in
the past, the exact nature of the president's relationship with the other
two commissioners had sometimes been the subject of dispute. Second,
amendments were made to the procedures for appointing the president,
bolstering the presidents unique status and independence. While still a
governor-in-council appointment, the president is now appointed only
after the nomination has been approved by a resolution of the House of
Commons and the Senate. Moreover, appointed for a seven-year term,
the president can only be removed by the government at the request of
Parliament. These amendments underscored the commission's special
relationship to Parliament and its distance from the political executive.
However, while the PSC was kept as an independent agency
exercising authority over staffing, the comprehensive reforms adopted
in 2003 still profoundly affected the distribution of roles among central
agencies involved in human resources management. The most notable
change was the creation of a new central agency for human resources
management: the Public Service Human Resources Management Agency
of Canada (since renamed the Canada Public Service Agency).63 Under
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the portfolio of the president of the Treasury Board, the new agency
was created by hiving off most of the personnel responsibilities long
held by the Treasury Board Secretariat, with the notable exceptions of
labour relations management, collective bargaining, and compensation
matters.64 Additional responsibilities, such as career development
programs previously administered by the PSC, were also transferred to
the Canada Public Service Agency.
Since it seemed to run somewhat counter to the oft-professed desire
to simplify the central management of personnel, the creation of the
Canada Public Service Agency might have been perceived as a surprising
development. In fact, the Quail Task Force had not initially proposed
the creation of a new central agency. But, as its recommendations were
considered and debated within the senior ranks of the public service,
the clerk of the Privy Council at the time, Alex Hirnmelfarb, came
to consider the creation of a separate human resources agency as a
promising step forward.65 The creation of a separate agency, distinct
from the Treasury Board Secretariat, and solely dedicated to human
resources management, seemed to serve two objectives. First, while
it might not simplify the system, it would serve to recognize, at the
institutional level, the fundamental importance of people management
to the future success of the public service. But, second, it would also
allow the Treasury Board Secretariat to focus its efforts more exclusively
on budgetary policy and financial management at a time when there
were growing concerns about financial controls and accountability. In
this sense, a separate agency would contribute to the improvement of
the management framework of the public service.
As already noted, for the PSC, the creation of the Canada
Public Service Agency meant the loss of its responsibilities for
career development. Its career programs, including the well-known
Management Trainee Program, the Career Assignment Program,
the Accelerated Executive Development Program and Interchange
Canada, were all transferred to the new agency. But this was not the
only change in the distribution of responsibilities. As a result of the
adoption of the Public Service Modernization Act, the Public Service
Commission also lost most of its appeals functions. Under the new legal-
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framework, while the PSC would continue to investigate complaints
involving external appointments, most complaints concerning internal
appointments would be handled by a new independent Public Service
Staffing Tribunal.66 The PSC's responsibility for language training,
which had played a big part in the commission's life since the late
1960s, was transferred to a new Canada School of Public Service, an
expanded training organization created out of the Canadian Centre for
Management Development.67
There is no doubt that these changes considerably transformed the
PSC as an organization. Some of the affected functions, such as training,
had been a sizeable part of the organization and had played a significant
role in the commission's recent history. But the reorganization also
provided the commission with greater clarity of purpose. As it discarded
its training and career development activities, the commission dedicated
a larger part of its efforts to better oversight of the staffing system, a
task of growing importance due to the new law's emphasis on extensive
delegation of authority to deputy heads and managers. For example, in
this regard, a new Audit Branch was created and, between 2003 and
2006, the number of auditors at the commission increased from five
to twenty-three, a significant reinvestment in an area that had been
neglected over the years.68
However, it must be noted that, despite the greater emphasis on
delegation of staffing authority to the deputy heads, the commission
has not fully shed its staffing, recruitment and assessment services in
the years since the 2003 reforms, even though these services are no
longer mandatory. For instance, the commission still runs a number of
specialized government-wide recruitment programs and manages the
Public Service's centralized online recruitment and screening system,
which received over one million applications in 2006-2007.69 Moreover,
while the new staffing regime encourages extensive delegation and seeks
to maximize autonomy for departmental managers, many departments
and agencies will never develop a full range of staffing, recruitment and
assessment services, due to their small size or the lack of availability
of HR expertise. For this reason, the commission still offers these
services on an optional basis and many departments continue to use
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them. Furthermore, even under a delegated authority model, effective
centralized services are still necessary to allow the commission to
withdraw, in part or in total, the authority to do staffing from any
department that has been found to be inappropriately performing these
delegated functions. Hence, despite a clear realignment of its functions
in favour of its oversight role, the commission remains an organization
that delivers important staffing services.
In sum, the institutional reforms brought about by the Public
Service Modernization Act\\^ the effect of recentring the commission on
its core mission: ensuring that the merit principle is applied in staffing
the public service. At the institutional level, it did so by re-emphasizing
the commission's role as a parliamentary oversight body, shedding some
of its services and strengthening the president's autonomy from the
government. But, this recentring did not mean breaking with one of
the central elements of the 1908 bargain: the dual personality of the
commission as a parliamentary agent and an executive office possessing
statutory authority over staffing. In this sense, despite the profound
changes that it brought to the central personnel management system,
the 2003 reforms also provided a significant degree of continuity with
the commission's history.
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MERIT PRINCIPLE
While these institutional changes were of fundamental importance for
the PSC and the central management of personnel in the public service,
they were not the most contentious part of the legislative changes
adopted in 2003. More controversial among stakeholders and more
prevalent in parliamentary debates were the proposed changes to the
public service's approach to the merit principle. In addition to pushing
staffing authority as far as possible down departmental hierarchies, the
modernization of human resources management also meant breaking
down some of the staffing system's rigidities. Since 1967, court decisions
had resulted in a rule-heavy system, and legislative changes were needed
to allow the public service to leave behind some of these constraints. The
elimination of "unnecessary red tape in staffing" was a clear objective of
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the legislative reform.70 As Lucienne Robillard, president of the Treasury
Board, put it, "The current system is cumbersome and outdated. The
public service needs a renewed legal framework for its staffing and
management practices to allow it to operate more effectively and to
better meet the needs of Canadians."71
The approach taken was a bold one. Merit-based appointments
had never been explicitly defined in statute. The Public Service
Commission had been left to design selection procedures that would
bring some life to the merit principle. However, as staffing decisions
were challenged, the courts had progressively defined the nature of
meritorious appointments, emphasizing the identification of the best
qualified candidate as determined through a comparative assessment
of candidates for a specific position. Despite the amendment to the
Public Service Employment Act in 1992 that introduced the possibility
of using a more absolute standard of competence, the staffing system
was still largely dominated by cumbersome procedures meant to ensure
that candidates were rigorously assessed and ranked, so as not to give
grounds for appeals. The 2003 legislative changes sought to leave behind
this approach by legislating, for the first time, a definition of merit that
would be more flexible.
The new Public Service Employment Act, contained in the Public
Service Modernization Act, redefined meritorious appointments
as appointments where the selected person meets "the essential
qualifications for the work to be performed, as established by the
deputy head, including official language proficiency."72 In other words,
it would now no longer be necessary to show that the selected person
was the best qualified candidate, but only that he or she possessed the
necessary qualifications to perform the work. Moreover, in making
staffing decisions, departments would now be able to consider
additional qualifications deemed to be assets but not essential for the
job, as well as take into account their current or future operational
requirements and organizational needs. Deputy heads would now have
the authority, which could be subdelegated, to define these various
staffing requirements. Finally, the new act stipulated that it was not
necessary to consider more than one person for an appointment to be
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based on merit and that non-advertised appointment processes could be
used.73 Overall, these measures represented a clear embrace of a more
limited conception of merit—having the essential qualifications to do
a job—and granted considerable discretion to managers in conducting
the staffing process.
This new approach to merit was not universally well received.
In Parliament, opposition parties, which generally agreed that a new
legislative framework for staffing was required and that more flexibility
was needed to speed up the hiring process, nevertheless expressed
some concerns about the proposed approach to establishing merit. For
instance, Paul Forseth, the Vancouver MP representing the Canadian
Alliance Party on the file, stated,
My problem is that the new, watered down definition of merit gives
no direction to select the best person for the job within a specific
competition process. Since that basic goal would no longer be
required, no justification or accountability would be required to
defend perhaps a sloppy selection process or even insider advantage
to a favoured personhere is nothing that will bring the whole
system down faster than the informal social network of news
among employees when it becomes known that a significantly less
able employee was selected for promotion under the new proposed
system, where this so-called winner met the basic qualifications but
was clearly not the best person within any given competition. I say to
the minister that she will have a disaster on her hands if she fails to
fix this most basic definition.74
Then, Monique Guay, who spoke for the Bloc Quebecois on the
file, expressed similar views:
Staffing and the merit principle are at the heart of the reform in
Bill C-25he minister wants to give managers greater leeway.
Hiring time will be shortened, but we are wondering at what cost.
The employees will have to make sure not only that they meet the
position requirements, as they are currently required to, but also
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that they are on the good side of the boss under whom the position
falls, or else they will no longer even be evaluated. There is therefore
the whole issue surrounding recruiting and staffing in which some
balance should perhaps be sought, within limits. I realize that the
process so far has proven complex and time consuming. But could
a middle ground not be found? This is something we have a bit of a
problem with.73
As we can see, despite being fairly supportive overall, parliamen-
tarians sitting on the opposition benches were clearly concerned about
the reform's eventual impact on the pubic service if, in practice, the
reform resulted in an erosion of the merit principle.
Their concerns were fuelled or echoed by concerns expressed by
many observers or stakeholders. As could be expected, labour unions
were particularly critical. For example, Nycole Turmel, president of the
Public Service Alliance of Canada, strongly condemned the legislation.
Before the House of Commons' committee studying the bill, she said,
[The proposed Public Service Employment Act], in its current form,
represents a wholesale retreat from a public service defined by the
appointment of the best-qualified individuals. Bill C-25 delivers on
its promise of increased flexibility for management, but contains very
little protection for employees or the principle of meritIn doing
so, the PSAC fears that the new PSEA has the potential to usher in a
new era of patronage, favouritism and a lack of accountability that is
inconsistent with the government's stated objective.76
Some recognized experts, such as Nick D'Ombrain and Donald
Savole, acknowledged the need for greater flexibility and a rethinking
of the distribution of responsibilities among institutional actors but
nevertheless worried about the erosion of the merit principle.77 Ruth
Hubbard, former president of the PSC, now retired from the public
service, took a similar position. In an article published at the time, she
endorsed the bill as "cautiously constructive" but worried that the new
216 Defending a Contested Ideal
approach to merit might open "the door to significantly more abuse"
and become "a slippery slope to mediocrity."78 Those were hardly strong
or unequivocal endorsements.
Despite these concerns voiced in the House of Commons and in
public debates, the Public Service Modernization Act was adopted in
June 2003, with some limited amendments. As we have seen, one of
those changes modified the process for appointing the PSC president.
Others provided for consultations among the commission, the employer
and labour unions on a number of policy issues or gave the PSC more
flexibility in granting leaves to employees wishing to run for political
office. While these changes were useful, they did not alter the essential
intent of the legislation on matters of staffing. The vast majority of the
amendments accepted by the government came from the Canadian
Alliance Party, which supported the bill in the end, judging that it was
the best that could be achieved at the time.79 In contrast, all but one of
the 120 amendments moved by the Bloc Quebecois were rejected, as
were all those proposed by the New Democratic Party.
It should also be remembered that, much like the Public Service
Reform Act in the early 1990s, the Public Service Modernization Act was
a very comprehensive piece of legislation. For example, in addition to
pushing for more extensive delegation of staffing and redefining merit,
the act also provided for the automatic conversion of term employees
into indeterminate status after a specified period of time, without giving
grounds for appeal. The first part of the act enacted an entirely new
Public Service Labour Relations Act, which, among other measures,
established a new Public Service Labour Relations Board and mandated
the establishment of departmental labour-management committees.
Moreover, because of the political climate at the time, a portion of the
parliamentary'debates centred on the need for better protection of civil
servants who disclose wrongdoing in the workplace (whistleblowing),
even though the issue was not part of the bill. Workplace harassment
was another issue raised by some parliamentarians. Wrhile we have not
examined them here, some of these issues and measures also met with
opposition and motivated several amendment proposals. However,
in the end, the government resisted most of the proposals and the
legislation was adopted without much difficulty.
Merit as the Essential Mandate: 1993-2008 217
During these public debates on staffing reform, the Public Service
Commission, as it had done with the Public Service Reform Act in the
early 1990s, defended the need for greater efficiency. As its president,
Scott Serson, argued before the House of Commons committee
studying the bill,
The proposed legislation offers an opportunity to increase the
flexibility of the staffing system so that managers can respond
quickly to the evolving needs of Canadians. This change is needed,
and we support it. Increased staffing authority for deputy heads
and the greater discretion for managers contained in the bill is
counterbalanced with measures to safeguard against such abuses as
political and bureaucratic patronage. It is a significant challenge to
find the right balance between flexibility and fairness.80 (emphasis
added)
In other words, while not perfect, the new act seemed to strike a
difficult but reasonable balance between efficiency and equity.
Despite its support for the bill, the PSC nevertheless suggested
some amendments.81 Some of them sought to further strengthen the
independence of the commission and tighten its ties to Parliament.
For instance, the commission proposed that Parliament play a greater
role in setting its budget, pointing out that negotiating its annual
resources with the Treasury Board, the employer of public servants,
was an uncomfortable position for an independent parliamentary
agency in charge of overseeing and auditing staffing by departmental
managers. It also suggested that Parliament weigh in on the criteria to
be used for the selection of commissioners and it requested the right
to table occasional special reports on emerging issues facing the public
service in its areas of responsibility. Finally, the commission also asked
to be given the authority to audit departmental practices regarding
the establishment of staffing requirements (for example, essential
qualifications, organizational needs and operational requirements) and
to take or order corrective actions as a result of audits. Some' of these
proposed amendments were adopted, such as the right to issue special
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reports and the right to audit managerial use of staffing requirements,
while the others were ignored. However, the commission's proposed
amendments were clearly aimed at improving the bill on the margins
in the hope of striking a better balance between efficiency and fairness.
They did not constitute a disavowal of the reform's essential intent or
the bill's main provisions.
In the end, having survived the reforms with its staffing authority
intact and a stronger affirmation of its institutional independence,
the commission had reason to be comfortable with the overall thrust
of the institutional reforms. While the loss of its training services, its
development programs and its appeal function left it: diminished in
some ways, the renewed focus on staffing oversight and accountability
was in keeping with the commission's direction over the last decade.
Even the new definition of merit, a bold attempt at ensuring
speedier, more flexible and more efficient staffing, was supported by
the commission. This might have been surprising, given that many
critics of the new approach were concerned about its deleterious
effect on respect for the merit principle. But, having worked over the
previous decades at maximizing the flexibility available under the old
Public Service Employment Act, the commission was well aware of the
difficulties that legal and policy constraints could cause, and it knew
that flexibility would be needed to deal with the upcoming challenges
of workforce renewal. The new approach was worth trying; it would
now be incumbent upon the commission to be effective in its renewed
oversight role in order to ensure that merit would indeed be respected
under the new system.
CONCLUSION
Over the past fifteen years, the staffing system and the Public Service
Commission have been significantly transformed. When the Chretien
government took office in 1993, the commission had just gone through
the difficult experience of Public Service 2000 and the subsequent
adoption of the Public Service Reform Act. Having survived this challenge
to its independence and with newfound flexibilities under the Public
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Service Employment Act, the PSC might have simply decided to focus
on making the most of the new measures while continuing to ensure
respect for the merit principle in staffing the public service. But instead
the decade that followed was characterized by intense efforts to rethink
the role of the PSC in the human resources management system.
The central issue was the need to strengthen the commission's
ability to demand accounts from departments for their use of their
delegated staffing authority. The commission's introduction of Staffing
Delegation and Accountability Agreements, its bold proposal set out
in the directional statement to move away from operations and HR
services to concentrate on oversight as well as the reforms of 2003,
which saw the commission actually divest itself of some of its functions
and prioritize its oversight role—all these events resulted in a progressive
shift in favour of the PSC's responsibilities as an independent oversight
body. As the staffing system as a whole increasingly moved toward the
delegation of staffing powers and responsibilities to deputy heads, the
need for the commission to concentrate on its essential mandate—
the protection of merit—became clear. Strong oversight was crucial
if merit, a foundational value of a professional public service, was to
be adequately safeguarded. This conclusion left the Public Service
Commission transformed, but with a greater clarity of purpose as it
headed toward its centenary.
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CONCLUSION
If Canada is to be reasonably well governed in the future, a
professional, non-partisan public service will be essential. For this
reason, the most important of the government's central agencies,
for the long-term, is not in my view the Privy Council Office, the
Treasury Board, or the Department of Finance, dearly though I love
them all. It is the Public Service Commission. If the professionalism
of the Public Service and its attractiveness to successive generations
of talented young Canadians are to be preserved, it is essential that
responsibility for the staffing of government positions continues to be
vested in an agency whose independence is guaranteed by statute.'
Arthur Kroeger, former deputy minister
In his book on the development of the American public service,
Stephan Skowronek described the establishment of the U.S. Civil
Service Commission as "nothing less than a recasting of the foundations
of national institutional power."2 To some extent, the same claim can
be made for the establishment of the Public Service Commission in
Canada. The adoption of a merit-based staffing system, entrusted to
an independent commission, not only changed the balance of power
between Parliament and the Crown over the control of the bureaucracy,
and the balance of power between ministers and public servants within
the executive, but also entailed the adoption of new norms, such as
political neutrality and professionalism, which have shaped the identity
of the public service and its behaviour in the governance of Canada
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over the last century. The historical significance of this choice and the
lasting impact that it has had on Canadian government and public
administration should not be forgotten or underestimated.
While the same basic institutional architecture has remained
constant over the past 100 years, as we have shown in this book, the
ideal of merit, along with the independence of the PSC itself, has been
contested from the very beginning. The commission's independence
was first criticized on constitutional grounds—political appointments
being regarded as a matter of Crown prerogative and ministerial
responsibility—and then came to be seen by many as an impediment
to efficiency and effective management. Over the years, the dominant
definition of merit and the rules used to put it in operation have been
challenged on various grounds: the need for the bureaucracy to be more
responsive to elected officials, the democratic equality of citizens, the
need for better representation of underrepresented groups in the public
service, the fundamental right of public servants to participate in the
political process, the efficient use of public resources and the need for
better management. As an ideal, merit has never been straightforward:
its exact meaning, its practical implications and even its desirability
have been disputed throughout its history. Consequently, much more
than a simple search for the "best qualified," the merit system has always
been an awkward attempt to balance competing sets of values and
respond to some of the political demands placed on the staffing system
of a public service in a liberal democracy. To a great extent, the history
of the PSC has been a continuing endeavour to strike an appropriate
balance among these competing values and demands, adapting as both
Canadian society and the role of the public service have evolved over
time.
Throughout its history, the PSC has been both an agent of change
and a voice of caution, seeking to ensure that some of the core values
of the Canadian public service would not be sacrificed in the pursuit
of immediate priorities. For example, in the 1960s; and 1970s, the
PSC readily embraced the promotion of underrepresented groups and
bilingualism in recognition of the growing importance of these realities
for the governance of Canadian society. Since the 1970s, through the
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delegation of authority to departments and its contribution to legislative
reforms, it has actively sought to increase managerial flexibility in
recognition of growing political demands for a more adaptable and
efficient public service. In these instances and others, the PSC has fully
understood the need for change, and acted either on its own initiative
or in response to centrally driven proposals.
However, in other instances, the commission's desire and support
for change has unquestionably been measured. While recognizing the
need to adapt to changing realities, in particular to answer elected
officials' calls for more efficiency, it has also played a key institutional
role in reminding politicians and public servants seeking reform of
the importance of some of the core values, such as political neutrality
and equity, that have historically been served by the staffing system.
Throughout its history, the PSC has periodically acted as a brake on
reformers' attempts at transforming staffing rules in order to meet the
imperatives of efficiency and responsiveness. This institutional role may
not be unique, but it is rather exceptional in the public service. While
some other institutional actors, notably the clerk of the Privy Council,
are entrusted with upholding the core principles and values of Canada's
Constitution, the PSC has a unique responsibility for safeguarding
the key values that the merit-based staffing regime was originally
designed to breathe into the public service. Historically, the PSC has
endeavoured to play this important but difficult institutional role. In
doing so, it has played an invaluable role in shaping the evolution of the
Canadian public service and in defining the role of public servants in
the democratic governance of the country.
Over the years, the commission's independence, inscribed in
statute, has been an important asset allowing it to play this role. At
various points in time, the commission has relied on its statutory
independence to resist political pressures on behalf of departments, to
voice a dissenting opinion about proposed staffing reforms, and to resist
changes that it believed would unduly compromise such core principles
of the public service as professionalism and political neutrality. For this
reason, while the ambivalent institutional position of the PSC—at once
an independent agency exercising executive authority over staffing and
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an oversight body reporting directly to Parliament on the integrity of
the merit-based staffing system—has been the subject of much criticism
over the years, our examination of the commission's history leads us to
believe that this dual personality has served it, and the public service,
rather well.
It is doubtful that a simple parliamentary agency dedicated to the
oversight of staffing—the preferred model of many reformers in the
past—could ever have been as effective a check on political pressures for
appointments or as effective a voice defending the core values of merit in
public and internal debates. The ambivalent constitutional position of
the commission, while somewhat unorthodox, has been a powerful asset
that has allowed it to remain closer to the realities of departments while
giving it sufficient independence and distance from the government,
when the circumstances called for it, to fulfill its unique mandate.
Staffing a public organization as large and diverse as the public service
of Canada is sufficiently complex, and merit sufficiently contested, that
combining aspects of regulation, service delivery and audit in an agency
like the PSC has proven to be a durable invention.
Moreover, the PSC's statutory independence has provided the
Canadian public service with a more resilient institutional arrangement
to safeguard its merit system. The commission's independence certainly
has not insulated it, or the merit system, from change. As we have
seen, the PSC has changed considerably over its history, acquiring and
shedding responsibilities for the delivery of various staffing services
and modifying its relationship to departments significantly. The merit
system has also been considerably transformed, through policy as well as
legislation. But through it all, the PSC has maintained a unique degree
of independence and successfully fought off attempts to curtail its
authority, and, consequently, it has remained a strong and independent
voice in the staffing regime of the Canadian public service.
AN EXCEPTIONAL RESILIENCE
The longevity and continued influence of the PSC is particularly notable
in light of the fact that its counterparts in other Anglo-American
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democracies do not seem to have fared as well in the face of similar
pressures for greater managerial flexibility, efficiency and political
responsiveness. Commenting on the evolution in the past few decades of
staffing systems in these countries, noted scholar Peter Aucoin observed
that the "once powerful central agencies for public service staffing and
human resource management were greatly diminished in their authority,
functions and influence. In every instance, they lost their exclusive
authority over public service staffing."3 In fact, Britain, Australia,
New Zealand and the United States have all significantly transformed
their personnel management regimes in the last thirty years and their
independent staffing bodies traditionally tasked with the protection and
implementation of the merit system have suffered as a result.
In the United States, the Civil Service Commission was abolished
with the adoption of the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978. Having
been elected on a promise to reform the public service staffing system,
President Jimmy Carter quickly began to introduce changes that would
make the American civil service more flexible, efficient and responsive
to the president.4 Hie Civil Service Commission's functions were
distributed to a trio of new offices, including a new Office of Personnel
Management, controlled by the president. While a commitment to
the merit principle remained, its protection was left essentially to the
new Merit Systems Protection Board, which can hear appeals and
investigate alleged violations of the law. The third major organization
that emerged from the 1978 reforms was the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, which took over all the labour relations responsibilities of
the Civil Service Commission. These reforms were a clear blow to the
independence of the American public service.5
Australia and New Zealand have adopted similar reforms. The
Australian Board of Commissioners was abolished in 1987. It was
replaced by a new Public Service Commission that was entrusted only
with authority for setting policy in some areas, such as recruitment
and promotion, and with responsibilities for the senior management
category. To enhance flexibility and efficiency, most personnel
management powers were transferred to departments. Bob Minns, the
author of an extensive study on the evolution of staffing legislation in
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Australia, asserts that one of the reasons for the "sudden and abrupt
disappearance of the Board as a powerful, central agency" was that both
ministers and senior executives of the public service sometimes felt
aggrieved by its public expression of independent views and believed
that it encroached on their prerogatives over the management of
the public service.6 New Zealand also did away with its commission
in 1988 in order to emphasize performance-based management and
increase the responsiveness of public servants to the political executive.
The new body, the State Services Commission, no longer appoints all
public servants but rather focuses on the selection and appointment of
the chief executives of the public service.7
Even Britain, the birthplace of the merit system among Anglo-
American democracies, has abandoned its original, more powerful and
independent Civil Service Commission. It was transformed into a new
Civil Service Commission, composed of twelve part-time commissioners
appointed by the government from outside the public service, with few
powers and only modest executive responsibilities for staffing the public
service.8 While it publishes a Recruitment Code describing expected
standards for merit-based staffing, the new commission does not make
appointments itself, a responsibility that now falls to departments
and agencies. Instead, the commission now hires a consulting firm to
audit departmental staffing practices and uses its findings to comment
publicly on the state of departmental staffing. According to British
scholar Richard Chapman, the original commission was abandoned
because its critics saw it as being out of touch, unresponsive and, in a
sense, concerned with the problems of a much earlier era in government.
Politicians saw it as an impediment to pursuing an ambitious reform
agenda driven by the need for greater managerial flexibility. In other
words, it was killed by an "increasing emphasis on a private sector
approach to management in Government."9
In these countries, the principle of merit-based appointment has
not been abandoned, but it has been changed substantially to meet
the growing demand that bureaucracies be more efficient and results-
oriented, more in tune with the practices of private sector management,
and more responsive to elected politicians. In all cases, the historical
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role of the independent staffing agency has come to an end. Over
the years, the Canadian public service has faced the same kinds of
pressures and its personnel management regime has been transformed
as a result. But as an independent agency with staffing authority, the
PSC has not suffered the same fate. In comparison with the other
commissions, it has remained truer to the original model. Its role has
been refocused and its policies have been adapted to the new context,
but it has maintained a stronger, more independent presence in the
staffing of the professional public service than its equivalents in other
Anglo-American democracies. The statutory basis for its independence
undoubtedly explains this greater resilience to a large extent, but the
willingness of its leadership to adapt to new circumstances over the
years while still defending the core values at the heart of its mandate
have also contributed significantly to this outcome.
LOOKING AHEAD
As it reaches its centenary, the PSC continues to face considerable,
but familiar challenges. The complete effects of the Public Service
Modernization Act, which only fully came into force at the end of 2005,
have not yet been felt. The PSC is still working with departments to forge
a new relationship that will see it devote a larger share of its efforts to the
oversight of staffing. The new definition of merit, inscribed in legislation
for the first time, also represents a historical change with uncertain
implications. The commission will no doubt devote considerable
attention to how this shift toward more managerial flexibility will affect
the treatment of employees, as well as the professionalism of the public
service. Moreover, as the public service as a whole attempts to renew
its workforce in the face of an impending wave of retirements and to
attract young knowledge workers in a highly competitive labour market,
the commission is likely to face new pressures to adapt its practices and
policies.
Only a few years after the adoption of the Public Service Moder-
nization Act, the government established a high-level taskforce to look
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once more into needed reforms to the public service. In February
2008, releasing its second report, the Prime Minister's Advisory
Committee on the Public Service, co-chaired by former clerk of the
Privy Council Paul Tellier and former Mulroney cabinet minister Don
Mazankowski, again took aim at the central governance structure for
human resources management, describing it as "overly complex" and
resulting in a "burden of duplicative and often unnecessary rules."10
Thus, despite the major reorganization brought by the Public Service
Modernization Act, the advisory committee has expressed the view that
further structural changes are essential. This time, however, the Public
Service Commission has been spared: the advisory committee has
simply reaffirmed the essential role of the commission in the safeguard
of merit and the non-partisan character of the public service. It has
merely suggested that the remaining services offered by the commission
should be operated on a full cost-recovery basis and that deputy
ministers should be appropriately involved in their governance. The
advisory committee has not recommended further institutional reform
affecting the commission's role or independence.
Instead, the advisory committee has argued essentially for a
disentanglement of the responsibilities of the Canada Public Service
Agency and the Treasury Board Secretariat. The committee would
like to take the 2003 reorganization further by transferring human
resources-related matters to a more unified and smaller human resources
central agency. In effect, the Treasury Board Secretariat would lose its
responsibilities for classification and compensation policy and focus
exclusively on expenditure control. With.the Canada School of Public
Service remaining in charge of delivering training and development
courses and the Privy Council Office continuing to ensure talent
management for the deputy head community, a smaller Canada Public
Service Agency would be the exclusive source of human resources
policy, except in the area of staffing. Continuing to rely on a strong
delegation model, the agency would be expected to set expectations,
provide as light an operating framework as possible, and then ensure
accountability for performance from departmental heads. In effect, the
advisory committee seems to be arguing for more of the same, wanting
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to push further, in the same direction, the institutional reforms adopted
in 2003. The committee's recommendations seem to suggest that the
system is at peace, at least for now, with the PSC's new orientation and
its role in the human resources framework of the public service.
But in fact, given the trends across Western democracies, it may
well be that the value and necessity of the PSC will again be challenged
in the years ahead on the most fundamental issue that led to its
creation: political control over the public service. As many scholars have
observed, the past few decades have seen the politicization of the public
administrations in many industrialized democracies.11 While an uneasy
tension always exists between the neutrality and independence of a
professional public service and the need for a public service to respond
effectively and loyally to the direction of elected officials, there has been
a distinct rise in the desire of politicians to expand their control of
the public service. American scholar Ezra Suleiman points out that the
bureaucracy is increasingly regarded as being solely the instrument of
the political party in power and that it is being transformed accordingly,
increasingly deprived of the relative autonomy that it has enjoyed
historically.12 There has been a cultural shift and "the attempt to gain
control of the bureaucracy by an elected government is no longer viewed
as objectionable."13
According to Jon Pierre and Guy Peters, who have surveyed the
trends in a dozen countries, managerial reforms designed to improve
efficiency, from the creation of quasi-autonomous agencies to the
adoption of performance-based accountability systems, have in many
cases led to the politicization of public administrations.14 It has also been
observed that the face of patronage is changing: increasingly, elected
officials look to reward the loyalty of key allies, including senior public
servants, who share their objectives, style and ideology, irrespective of
their formal partisan history or attachment. Alongside more traditional
political patronage (i.e., appointments of allies from the outside), this
form of politicization (i.e., internal promotion of allies) is a significant
phenomenon in many countries, such as France and Japan.15 As well,
in some countries, as a result of an increase in the number of political
staffers and changes to staffing legislation, many public employees no
longer fall within the purview of the merit system.
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While the pressures for politicization might not have been as
prevalent in Canada as in some other countries, Canada has not
been immune from them. At least as far back as the government of
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, elected officials have sought to establish better
political control over policy decisions.16 As we have seen, it was also
an important preoccupation of Brian Mulroney's government in the
late 1980s. And, referring to the more recent past, scholar Donald
Savoie has condemned the rise of "court government," a concentration
of decision-making power in the hands of the prime minister and a
handful of courtiers to the detriment of the established policy process
operated by the public service.17 He has expressed concern that political
interference in program management and day-to-day operations of the
public service is on the rise.18 Marshalling a wide range of evidence
and opinions, he argues that the relationship between public servants
and politicians has been broken, and that the Constitution should be
amended to clearly carve out a space of autonomy for the public service
in the governance of the country. Legislative reform should establish
without doubt that the public service has a distinct personality from
the government and should give it the legal means to resist "instructions
from elected politicians to perform essentially political acts."19 Clearly,
excessive politicization is also an issue of contemporary significance in
Canada.
Politicization is a complex and multi-faceted issue that clearly
goes beyond staffing. However, at its core, it indisputably involves
the erosion of the political neutrality and independence of the
public service and challenges the conception of the public service as
a hierarchical meritocracy.20 And, as we have seen, the staffing of the
public service on the basis of merit has historically been a central pillar
of the independence of the public service. Politicization is therefore an
issue that necessarily speaks to the staffing regime and the purpose of
the Public Service Commission. As Canadians and their government
wrestle with the difficult issue of the political control of the public
service, it may very well become necessary for the PSC to defend, once
again, the value of an independent, neutral and competent public
administration to democratic government.
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In the context of such a debate, it will be useful to remind ourselves
of the fact that one of the main reasons the merit system was adopted,
and the PSC created, was to provide elected officials with a more
effective tool for implementing the democratic will. The goal was to do
away with the dysfunctions of patronage and endow the Government
of Canada with a professional bureaucracy, effective in making and
implementing policy and dedicated to serving the political will of the
elected government, but possessing enough independence to allow it
to "speak truth to power" and resist political instructions that would
violate laws and established norms of ethical behaviour. This complex
goal, far from being opposed to the interests of our elected politicians,
is in their long-term interest. As Professor Hugh Heclo reminds us,
the "independence entailed in neutral competence ... exists precisely in
order to serve the aims of partisan leadership."21 Politicians should be
careful that, in the pursuit of more immediate objectives, they do not
end up compromising the ability of future governments, and citizens
more broadly, to rely on a professional public service that is able to best
serve the public interest.
Institutionally, the Public Service Commission will have a key role
to play in the debate. In an era of managerialism, the PSC will inevitably
have to remind politicians and public servants alike that
because a system of representative government requires officials to
act as custodians of the constitutional values it embodies, it cannot
frame the role of bureaucrats solely in terms of efficient management,
performance, responsiveness and securing results.22
Through their myriad of daily tasks and functions, public servants do
not merely deliver programs, they also administer laws and, as scholar
John Rohr has put it, they "run a constitution."23 This reality means
that staffing the public service must be subject to constraints that, while
sometimes difficult to reconcile with managerial and short-term political
objectives, serve an important purpose in the democratic governance of
the country.
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